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 Violent events involving female students symbolized the rise and fall of the New Left in 
Japan, from the death of Kanba Michiko in a mass demonstration of 1960 to the 1972 deaths 
ordered by Nagata Hiroko in a sectarian purge. This study traces how shifting definitions of 
violence associated with the student movement map onto changes in popular representations of 
the female student activist, with broad implications for the role women could play in postwar 
politics and society. 
 In considering how gender and violence figured in the formation and dissolution of the 
New Left in Japan, I trace three phases of the postwar Japanese student movement. The first 
(1957–1960) was one of idealism, witnessing the emergence of the New Left in 1957 and, within 
only a few years, some of its largest public demonstrations. Young women became new political 
actors in the postwar period, their enfranchisement commonly represented as a break from and a 
bulwark against "male" wartime violence. The participation of females in the student movement 
after its split from the Old Left of the Japan Communist Party in 1957 served to legitimize the 
anger of the New Left by appealing to the hegemonic ideal of young women's political purity. 
Chapter one introduces the postwar context in which female students represented, in both works 
of fiction and reportage, new ideals for citizen participation and agency. The 1960 death of 
activist Kanba Michiko at the frontline of a climactic protest against renewal of the US-Japan 
Security Treaty (Anpo) won an extraordinary amount of public sympathy for the student 
	  
 
movement as a whole in the early 1960s. Kanba stepped into a narrative, forged in the mass 
media, of young women as victims of violence. However, when considered as an individual, 
Kanba is far more complicated and even aggressively radical. Chapter two traces the processes 
by which Kanba Michiko became an icon of New Left sacrifice and the fragility of postwar 
democracy. It introduces Kanba's own writings to underscore the ironic discrepancy between her 
public significance and her personal relationship to radical politics 
. A phase of backlash (1960–1967) followed the explosive rise of Japan's New Left. 
During the early and mid-1960s, both leftists and conservatives engaged in a series of seemingly 
disparate debates about the political place of women, countering ideals of female purity and 
political utility. In the wake of the 1959–1960 mass demonstrations opposing Anpo and the death 
of Kanba Michiko, government policies focused on national economic growth sought to quiet the 
recent tempest of street activism. Chapter three introduces some key tabloid debates that 
suggested female presence in social institutions such as universities held the potential to "ruin the 
nation." The powerful influence of these frequently sarcastic but damaging debates, echoed in 
government policies re-linking young women to domestic labor, confirmed mass media's 
importance in interpreting the social role of the female student. Although the student movement 
imagined itself as immune to the logic of the state and the mass media, the practices of the late-
1960s campus-based student movement, examined in chapter four, illustrate how larger societal 
assumptions about gender roles undergirded the gendered hierarchy of labor that emerged in the 
barricades. I frame these practices as a kind of backlash in light of the theoretical importance of 
the writings of Tokoro Mitsuko to the organizational ideals of the late-1960s student movement. 
Tokoro, a student activist of Kanba Michiko's generation, proposed to bring nonviolent and 
nurturing feminine values to the student movement as a whole. Although Tokoro's ideas of a 
	  
 
non-hierarchical leftist organization influenced the student movement of the late 1960s, opening 
up a moment of potential liberation for female student activists from the strict gender codes 
solidifying in Japan's increasingly rationalized economy and society, the dichotomy of 
"violence" versus "nurturing" created a new hierarchy in the campus-based student movement of 
1968–1969. 
 The final phase (1969–1972) of the student New Left was dominated by two imaginary 
rather than real female figures, and is best emblematized by the notion of  “Gewalt."  I use the 
German term for violence, Gewalt, because of its peculiar resonances within the student 
movement of the late 1960s. Japanese students employed a transliteration—gebaruto—to 
distinguish their "counter-violence" from the violence employed by the state. However, the mass 
media soon picked up on the term and reversed its polarities in order to disparage the students' 
actions. It was in this late-1960s moment that women, once considered particularly vulnerable to 
violence, became deeply associated with active incitement to violence. In the case of Japan's 
New Left , the imaginary embodiment of the rationalized liberal social order and the target of the 
radical student movement's anger was not "the Man," but "Mama." The conservative order that 
stepped in after the Anpo demonstrations to organize social life around national economic 
strength linked women with motherhood and the household, and knitted each household in turn 
to the Japanese nation. Chapter five explores how student activists' rejection of "Mama" led to an 
embrace of a particularly masculinist ideal of violence, aligning the student left in many ways 
with the logic of the far right. Chapter six explores how the mass media, on the other hand, 
coded female student activism in particular as both terrifying and titillating through its imaginary 
construction of the "Gewalt Rosa" (Violent Rosa). By 1970, public sympathy, which had sided 
with the student movement when its members seemed like victims of state violence, faded in the 
	  
 
wake of increasingly violent poses and tactics on the part of the New Left. Demonstrating the 
shifting meaning of the politics of protest, by the end of the 1960s, few Japanese would have 
entertained the idea that female students were politically innocent, much less peaceful by nature. 
 Throughout these three phases, violence may have changed in form, but it provided a 
common means of pursuing political goals as well as evaluating their significance. The social 
meaning created by the relationship between female students and violence and disseminated 
through the mass media critically influenced public reception of student activism. When, in 
1972, the mass media revealed a leftist group's bloody internal purge, it marked the definitive 
"death" of the New Left. The female leader of the group, Nagata Hiroko, stepped all too 
conveniently into existing media formulations of the "Gewalt Rosa", leading to a general 
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  This is the story of one of the most violent but least understood student movements of the 
twentieth century. In the 1960s, few industrialized nations escaped the eruption of student 
radicalism. In Japan as elsewhere, the student New Left battled police in the streets, disrupted 
hundreds of campuses, paralyzed the higher education system, and challenged political institutions. 
More than any other single factor, female participation defined the postwar student movement in 
Japan and its relationship to the public. Indeed, I argue that female participation is what made the 
New Left "new" in the popular imagination. Violent events involving female students symbolized 
the rise and fall of the New Left in Japan, from the death of Kanba Michiko in a mass 
demonstration of 1960 to the 1972 deaths ordered by Nagata Hiroko in a sectarian purge. This study 
traces how shifting definitions of violence associated with the student movement map onto changes 
in popular representations of the female student activist, with broad implications for the roles 
women could play in postwar politics and society. The title of my study, "Coed Revolution," 
emphasizes the newly coeducational character of many universities and of student activism in 1960s 
Japan, while underlining also that the female "coed" represented a potentially revolutionary figure. 
The English-language "coed" also carries reactionary valences that make it my favored translation 
for the Japanese term joshigakusei (female student). This literally means "girl student," and I 
translate this term as the English term "coed" to convey the various implications of secondary status 
conferred by the term joshigakusei in the context of postwar debates on coeducation. Both terms 
imply that the position of the female student was supplementary and particular in contrast to the 
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primary and normative position of the male student, who is referred to simply as a gakusei 
(student), unburdened by the gendered qualifier. 
 This story is not about a "women's movement." However, it is about women who moved: 
into formerly all-male institutions of education, into street protests, into campus barricades. The 
following chapters tell the story of the New Left in postwar Japan from its formation in the late 
1950s to its dissolution in the early 1970s through the figure of the female student with the goal 
of assessing how gender influenced the political possibilities of radical politics in postwar Japan. 
A focus on the role of female student activists in the dynamic protest movements of the 1960s 
allows us to answer broader questions that are key both to a history of women in modern Japan 
and to the global history of 1960s student activism and 1970s feminism. 
 Postwar reforms in Japan create the context for my history. The Allied Occupation of 
Japan (1945–1952) inaugurated a gendered political culture that construed female participation 
in an essentializing way, specifically understanding females as non-violent. Japan's wartime 
experience and the particular ways in which women were imagined to figure in its resolution 
offered women a privileged place from which to speak as new citizens. Furthermore, progressive 
advocates of democracy and women's suffrage attributed feminine characteristics to postwar 
democracy itself. After democratic reforms ended the longstanding government ban on 
coeducation beyond the primary level in 1947, the female college student tested the limits of 
democratic citizenship. While she embodied the new citizenship ideal of a pacifist postwar 
society, she also threatened received social hierarchies in formerly all-male social institutions 
and, in the eyes of the male gatekeepers of those institutions, harbored a terrifying potential for 
radical violence. Policy changes formed the postwar order that I examine. However, I do not 
wish to overemphasize a sense of rupture with the pre-1945 past. I approach this project along 
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both diachronic and synchronic lines, situating the figure of the female student in Japan's New 
Left within the longer history of Japanese women as well as within the growing scholarship on 
protest in the global 1960s. 
 A key goal of this project is to unsettle a clear "Left to Lib" trajectory, in which women, 
ostensibly not addressed in the "men's" New Left movement of the 1960s, supposedly formed 
their own movement, "women's lib," in the 1970s.1 As Kathleen Uno has argued of "first-wave" 
and "second-wave" feminists in Japan, "the personal and organizational ties between first- and 
second-wave activists [caution us] against assuming a great disjuncture between pre- and post-
1970 women's movements."2 My project likewise demonstrates that no "great disjuncture" 
existed between the frequently sexist and self-consciously masculine student movement and the 
later emergence of women-only activism. It seeks instead to uncover a dynamic history in which 
a student movement composed of both male and female students, created by postwar policies of 
coeducation, negotiated rapidly changing ideals of femininity and masculinity. So far there has 
been little scholarly analysis of how female participation operated within the 1960s student 
movement in Japan, although a common complaint voiced by feminists in the 1970s indicted the 
late 1960s movement for relegating young women behind the university barricades to kitchen 
duty. Even more damning were accounts of sexual assault.3 The facts involved are true enough. 
However, the historiographic commonplace that the student New Left of 1968–1969 was a male 
movement and that the subsequent women's liberation movement of the early 1970s was a 
women's movement does little to explain why student activism, which actually succeeded in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See, for example, Vera Mackie, Feminism in Modern Japan: Citizenship, Embodiment, and Sexuality 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
2 Kathleen Uno, “The Death of 'Good Wife, Wise Mother'?," in Postwar Japan as History, ed. Andrew 
Gordon (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 312. 
3 Oguma Eiji, “Dai 17 Shō: Ribu to ‘Watashi,’” in 1968, vol. 2, 2 vols. (Tokyo: Shinyōsha, 2009). 
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mobilizing many young women, including a number who went on to participate as feminist 
activists, may have inspired the future strategies of women's lib, but ultimately failed to 
incorporate young women's political interests. As the present study reveals, female students' 
participation in radical activism alongside male students influenced the theories and strategies of 
the New Left, and contributed to a rise in young women's consciousness of everyday sexism. 
Guy Yasko, in his examination of the philosophy of campus-based activism in Japan, noted that 
the " history of women's thought and struggle were essential ingredients" of late-1960s student 
radicalism.4 However, his study does not incorporate an analysis of how those "essential 
ingredients" became erased in the course of the movement. I offer here an examination of 
gender—not only femininity but also masculinity—within the Japanese student movement of the 
1960s in order to illuminate the processes by which "women's issues" fell out of the New Left. 
 Scholars such as Setsu Shigematsu on radical women's lib and Patricia Steinhoff on 
extreme leftist sects have noted that the violent dissolution of the New Left in Japan had 
everything to do with gender.5 As Shigematsu demonstrates, a feminist critique of the 
masculinist practices of the student movement provided the theoretical foundation of radical 
women's lib, which also strove to understand the violent potential of women, as demonstrated by 
female leftist activists.6 Critically, Shigematsu offers a close examination of the thought and 
practices of Tanaka Mitsu, a key women's-lib theorist, whom previous accounts of activism 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Guy Yasko, “The Japanese Student Movement 1968-70: The Zenkyōtō Uprising" (Dissertation, Cornell 
University, 1997), 21. 
5 Setsu Shigematsu, Scream from the Shadows: The Women's Liberation Movement in Japan (University 
Of Minnesota Press, 2012). Patricia Steinhoff, “Death by Defeatism and Other Fables: The Social 
Dynamics of the Rengō Sekigun Purge," in Japanese Social Organization, ed. Takie Sugiyama Lebra 
(University of Hawaii Press, 1992); Patricia Steinhoff, “Three Women Who Loved the Left: Radical 
Women Leaders in the Japanese Red Army Movement," in Re-Imaging Japanese Women, ed. Anne 
Imamura (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996). 
6 Shigematsu, Scream from the Shadows, 159. 
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frequently cited but rarely analyzed.7 Steinhoff, while arguing that women rose to positions of 
power in the far-left Japan Red Army only when male leaders could not fulfill their duties, also 
noted the sexist media frenzy that interpreted their leftist violence for popular consumption.8 By 
contrast, my study suggests that ideas about gender, violence, and the role of both in a politics of 
dissent were crucial considerations for the New Left in Japan from its very inception. 
 By showing how female participation made the New Left "new" in the Japanese case, I 
argue for a gendered understanding of radical politics in postwar Japan. My use of the term 
"New Left" borrows an Anglophone expression to describe a larger global phenomenon. In the 
United States, Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) adopted the term New Left in 1963 from 
previous British usage, defining a break from the "Old Left" of institutionalized Communist and 
Social Democratic parties and a commitment to such concerns as social equality, antimilitarism, 
and antiracism.9 I use the same term to describe the main current of student leftism in Japan after 
the late-1950s break from the Japan Communist Party (JCP). Although "women's issues" at no 
point constituted a major part of the movement's concerns, female participation defined the 
postwar student movement as distinct from prewar iterations, and influenced public reception of 
its actions. As Henry Smith has noted in his study of the prewar student left at Tokyo Imperial 
University, two key factors that distinguished the postwar student movement from its 
predecessors were a disassociation from the Japan Communist Party and a willingness to resort 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Dorothy Robins-Mowry, The Hidden Sun: Women of Modern Japan (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 
1983), 134; Uno, “The Death of 'Good Wife, Wise Mother'?," 312; Mackie, Feminism in Modern Japan, 
144. 
8 Steinhoff, “Death by Defeatism"; Steinhoff, “Three Women Who Loved the Left." 
9 Todd Gitlin, The Whole World Is Watching: Mass Media in the Making and Unmaking of the New Left 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2003), 293. 
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to physical combat.10 In passing, Smith also mentions the presence of female students as a 
distinctive feature of postwar activism.11 I choose to understand all three forms of difference as 
mutually interrelated, and indeed crucial to understanding how the student movement in postwar 
Japan organized itself and operated within the popular imagination. To approach social 
movements from the perspective of gender is to reevaluate in a fundamental way the political 
dynamics of the postwar order. 
 Although it is possible, as Takemasa Ando has done, to expand the definition of the New 
Left in Japan to include citizens' and workers' groups, I limit my project to the student 
movement.12 Not only did the phrase "student power" become a powerful rallying cry among 
expanding university populations worldwide by the late 1960s, but examining a postwar student 
New Left across generations of activists and causes between 1957 and 1972 reveals significant 
shifts in the social meaning of activism at large. Many scholarly works on activism in 1960s 
Japan frame their research around either the 1960 mass demonstrations surrounding revision of 
the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty or, alternatively, the late-1960s flurry of protest against the 
Vietnam War that resonated with similar aesthetic, cultural, and activist cultures globally. 
Wesley Sasaki-Uemura has shown how 1960 protests centered around Tokyo "marked a 
paradigm shift in social movements away from ideologies of class struggle and mass movements 
dominated by workers and the opposition parties to smaller, diverse movements based on 
citizens as the main actor."13 Simon Avenell has recently returned to the protest movement of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Henry DeWitt Smith, Japan's First Student Radicals, First Edition (Harvard University Press, 1972), 
284. 
11 Ibid., 274. 
12 Takemasa Ando, Japan's New Left Movements: Legacies for Civil Society (Routledge, 2013), 2. 
13 Wesley Sasaki-Uemura, Organizing the Spontaneous: Citizen Protest in Postwar Japan (Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press, 2001), 2. 
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1960 to discuss how the defeat of the anti-Treaty citizens' protests inspired new modes of citizen 
activism.14 My work draws on the above understandings of how a new citizen ethos arose in the 
course of the 1960 protests and its aftermath. My examination of the New Left reveals how 
critical gendered social meanings and roles became not only for progressives, but also for radical 
critiques of civil society from both the left and the right in the 1960s. In focusing on the student 
left and particularly the role of female participation in that movement, I demonstrate the ways in 
which young women activists both defined the model postwar citizen and also threatened that 
ideal.  
 The swirl of discourses around the "coed" citizen in the 1960s had connotations beyond 
gender and schooling with roots that traversed the ostensible rupture of 1945. Much like the 
Modern Girl of the late 1920s, influentially discussed by Barbara Sato and Miriam Silverberg, 
the coed was as much a creation of the mass media as she was a real person.15 If, as Silverberg 
put it, the "Modern Girl appeared during a historical juncture" in which Japanese women acted as 
"consumers, producers, legal subjects, and political activists," the postwar coed stood at a 
similarly momentous historical juncture, with the critical difference that she was a newly minted 
citizen and, at least early on in the postwar period, considered a particularly pacifistic political 
subjectivity.16 Postwar reforms transformed the institutional landscape within which the female 
student accessed public spaces previously forbidden to her. However, conservative reactions to 
the "coed" in the 1960s often repeated earlier reactions to the appearance of the "Modern Girl" in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Simon Avenell, Making Japanese Citizens: Civil Society and the Mythology of the Shimin in Postwar 
Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010), 
http://public.eblib.com/EBLPublic/PublicView.do?ptiID=570670. 
15 Barbara Hamill Sato, The New Japanese Woman: Modernity, Media, and Women in Interwar Japan 
(Durham [N.C.]: Duke University Press, 2003); Miriam Rom Silverberg, Erotic Grotesque Nonsense: The 
Mass Culture of Japanese Modern Times (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006). 
16 Silverberg, Erotic Grotesque Nonsense, 65. 
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urban landscapes. The female student became a representative of both the potential and the threat 
of consumer culture and social revolution in the mass media. 
 Recent scholarship on female political activism in the Meiji Period (1868–1912) 
demonstrates that a lack of "citizenship" does not categorically bar women from civil society.17 
However, as Marnie Anderson argues, gender constituted a key criterion of one's fitness to 
participate in formal channels of politics under the modern constitutional order. Anderson finds 
the 1890 Law on Political Association and Assembly banning women from joining political 
parties and attending political events to be a "foundation stone of the modern Japanese state."18 
Although in 1922 women were finally allowed to attend political meetings, they would not gain 
the right to vote or to join political parties until postwar constitutional reforms revolutionized 
political life. Another reform that postwar authorities instituted alongside women's suffrage was 
a new policy encouraging coeducation, which overturned a longstanding government ban on 
educating boys and girls together beyond primary school. My project explores not the history but 
rather the consequences of changes in access to formerly all-male institutions of education and 
modes of political activism. 
 In the high-growth era in Japan, gender difference became important in social and 
political discourse at the precise moment that other fraught social differences, such as class and 
ethnicity, were elided in favor of a myth of a classless, homogenous nation of Japanese citizen-
subjects. "Women" became the key particularity as a symbol for a host of anxieties about 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Elizabeth Dorn Lublin, Reforming Japan: The Woman's Christian Temperance Union in the Meiji 
Period (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010); Marnie Anderson, A Place in Public: Women's Rights in Meiji 
Japan (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center, 2010); Mara Patessio, Women and Public Life 
in Early Meiji Japan: The Development of the Feminist Movement (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Center for Japanese Studies, 2011). 
18 Anderson, A Place in Public, 53. 
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massification and democratization in higher education, even as new economic imperatives drove 
its expansion. 
 Although ostensibly included in the post-WWII definition of citizenship, sociological 
studies on the conditions facing Japanese citizens routinely excluded women. Influenced by 
American sociologists, founders of the 1955 Social Stratification and Social Mobility (SSM) 
Survey in Japan attempted to collect data on changes in class structure in Japan as economic 
growth embraced the country. They determined class mobility in patriarchal fashion, by tracing 
the changed social statuses of sons in relation to fathers. Until the mid-1980s, their sociological 
definition of the “citizen” who was or was not making class gains assumed that he was male.19 
 The idealized universal citizen of Japan's postwar democracy, by the late 1960s, was also 
middle-class. Although scholars established the SSM Survey to monitor class mobility, by the 
late 1960s, about ninety percent of respondents to the annual Survey on the People’s Life-Style 
conducted by the Prime Minister’s Office in Japan identified themselves as belonging to the 
middle, upper-middle, or lower-middle socio-economic strata.20 While many sociologists and 
economists used the language of social class to analyze dynamics within Japanese society, fewer 
people found class a meaningful category for their own lives. They were more inclined to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Shigeto Tanaka, “SSM Survey,” April 17, 2008, http://www.sal.tohoku.ac.jp/~tsigeto/ssm/e.html#85. 
Rosemary Crompton notes a similar narrowly male definition of social actors in twentieth-century 
Britain. See Rosemary Crompton, “Women’s Employment and the ‘Middle Class,’” in Social Change 
and the Middle Classes, ed. Tim Butler and Mike Savage (London: UCL Press, 1995), 58–75. 
20 William Kelly, “At the Limits of New Middle Class Japan: Beyond ‘Mainstream Consciousness,’” in 
Social Contracts under Stress: The Middle Classes of America, Europe, and Japan at the Turn of the 
Century, ed. Olivier Zunz, Leonard J Schoppa, and Nobuhiro Hiwatari (New York: Russell Sage 
Foundation, 2002), 235. Kelly articulates discursive and institutional processes that delinked “mainstream 
consciousness” from the socioeconomic situation of an actual middle-income stratum. He sees 
“complementary gender role dichotomies” as a “key ideological tenet of the ‘mainstream’” as constructed 
in the high-growth period, and as a foundation for the social contract in postwar Japan. See also Mari 
Osawa, “Twelve Million Full-Time Housewives: The Gender Consequences of Japan’s Postwar Social 
Contract,” in Social Contracts Under Stress: The Middle Classes of America, Europe, and Japan at the 
Turn of the Century, ed. Olivier Zunz, Leonard Schoppa, and Nobuhiro Hiwatari (New York: Russell 
Sage Foundation, 2002), 255–80; Uno, “The Death of ‘Good Wife, Wise Mother’?”. 
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identify with a mainstream, classless ideal of the “typical” Japanese household.21 Furthermore, in 
the wake of the failed coal miners' strikes in Miike, Kyushu in 1960, a class-struggle model for 
political protest and change came to seem outmoded. This did not mean that the uneven 
economic development so dramatically highlighted by the embattled coal miners in Japan's 
hinterlands ceased to exist.22 However, from 1960 on, the terms of organized labor shifted from 
“class struggle” to those of a shared strategy between employers and workers for affluence and 
prosperity.23 Although access to that prosperity varied in the high-growth period, and the rise of 
a civic subjectivity that transcended class did not mean that Japanese society had become 
classless, middle-class aspirations—with deeply gendered inflections and expectations—became 
a strong ideal not only within mainstream Japanese society, but also within Japan’s unions. 
 Another strong trend that emerged from the high-growth period and within the crucible of 
American Cold War policy, insistent upon Japanese ethnic distinctness from the rest of Asia, was 
to subsume difference in terms of class and ethnicity into a cultural ideal of a homogenous 
Japanese ethnos.24 Issues raised by the ongoing presence of those on the outside of a mainstream 
definition of "Japanese"—"resident Koreans" brought to Japan while subjects of the empire and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Kelly, “At the Limits of New Middle Class Japan: Beyond ‘Mainstream Consciousness,’” 234. The 
question of whether a class exists without its own self-recognition as a collective remains a persistent 
issue for Marxist and non-Marxist social sciences alike. 
22 For example, the Chikuho of northern Kyushu region remained depressed relative to the rest of the 
nation, one city – Kawasaki – reporting almost 28 percent welfare dependence in 1986, more than 
fourteen times the national rates for welfare dependence. Allen, Matthew. Undermining the Japanese 
Miracle: Work and Conflict in a Japanese Coal Mine-mining Community. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009. P. 15. 
23 These would be termed the “wages of affluence” by labor historian Andrew Gordon. See Andrew 
Gordon, The Wages of Affluence: Labor and Management in Postwar Japan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1998). 
24 Tessa Morris-Suzuki, Re-Inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), 
106–107. See Morris-Suzuki's entire chapter on race in modern Japan to see how this postwar link 
between ethnos and citizenship "narrowed possible ethnic meanings" of being a Japanese national at the 
same time that there was a "broadening of the political meaning of nationality," as, for example, with the 
inclusion of previously oppositional political positions and also women. 
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continually denied citizenship status, indigenous Ainu in the north, the historically outcast 
burakumin people—failed to spark mass debate. While class faded from popular and political 
discourse and became chiefly the province of intellectuals in the 1960s, race for the most part 
escaped the attention of the period’s scholars.25 
 A vision of an ethnically and increasingly economically homogenous society still allowed 
for—in fact, it insisted upon—difference between “mainstream” male and female roles.26 As 
historian Carol Gluck has described the postwar ideal, "The middle-class myth reaffirmed and 
regendered the family, remarginalized minorities, and reestablished a monolithic, homogenous 
society of 100 million Japanese as one putative middle class."27 Those excluded from the 
accepted standards of "Japaneseness" could not test the limits from without; the figures of 
middle-class Japanese women, however, tested the limits of access to citizen subjectivity from 
within.  
 Although the story of the postwar student movement is the story also of this expanding 
and increasingly hegemonic postwar middle class, this story, too, has transwar dimensions. As 
Mark Jones has noted of early twentieth-century Japan, "Higher education institutions, urban 
education societies, and the periodical press were a few of the arenas where the desired [middle-
class] community was created and displayed."28 This institutional configuration lasted into the 
postwar period, so that my study situates the radicalism of college students within the discursive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Yasunori Fukuoka, “Sabetsu Kenkyū,” in Sabetsu to kyShakai Hendō to Kyōikusei No Shakaigaku, ed. 
Inoue Shun et al. (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1996), 223–224. 
26 Kelly, “At the Limits of New Middle Class Japan: Beyond ‘Mainstream Consciousness,’” 239. See also 
Anne Allison, Permitted and Prohibited Desires: Mothers, Comics, and Censorship in Japan (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1996); Walter Edwards, Modern Japan Through Its Weddings: Gender, 
Person, and Society in Ritual Portrayal (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990). 
27 Carol Gluck, “The ’End" of the Postwar: Japan at the Turn of the Millennium,” Public Culture 10, no. 1 
(1997): 9. 
28 Mark A. Jones, Children as Treasures  : Childhood and the Middle Class in Early Twentieth Century 
Japan (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Asia Center, 2010), 25. 
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space of the periodical press to examine not only postwar democracy, but also the postwar 
middle-class family. In the postwar period of rapid economic growth, the middle class, long an 
economic and cultural ideal, became mainstream. By the late 1960s, about ninety percent of 
respondents to the annual Survey on the People's Lifestyle conducted by the Prime Minister's 
Office identified themselves as belonging to the middle, upper-middle, or lower-middle 
socioeconomic strata.29 But self-identification as "middle class" is as much cultural as it is 
economic, and in postwar Japan, much as in the prewar period, "middle class" identity rested on 
a gendered division of labor within the home.30 The Japanese New Left of the 1960s defined 
itself in many ways as a radical challenge to middle-class values and structures, even as more 
and more young people entered the "middle class" through expanded access to higher education. 
Gender, key to the historical definition of a middle-class lifestyle in modern Japan, therefore also 
informed postwar student critiques, although the meanings generated by gender shifted over the 
course of the period. 
 The postwar student movement was "postwar" in the chronological sense of following the 
Second World War. It was also “postwar" in how it framed its concerns, since the recent history 
of militarism informed the concerns of the Japanese student movement between the 1950s and 
1970s, and especially its relationship to violence.31 Postwar democracy became the hegemonic 
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ideal for Japanese society, but Japan's Cold War relationship to the United States often stood at 
odds with what certain people in either country would have defined as radical democracy. New 
Left activism often reacted against what students saw as hypocritical calls for "peace" within a 
larger geopolitical order of war and for social harmony within an exploitive and hierarchical 
economy. Immediately after the war, youth enjoyed a particularly privileged place as new and 
"pure" social actors. As Charles Kim has noted of the April 1960 eruption of student activism in 
South Korea,  "More so than any other social identity, the South Korean 'student' was assigned 
the moral duty of serving as the vanguard of postcolonial nation-building and postwar national 
recovery."32 While Japan's case was post-imperial rather than postcolonial, the Japanese student 
similarly enjoyed a new moral authority in 1960. That moral authority cannot be grasped fully 
without understanding its gender dynamics, as the social identity of “college student" and 
“student activist" had only recently expanded to include young women. While the growing 
violence of the late-1960s student movement has been attributed to, among other factors, an 
"excess of ethics" that student radicals felt justified intensified attacks on police, university 
property, and each other, I carefully trace the shifting relationship between popular support and 
student activism to reveal a gendered dynamic of violence and vulnerability.33 How violence and 
vulnerability intersected with gender in the student New Left defined the movement's 
relationship to its members and to the public at large, as communicated in the expanding mass 
media of the time. 
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 The discursive space of the periodical press plays an important role in framing my 
project. The expanding mass media of the 1960s, which may be seen as an informal educational 
institution that disseminated knowledge of protest to a more general readership, in many ways 
defined the social meaning of the student movement. The successes and failures of New Left 
activism hinged upon media representation. As Todd Gitlin has pointed out in his discussion of 
the historical relationship between the New Left and the mass media in the United States, 
"People directly know only tiny regions of social life." Like Gitlin, I emphasize the role of the 
mass media in “orchestrating everyday consciousness" by virtue of “their pervasiveness, their 
accessibility, [and] their centralized symbolic capacity." The vast majority of Japanese in the 
1960s, like their American counterparts,  "rel[ied] on the media for concepts, for images of their 
heroes, for guiding information, for emotional charges, for a recognition of public values, for 
symbols in general, even for language."34 Gitlin specifically traces how the mass media first 
ignored, then hystericized, and finally undermined the American student movement of the 1960s. 
I find elements of these same processes, along with significant differences, in the relationship 
between the student New Left and the mass media in Japan. Gitlin is hardly the first thinker to 
link the news media with social perceptions of daily life. Tosaka Jun, a Japanese Marxist 
philosopher, noted as early as the 1930s that the press operated as an "agent of ideology" and did 
not simply communicate, but itself constructed both the idea and content of "public opinion."35  
Although I listen also for the voices of student activists, and female student activists in 
particular, my analysis devotes sustained attention to the role of the mass media as an actor 
creating social meaning. 
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 Both Gitlin and Tosaka, writing on the mass media at different times and from different 
perspectives, include a keyword critical to recent studies of radical activism in 1960s Japan: the 
"everyday." Radical activism in several sites around the globe in the 1960s defined their battles 
around not just revolutionizing political structures, but also transforming daily life. The 
designation New Left describes not only a political, but also a cultural sensibility. Takemasa 
Ando frames his examination of changes in activism over the 1960s in terms of how New Left 
groups reacted to the "disciplinization" of everyday life, commonly referred to in Japan as 
"controlled society" (kanri shakai). Ando points out that the latter concept was not merely a 
translation of Western thinkers such as Marcuse, but also a response to the circumstances in 
which activists operated.36 William Marotti's study of artist-driven attempts to challenge the 
regulated daily life of the state, in which economic prosperity eclipsed political engagement, 
demonstrates the importance of artists in identifying "everyday" life as a key site of contestation 
in the 1960s.37 I share with Ando and Marotti a concern for the role of "everyday life" as a 
critical site for 1960s activists and also as an analytic mode for historians examining that era. 
Indeed, I find that a gendered analysis of this particularly gender-coded moment and movement 
reveals the limits to the New Left's conceptualization of "everyday life."  
 The pervasive influence of mass media in the 1960s resulted also in an acute sense of the 
synchronicity, particularly during the late 1960s, of "student power," as campus-based protests 
erupted worldwide and images of street demonstrations flew across the globe via print media as 
well as the moving images of television. Extending the chronology of the Japanese New Left 
back to the late 1950s split from the Japan Communist Party demonstrates that the late 1960s 
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wave of activism in Japan, while galvanized by US involvement in Vietnam, did not arise in 
reaction to or as a Japanese version of American counterculture.38 Indeed, the youth protests of 
1960 in Japan prompted observers to decry Japanese democracy as "immature," setting the scene 
for an ironic switch when extraparliamentary protest erupted in the democratically "mature" 
United States in the late 1960s.  
 The feminism of 1970s Japan similarly cannot be dismissed as a Western import. Neither 
should it be thought of as an inherently "feminine" reaction to the "masculine" dogmatism and 
violence of the student movement. An examination of tensions within the New Left helps 
illuminate how gender—that is, issues of femininity and masculinity—became important in the 
student movement of the 1960s. A complex interplay between essentializing gender categories 
influenced political action and its reception. How gender ideals set up hierarchies of violence and 
vulnerability need to be understood, since, as Setsu Shigematsu has pointed out, a tendency 
within certain strands of feminism to create a universalizing discourse of the victimhood of 
women can obscure the capacity of women to wield power and commit violence.39 Although the 
story of the student New Left includes cases of sexism toward women from both within the 
movement and among its observers, I will show also how assigning women the role of victims 
can obscure women's social critiques and quickly flip into a contrasting essentialist idea of 
female authority as threat to masculine vulnerability. 
 Albeit with great variation, similar "Left to Lib" narratives emerge in the wake of nearly 
every youth movement around the world considered New Left. Sara Evans pointed out over 
thirty years ago how sexism within the civil rights and radical New Left movements led to a 
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women's liberation movement in the United States.40 Collected memoirs of second-wave 
feminists assembled in the United States, Germany, and Japan reveal similar understandings of 
coming into consciousness of women's issues through New Left activism.41 While respecting 
individuals' interpretations of their own life stories, I also suggest that bringing women back into 
the story of leftist student radicalism in Japan will illuminate the role of gender in the structure of 
the New Left.42 
 In considering how gender and violence figured in the formation and dissolution of the 
New Left in Japan, I trace three phases of the postwar Japanese student movement. The first 
(1957–1960) was one of idealism, witnessing the emergence of the New Left in 1957 and, within 
only a few years, some of its largest public demonstrations. Young women became new political 
actors in the postwar period, their enfranchisement commonly represented as a break from and a 
bulwark against "male" wartime violence. The participation of females in the student movement 
after its split from the Old Left of the Japan Communist Party in 1957 served to legitimize the 
anger of the New Left by appealing to the hegemonic ideal of young women's political purity. 
Chapter One introduces the postwar context in which female students represented, in both works 
of fiction and reportage, new ideals for citizen participation and agency. The 1960 death of 
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female student activist Kanba Michiko at the frontline of a climactic protest against renewal of 
the US-Japan Security Treaty (Anpo) won an extraordinary amount of public sympathy for the 
student movement as a whole in the early 1960s. Kanba Michiko stepped into a narrative, forged 
in the mass media, of young women as victims of violence. However, when approached as an 
individual, Kanba is far more complicated and even aggressively radical. Chapter Two traces the 
processes by which Kanba became an icon of New Left sacrifice and the fragility of postwar 
democracy. It introduces Kanba's own writings to underscore the ironic discrepancy between her 
public significance and her personal relationship to radical politics 
 A phase of backlash (1960–1967) followed the explosive rise of Japan's New Left. 
During the early and mid-1960s, both leftists and conservatives engaged in a series of seemingly 
disparate debates about the political place of women, countering ideals of female purity and 
political utility. In the wake of the 1959–1960 mass demonstrations opposing Anpo and the death 
of Kanba Michiko, government policies focused on national economic growth sought to quiet the 
recent tempest of street activism. Chapter Three introduces some key tabloid debates that 
suggested female presence in social institutions such as universities held the potential to "ruin the 
nation." The powerful influence of these frequently sarcastic but damaging debates, echoed in 
government policies re-linking young women to domestic labor, confirmed mass media's 
importance in interpreting the social role of the female student. Although the student movement 
imagined itself as immune to the logic of the state and the mass media, the practices of the late-
1960s campus-based student movement, examined in Chapter Four, illustrate how larger societal 
assumptions about gender roles undergirded the gendered hierarchy of labor that emerged in the 
barricades. I frame these practices as a kind of backlash in light of the theoretical importance of 
the writings of Tokoro Mitsuko to the organizational ideals of the late-1960s student movement. 
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Tokoro, a student activist of Kanba Michiko's generation, proposed to bring nonviolent and 
nurturing feminine values to the student movement as a whole. Although Tokoro's ideas of a 
non-hierarchical leftist organization influenced the student movement of the late 1960s, opening 
up a moment of potential liberation for female student activists from the strict gender codes 
solidifying in Japan's increasingly rationalized economy and society, the dichotomy of 
"violence" versus "nurturing" created a new hierarchy in the campus-based student movement of 
1968–1969. 
 The final phase (1969–1972) of the student New Left was dominated by two imaginary 
rather than real female figures, and is best emblematized by the notion of  “Gewalt."  I use the 
German term for violence, Gewalt, because of its peculiar resonances within the student 
movement of the late 1960s. Japanese students employed a transliteraion—gebaruto—to 
distinguish their "counter-violence" from the violence employed by the state. However, the mass 
media soon picked up on the term and reversed its polarities in order to disparage the students' 
actions. It was in this late-1960s moment that women, once considered particularly vulnerable to 
violence, became deeply associated with active incitement to violence. In the case of Japan's 
New Left, the imaginary embodiment of the rationalized liberal social order and the target of the 
radical student movement's anger was not "the Man," but "Mama." The conservative order that 
stepped in after the Anpo demonstrations to organize social life around national economic 
strength linked women with motherhood and the household, and linked each household in turn to 
the Japanese nation. Chapter Five explores how student activists' rejection of "Mama" led to an 
embrace of a particularly masculinist ideal of violence, aligning the student left in many ways 
with the logic of the far right. Chapter Six explores how the mass media, on the other hand, 
coded female student activism in particular as both terrifying and titillating through its imaginary 
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construction of the "Gewalt Rosa." Demonstrating the shifting meaning of the politics of protest, 
by the end of the 1960s public sympathy, which had sided with the student movement when its 
members seemed like victims of state violence, faded in the wake of increasingly violent poses 
and tactics on the part of the New Left. By 1970, few Japanese would have entertained the idea 
that female students were politically innocent, much less peaceful by nature 
 Throughout these three phases, violence may have changed in form, but it provided a 
common means of pursuing political goals as well as evaluating their significance. The social 
meaning created by the relationship between female students and violence and disseminated 
through the mass media critically influenced public reception of student activism. When, in 
1972, the mass media revealed a leftist group's bloody internal purge, it marked the definitive 
"death" of the New Left. The female leader of the group, Nagata Hiroko, stepped all too 
conveniently into existing media formulations of the "Gewalt Rosa" (Violent Rosa), leading to a 
general disavowal of the student movement among feminists in the 1970s. I touch upon these 






Good Citizens and Angry Daughters: 
The Moral Authority of Female Students in the New Left 
 
—It's the school's misguided system and the teachers' feudal ideas that caused this tragedy. In 
order to guarantee our human rights and our academic freedom, we must show the school 




  Female students in Garden of Women (1954) 
 
 Kinoshita Keisuke's 1954 film Garden of Women (Onna no en) opens with a close-up 
shot of a young woman as she denounces school administrators' "feudal" wrongdoing. Her voice 
is stern, her brow furrowed in anger. As the camera zooms out, it reveals several uniformed 
female students gathered around the speaker. Her fists are clenched. In response to her urging 
that the students stand together in protest, a chorus of female voices declares approval. Men push 
their way into the applauding group, demanding that the young women "break it up!" The young 
women move. They rush to the gates of their school and grapple with suited men who attempt to 
keep them out. They jump the walls of the school grounds. The sound of their running feet 
accompanies images of a swarm of female students in motion. As the young women descend 
upon the lecture hall, they again confront adult men. One man urges them to "quiet down" and 
"think calmly." Instead they raise their voices in song.1 This opening scene offered 1950s 
filmgoers a vision of the female student as a democratic citizen. The fictional young women's 
affirmation of their democratic agency against the restrictive rules of their women's college 
reflects a common trope of the popular imagination in Japan's early postwar decades: that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Kinoshita Keisuke and Abe Tomoji, Onna No En, 1954. 
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righteous anger was a form of political affect that came easily to young females, and was 
possibly even to be lauded. 
Introduction 
 The female higher-education student in postwar Japan stood at the intersection of rapidly 
changing ideologies of gender and age. A general societal consensus on the need for a "break" 
with wartime institutions thrust both women and youth into the spotlight as key groups 
victimized by wartime policy. Under postwar democratic reforms, women gained the vote and 
the right to coeducation, and college students, such as those depicted in Kinoshita's film, 
demanded access to decision-making at their campuses. For many postwar Japanese, the female 
student represented the potential for a new and pure political subjectivity. The present chapter 
draws on works of literary and cinematic fiction, journalism, and the accounts of witnesses to 
street protest in the late 1950s to trace the construction of new standards of citizen participation 
and agency through the figure of the female student. 
 The fictional prominence of the female student as a symbol of democracy during the late 
1950s must be understood against the backdrop of evolving leftist politics. In this period, student 
activism moved away from established leftist parties. I explore fiction in which female students 
featured as the protagonist in student literary works criticizing the rigid dogmatism of the 
institutional left in the late 1950s as the split in the late 1950s between a "New Left" and the 
"Old Left" of the Japan Communist Party (JCP) marked not only a political but also a cultural 
rift. The participation of young women in the New Left defined the movement, and also became 
key to the public sympathy for the "anger" of the New Left and its female student activists, in 
particular as students figured prominently in the 1960 climax of citizen protest around the 
renewal of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty (Anpo). The presence of female students in anti-Anpo 
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street protests attracted sympathy to the student movement, and reports of police violence toward 
the bodies of female students became emblematic of the potential for the violent excesses of the 
state in opposition to its citizens. Such accounts, frequently articulated by those who were not 
female students, extended a hegemonic idea of young women's political purity to legitimize the 
anger of the New Left. 
 This chapter explores works of fiction alongside journalistic accounts of student activism. 
Fictional representations of young women as political figures contributed to the way reading and 
viewing audiences interpreted press reportage on female students. Conversely, films and 
literature on student activism drew their subjects from the headlines, presenting interpretations of 
motives that created political meaning in turn. For example, Kinoshita's 1954 film about a group 
of students at a women's college battling to form a student council at their restrictive school 
portrayed the young heroines as victims of "feudal" rules. The unyielding and old-fashioned 
regulations, enforced for their own sake, crush one young woman in particular, played by cinema 
idol Takamine Hideko. Her suicide prompts school administrators to blame "red elements." 
However, the film indicts the unyieldingly hierarchical and strict system of the women's college 
for trapping not only the female students, but also their teachers and parents. Kinoshita's film 
imagined how various tensions produced by class differences, gender inequality, and family 
expectations might define a campus movement. Ultimately, however, it was the young women 
who remained most vulnerable, and their angered reactions come across as just and earnest. 
Postwar Student Activism 
 Audiences most likely would have already read actual news about student attempts to 
participate in democratic governance at their schools. After the end of the war in 1945, high 
school and university students were among the first to apply the new democratic ideals of access 
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and voice to the institutions that governed them. According to one source, the first student strike 
of the postwar period took place at a women's high school, Ueno Gakuen High School, when 150 
female students initiated a strike on 8 October 1945 to protest misappropriation of rations and 
demand that faculty who had supported the war effort be fired, while faculty who advocated 
democracy be hired.2 A series of isolated student protests at various schools—including women's 
colleges and high schools—culminated in the formation of Student Self-Governing Associations, 
or Jichikai, beginning at Tokyo University in January 1947. As students from various campuses 
began to unite to fight rising fee hikes and governmental educational policy, the call for a general 
student association led to the September 1948 founding of Zengakuren (short for Zen Nihon 
gakusei jichikai sōrengō, or All-Japan General Alliance of Student Self-Governing 
Associations). The resolutions adopted by the 250 student representatives from 145 campuses 
invoked the language of democracy, freedom of study and student political engagement, and 
identified their collective enemy, in the very first resolution, as “the fascist-colonialistic 
reorganization of education."3 Zengakuren would become a key element in the mass protests 
leading up to the 1960 renewal of Anpo. The story of how female participation in Zengakuren 
influenced popular reception of its specifically "New Left" activism in the late 1950s requires an 
overview of the changing status of female political participation and of the split between Old 
Left and New Left. Both are stories of a search for moral authority in the wake of Japan's defeat. 
The 1945 surrender and subsequent occupation by Allied Forces demanded a complete 
reconfiguring not only of political structures but also of moral values.  
Gender in Postwar Politics 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Shakai mondai kenkyūkai, Zengakuren kakuha: gakusei undō jiten (Tokyo: Futabasha, 1969), 168. 
3 Matsunami Michihiro, “Origins of Zengakuren," in Zengakuren: Japan's Revolutionary Students, ed. 
Stuart J. Dowsey (Berkeley: The Ishi Press, 1970), 48. 
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 Efforts to imagine the ideal postwar political citizen embraced defeat as a moment of 
rupture, and instated a political culture in which political participation by women was gendered 
in an essentializing way representative of change. There is some debate about the source of the 
1945 cabinet decision to include women in the national franchise for the first time.4 Regardless 
of the policy's origins, the enactment strengthened a narrative of postwar democratization 
important to both the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces and the postwar Japanese 
cabinet. Although women's suffrage activists were not directly responsible for securing the vote, 
they had publicly campaigned for that goal since before the war, and their arguments enjoyed 
considerable influence in defining its popular meaning. Mainstream suffragists such as Ichikawa 
Fusae, in particular, stressed the mutual dependence of female political participation and the 
ideal of peaceful democracy. The hegemonic postwar interpretation of the final "victory" of 
women's suffrage after enduring repression and political exclusion in the "dark valley" of 
wartime framed the woman's vote as a bulwark against violence. This narrative elided wartime 
participation by women in such organizations as the Patriotic Women's Association and  
National Defense Women's Association in government-led campaigns, including certain forms of 
street activism. The period of total war was also one in which women entered public spaces in 
unprecedented numbers. In the prewar and wartime periods as in the postwar period, women's 
groups drew on a gendered ideology associating women with "purity" to legitimize campaigns 
against prostitution or partisan politics.5 
 In the postwar period, women's suffrage activists' equation of politics with the vote wrote 
out not only women's activities on behalf of the wartime state, but also the political contributions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Gregory M. Pflugfelder, “'Fujin Sanseiken' Saikō: Senzen Seiji Bunka No Jendaaka," in Kakudaisuru 




of women who did not conform to a liberal ideal of citizenship.  Defining postwar democratic 
reforms as a recuperation of interrupted liberal politics effaced the prewar political activism of 
socialist women, for example. Many proletarian women's alliances of the prewar period had also 
demanded "full suffrage" (that is, votes for all adult men and women), but standard postwar 
accounts of women's suffrage in Japan gave them short shrift.6 Within a dominant narrative that 
defined women's suffrage as key to ensuring the success of postwar democracy and pacifism, 
there was little space for radical women. The cases of women such as Kanno Suga (1881–1911), 
Itō Noe (1895–1923), and Kaneko Fumiko (1906–1926) sat uneasily alongside the triumphant 
history of women's suffrage as a force for liberalism and peace. All three became infamous in 
their time for embracing radical thought, ranging from anarchism to nihilism, as well as for 
defying moral codes for women. The Japanese mass media reacted to these women with fear and 
scorn; all three died in confrontations with the state.7 Attempts to emphasize the role of women 
in creating dramatic postwar change broke the strong imaginative link forged in an earlier time 
between political women and violence. 
 The female student became a "citizen" in postwar Japan within an ideological context that 
associated women with a politics of liberal pacifism. She found entry not only into the political 
realm, but also, with new coeducation policies, into formerly all-male spaces of higher 
education. As we shall see, during the early 1960s, allowing young women into key social 
institutions generated various specters within the public imagination. However, during the early 
postwar period, the hegemonic ideal of female political pacifism, along with the moral authority 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Ibid., Sheldon Garon, Managing Japanese Minds: The State in Everyday Life (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1997), 179. 
7 For more on these women and others like them, and for translations of their writings, see: Mikiso Hane, 
Reflections on the Way to the Gallows: Rebel Women in Prewar Japan (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1988), 19; Mikiso Hane, Peasants, Rebels, Women, and Outcastes: The Underside of 
Modern Japan (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 247–248. 
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of postwar youth activism, as demonstrated in the anti-Anpo demonstrations, conferred upon the 
female student activist a particularly "pure" political subjectivity.8 This image borrowed from 
earlier discussions of the essential nature of women, but with a slight difference. The postwar 
emphasis on democratizing and demilitarizing social institutions insisted on admitting women as 
a method of reforming society. Whereas prewar ideas about women in politics presumed female 
incompetence, postwar policies that stood women alongside men as full citizens retained a 
measure of the belief that women were basically vulnerable, but also insisted upon female 
political competency as a marker of postwar democracy. 
Students in Postwar Politics 
 Like the social category of "women," higher-education students, too, came to be 
perceived in the postwar period as a group with immense democratic potential. Not only were 
students among the first to adopt the language of "democracy" and "rights" at their schools, but 
postwar groups such as the Japan Teachers' Union and the Japan Memorial Society for Students 
Killed in the War memorialized students as particularly vulnerable victims of war, sent to kill 
and die as soldiers.9 Although wartime student-soldiers were male, the narrative of victimization 
colored the public reception of postwar student activism in general. More than any other social 
demographic, students emblematized the break between wartime ideology and postwar 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 The "purity" of youth in general was another matter. The popular "Sun Tribe" films targeting a younger 
audience in the 1950s featured disillusioned and reckless young people and sparked general moral panic. 
Representative of this genre are films based on Ishihara Shintarō's books, such as Season of the Sun 
(Taiyō no kisetsu), directed by Furukawa Takumi (1956) and Crazed Fruit (Kurutta kaijutsu), directed by 
Nakahira Kō (1956). However, both Cruel Story of Youth (Seishun zankoku monogatari), directed by 
Ōshima Nagisa (1960) and Dry Lake (Kawaita mizuumi), directed by Shinoda Masahiro (1961) 
demonstrated how the genre could be subverted to represent nihilistic and immoral youth as victims. In 
replicating the themes and aesthetics of Sun Tribe film, the more political creators of these two films—
Ōshima, Shinoda, and Shinoda's screenplay writer Terayama Shūji—explored the ways in which postwar 
youth were trapped by a corrupt society. Dry Lake ends as the young, guileless female protagonist joins in 
an anti-Anpo street protest moments before it clashes with riot police. 
9 See Franziska Seraphim, War Memory and Social Politics in Japan, 1945-2005 (Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard University Asia Center, 2006). 
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democratization by virtue of their certain innocence as children during wartime, contrasted with 
the potential complicity of every wartime adult. In the late 1950s, when the left-leaning student 
movement broke from the JCP, part of what marked this New Left as “new" for many observers 
was precisely the participation of female students. The percentage of student activists who were 
young women remained small, but fiction and reportage represented them disproportionately. 
 The leftist character of postwar student activism also leaned upon ideas about moral 
authority in the wake of war. Ostensibly nonpartisan, students affiliated with the postwar 
Japanese Communist Party quickly captured control of Zengakuren leadership. Aside from the 
general appeal of Marxism among students, which had an antecedent in the prewar period, the 
history of communist resistance to Japanese militarism attracted many; the Party was made up of 
men and women who had suffered imprisonment or exile for their opposition to the wartime 
state.10 For those seeking models of strong-willed individuals who had resisted imperialism and 
militarism, the Communists offered living examples. 
 However, the postwar JCP did not escape the factionalism of the prewar Marxist 
movement in Japan, and by the late 1950s, tensions brewing between JCP leadership and 
elements within Zengakuren came to a head.11 The Party's 1956 withdrawal of support for armed 
struggle disenchanted a generation of earnest would-be guerillas who had left universities to 
foment revolution in the countryside.12 This domestic issue compounded the disillusionment 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Ikeda Kazuo, “Historical Background," in Zengakuren: Japan's Revolutionary Students, ed. Stuart J. 
Dowsey (Berkeley: The Ishi Press, 1970), 35. Victor J. Koschmann, “Intellectuals and Politics," in 
Postwar Japan as History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 397. 
11 Germaine Hoston, The State, Identity, and the National Question in China and Japan (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1994). Chapter Ten offers the background for key postwar debates in the JCP. 
12 Shibata Sho's 1964 novel Saredo warera ga hibi focuses on this disappointed generation and includes a 
fictional account of a communist student's conflicted personal relationship with violence and the JCP. The 
title is often translated as Well, That's Our Lot, but a more literal translation might be Well, Those Were 
Our Days. It won the prestigious Akutagawa Prize in literature, and remains in print, and is advertised as 
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many young people felt with international Communism. In the wake of the brutal Soviet 
suppression of a people's movement in Budapest in the autumn of 1956 and the USSR's 
complicity with United States policy over the Suez Canal crisis, the institutional Left at home 
and abroad seemed more interested in maintaining the contemporary power balance than in 
achieving a just social order. The JCP's decision to cultivate a larger presence in elections rather 
than focusing on direct agitation stood in stark contrast to ongoing conflicts, such as anti-base 
struggles and strikes, that brought politics into the streets. Students who might have otherwise 
sympathized with a left-leaning critique of contemporary issues were also wary of the paranoia 
and inflexible dogmatism that became associated with the student movement under JCP 
leadership. In the context of a postwar ideal of active political subjectivity willing to speak truth 
to power, the JCP-led student movements seemed to harden in the 1950s into a system that 
suppressed individual voices. 
The Female Student as Democratic Protagonist in late-1950s Student Fiction 
 In two late-1950s literary representations critical of the Party, both by student writers on 
the verge of literary acclaim, female student protagonists offered a useful vehicle for conveying 
the authors' critique of rigid leftism. Ōe Kenzaburō and Kurahashi Yumiko both debuted as 
literary voices of a new, postwar generation; Ōe as a male student at elite, and newly 
coeducational, Tokyo University and Kurahashi as a female coed at Meiji University. Both 
enjoyed the support of literary critic Hirano Ken, himself a leftist who opposed the JCP's 
"hegemony in culture."13 Nearly a decade later, in writing a preface to Ōe's student works from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the “Bible" of the late 1960s student movement on the back cover of the most recent publishing in 2007. 
What is striking about the novel, however, is how, although it is often raised as an example of the 
literature born of the betrayed, disappointed, and lost Rokuzenkyo generation of student leftists, the central 
relationship in the novel is that of an engaged couple and the plot is driven by their increased 
miscommunication, fueled by her feelings that her desires are subsumed by his. 
13 Koschmann, “Intellectuals and Politics," 399. 
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the late 1950s, Hirano would note the frequent appearance of female students as characters in 
Ōe's early stories. These young university coeds, novelties to an older generation of readers, 
marked the milieu of Ōe's fiction as the postwar university.14 Kurahashi herself embodied that 
novelty. As her professor, Hirano Ken pointed out her fiction as representative of a fresh voice. 
In short stories by these student authors, neither one affiliated with organized leftism, fictional 
accounts of a female student's uneasy relationship with the JCP-led student movement affirmed 
the primacy of the individual—and, in both cases, female—body over the hypocrisy and 
inflexibility of dogmatic ideology. 
 Ōe Kenzaburō's short story "The Time of False Testimony" (Gishō no toki) took full 
advantage of literature's power to interpret the motivations and tensions behind events reported 
in the news. Based on various cases of spy accusations, "lynchings," and false identities, "The 
Time of False Testimony" appeared in the literary journal Bungakkai in October 1957.15 
Although soon overwhelmed by Ōe's increasingly prolific and ambitious oeuvre, the story 
inspired the 1960 film False Student (Nise gakusei), directed by Masumura Yasuzō. Ōe's story 
responded to reported cases of student “spies" held by JCP-affiliated groups at the nation's most 
prestigious campuses, news of which had made its way into mainstream newspapers since the 
early 1950s.16 In 1954, a group of JCP student activists allegedly kidnapped and held a suspected 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Hirano Ken, “Kaisetsu," in Ōe Kenzaburo zensakuhin furoku No. 2, vol. 1 (Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 1966), 
5. 
15 Republished in 1966 in a collected volume of Ōe's work. Ōe Kenzaburō, “Gishō no toki," in Ōe 
Kenzaburō zensakuhin, vol. 1 (Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 1966), 67–97. The transliterated English term “lynch" 
is used frequently among the Japanese left to describe extralegal punishments inflicted on members of 
opposing factions or for various infractions. These punishments range in violence and often took the form 
of beatings; I have not come across a case in which such a “lynching" results in the hanging that is 
commonly associated with the word in the United States, although “lynchings" have resulted in accidental 
and intentional deaths. 
16 “Watashi wa Tōdai sei ni korosareru?," Yomiuri shinbun, October 16, 1952; “Fashizumu to kyōsantō," 
Yomiuri shinbun, February 27, 1954; “Gakusei ryō wo tenten kankin," Yomiuri shinbun, March 14, 1954. 
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student spy for one and a half months in the student dorms of Tokyo Metropolitan University and 
the elite Tokyo University. Among the group of seven to eight students who stood guard in the 
actual incident, one was female.17 
 While media reports of the 1954 student kidnapping mentioned the female student only 
as one aggressor among many, Ōe chose to narrate his fictional account specifically from the 
female student's point of view, representing her as ambivalent to her role as a captor. Ōe's 
sensual style links her point of view to her embodied experience of the episode. The story opens 
as the female student describes the sensation in her fingers as she struggles to untie knots—knots, 
we soon learn, that fasten the ropes binding a “false student."18 The narrator, who is never given 
a name, is part of a group of students holding this “false student" as a suspected spy on the 
student movement at “T" University, most likely a reference to Tokyo University.19 The student 
literally bites the female student's hand as she tries to feed him, and throughout the narrative, as 
the “spy" escapes and the key student leaders are put on trial, and as students and faculty 
conspire to discredit this outsider, the young woman's festering wound troubles her. 
 While the narrator's physical pain serves as a constant reminder of her role in the false 
student's kidnapping, the elite community of men at the university mobilizes to protect the 
reputation of the institution by undermining the false student's accusations of kidnapping. As the 
female narrator watches facts about the physical structure of the student dorms change and the 
testimony of fellow students and professors shift, her body will not allow her to forget the reality 
of the false student's imprisonment. Her worries about creating an alibi to protect herself are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 “Gakusei ryō wo tenten kankin." 
18 Ōe, “Gishō no toki," 67. 
19 On November 1 of the same year, the Yomiuri shinbun ran an article about a false Tokyo University 
acting as student activist leader. When he was discovered to be a false student, student activists captured 
him and denounced him a spy. He declared, “I'm not a spy. I did it out of vanity." “Nise Tōdaisei ga chūo 
iin," Yomiuri shinbun, November 1, 1957. 
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interrupted by the violent pain of her wound, which does not allow her to sleep at night.20 
Students manage to persuade the police and the court that the false student is insane, and seem to 
convince even themselves that they are blameless. When the actually guilty student leaders are 
cleared in court, they hold a gathering to bask in their declared innocence. The female student 
notes, however, that her wound remains imperfectly healed. As she listens to the self-
congratulatory speeches, she tries to believe that she is not an aggressor, attempting to convince 
herself that “perhaps it is fine just to believe [that it never happened]."21 However, “On my palm 
the wound of the false student's bite remained and blood oozed from it."22 Her infected bite 
continues to aggravate her and prevents her from willing away the unpleasant details of a crime 
in which she was complicit. She finally cannot bear listening to the false student apologize to his 
former captors and instead screams out the truth about his involuntary confinement.23 The 
students respond to her presentation of the physical evidence of violence, manifested in the 
reddened bite, with laughter. She alone among the students is willing to speak the truth, but her 
voice is drowned out. Ōe suggests that, aside from the young female student, the institutions, and 
the male students invested in them, serve themselves, not the truth. In light of the infamous 
ideological conversions—tenkō—of prewar and wartime leftists who rejected dissent to embrace 
the nationalist cause, and thereby preserve their lives and social positions, Ōe's story challenged 
the postwar left with the suggestion that young activists remained vulnerable to ideological 
conversion as a means of maintaining social rank.24 Ōe offers a female protagonist as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Ōe, “Gishō no toki," 81. 
21 Ibid., 93. 
22 Ibid., 94. 
23 Ibid., 96. 
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counterpoint to the self-interested proceedings in which male students and professors cover up 
the crime. 
 Kurahashi Yumiko's debut short story, "The Party" (Parutai) features a female student 
narrator who quickly becomes disillusioned with the Party—a reference to the JCP--and the 
dogmatic inflexibility of both its organization and the male students devoted to it. The story first 
ran in the Meiji University newspaper, but it soon attracted notice and was reprinted. The success 
of "The Party" launched Kurahashi into the public sphere as a voice for her generation. Much as 
in Ōe's short story "The Time of False Testimony," Kurahashi's female student protagonist is the 
lone woman among men. Kurahashi's story also presents the young woman as an individual, 
making no reference to her family or home life. 
 Representing an array of tensions and misrecognitions among individuals defined only by 
gender and occupation, Kurahashi's narrative reflects not only an ascendant ideology of 
individual action in postwar Japan, but also the influence of Jean-Paul Sartre's existential 
philosophy. Kurahashi wrote her undergraduate thesis on Being and Nothingness, and dots her 
story with instances where the female protagonist feels a wave of nausea when her individual 
agency is overwhelmed. In “The Party" as in Ōe's story, the physicality of the protagonist's 
female body defines her relationships as a woman to the men around her. In the course of these 
political and sexual relationships, she recognizes the inability of her Party-loyal partner to hear 
her concerns as an individual; he instead favors institutional procedure. 
 The threats that Kurahashi's female student protagonist perceives toward her individual 
agency create a confluence of political and sexual meaning. The loose narrative follows the 
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young woman as she applies to become a Party member, painting her desire for Party 
membership in much the same terms as her desire for a meaningful romantic relationship. She 
quarrels with her lover about how to write her life history, a required part of her Party 
application. As he begins to construct a personal story that would make her membership appear 
"inevitable," she resists: 
I wanted to escape from the past and throw myself into the future. I had chosen 
the Party and had resolved to let the Party restrict my freedom. I had not arrived at 
this decision for any clear reason or through some cause-and-effect relationship. 
Wasn't it enough if the Party accepted this decision? But you disagreed. You 
called my argument 'intuitionalism' and said this is a dangerous ideology.25 
 
 Kurahashi's female protagonist prefers to think of her commitment to the Party as one 
might describe a romantic commitment. She enters the relationship not because she has to, but 
because she desires a partnership and the restrictions on one's freedom that it brings. What she 
also reveals in affirming her choice is the historical contingency of her participation. She does 
not see herself as an inevitably radical subjectivity. Recognizing the contingency of her decision 
to join the Party, she affirms her political agency, but also rejects forcing the narrative of her 
personal history into an argument. She finds the exercise artificial, with only an abstract relation 
to her experience. Much like the female protagonist of the Ōe story, Kurahashi's female student 
reacts physically to her lover's demands to alter her life history. She feels discomfort in her body, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Kurahashi Yumiko, “Partei," in This Kind of Woman: Ten Stories by Japanese Women Writers, 1960-
1976, trans. Yukiko Tanaka and Elizabeth Hanson (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1982), 5. 
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although this emotional affect manifests physically as nausea rather than an open wound.26 He 
attacks her way of thinking as intuitional, implying that she ought to impose a distinction 
between her feelings and her thoughts. According to her lover, she ought to prioritize the needs 
of the institution and adjust her thought to meet those needs. But for Kurahashi's narrator, the 
key attraction to the Party is not its connection to her history, but rather its promise of a complete 
break from her history. Her desire for a future completely different from the past stands as a 
poignant evocation of the political potential represented by young women in postwar Japanese 
society: their presence promised a complete break from the past of male-dominated political and 
social institutions. 
 In addition to the key romantic relationship that mediates the female student protagonist's 
application for Party membership, the way in which she negotiates sexual desire with two other 
men also defines her experience of leftist activism. In not only seducing a blue-collar worker, but 
also determining unilaterally that she will abort the resulting pregnancy, the female student 
affirms the primacy of her individual desire. She also exposes the gap between her middle-class 
self and the worker, "as if we were two animals of different species that had accidentally met and 
copulated on the spot."27 The physical contact between the two does not create an intimacy 
capable of transcending class. By contrast, the unwanted sexual attention of a different male 
comrade, "S," presents a complete rejection of her agency, leading her to feel "as if [she] were 
some 'object'." Making "no effort to conceal his desire," S" uses the authority of his position in 
the Party to pursue his own wants and disregard the needs of others. 28 The experience with "S" 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Both Ōe and Kurahashi studied French literature and existentialism, and would have been familiar with 
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27 Kurahashi, “Partei," 8. 
28 Ibid., 9. 
	  
 39	  
confirms for the young woman that those with power act only out of self-interest. In these two 
encounters with men, one a worker and one a comrade, hierarchies of desire trump ideals. 
The female student protagonist of Kurahashi Yumiko's story finds it impossible to assert the 
primacy of her agency and at the same time maintain her romance with both the young party 
member and the Party. When her male partner challenges her definition of "the revolution" and 
insists that it is inevitable, she aggressively rejects his argument: 
I said that “revolution" was not something that existed outside of myself. If 
revolution was external, how could the “inevitability" of something outside 
myself affect my freedom and ability to choose. I would join the Party not 
because the revolution is inevitable but because I want to choose the revolution, I 
said. I had chosen to restrict my freedom so that ultimately I would be even more 
free. My participation would make the revolution inevitable for me.29 
 
 The protagonist affirms her own will and desire in her decision to participate in 
revolution in terms similar to how she asserts her own will and desire to abort her pregnancy.30  
Her insistence that she needs to "choose the revolution" and "participate" to make it occur also 
affirms postwar democratic ideals of citizen engagement. Kurahashi's female protagonist stresses 
that the locus of "the revolution" lies in individual will and action. In the end, the young woman 
declares the Party to be an inhumane institution, not run by the needs of its members but instead 
consuming the people within it according to its own mysterious needs. Although the female 
protagonist had hoped that the Party would give her something larger than herself, she in the end 
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30 Although techincally criminalized, the Eugenic Protection Law of 1948 made abortion accessible to 
protect the physical and economic health of the mother. With this economic clause, induced abortion 
became widely available. 
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feels squashed as an individual by the Party's dogmatism. Kurahashi's story plays with the ideal 
of the earnest female student. Her protagonist is both exploitative (of the male worker) and 
exploited (by her male comrades). Kurahashi embodies the Party's intransigence and insincerity, 
however, with male characters, thus gendering the hypocrisies of the Left as male, while the 
female student operates as an independent-minded critic. 
 By the time Kurahashi Yumiko's story of a female student rejecting Party-led activism 
ran in 1960, a considerable number of student activists had decided to avoid the Party in real life. 
The December 1958 formation of the student-based Communist League – known for short as 
“Bund," after Marx's first organization – took lead of the mainstream of Zengakuren and marked 
the definitive end of the JCP's control of the organization.31  United more in their opposition to 
the authoritarianism of the JCP than by any specific goal, the Bund-led Zengakuren offered a 
response to the kind of mistrust of institutionalized ideology that Ōe and Kurahashi's fictional 
female students had articulated in literary form.32 
The Postwar Student Movement and Democracy 
 Although neither Ōe nor Kurahashi were student activists, literary critics such as Hirano 
Ken hailed them as spokespeople of their postwar generation, and their female protagonists' 
individualistic insistence on words matching deeds resonated with what came to define the 
“new" left of the Bund-led Zengakuren. The Bund-led Zengakuren gained the sympathy of many 
intellectuals because of both its split from the hardline ideology of the JCP and its willingness to 
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32 George Packard, Protest in Tokyo: The Security Treaty Crisis of 1960, First Edition edition (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966), 99. 
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take physical action at demonstrations and rallies. 33 It seemed to manifest the key concerns of 
many intellectuals who had weighed in on the postwar debates on political subjectivity, including 
the influential political scientist Maruyama Masao. Maruyama expounded the idea that “the 
essence of democracy must reside in each individual citizen assuming the stance and accepting 
the responsibility of being in charge," and his vision of the ideal citizen of Japan's postwar 
democracy included a willingness to participate in political action.34 Although the limits of that 
political action were the topic of ongoing debate and negotiation, democracy became equated in 
the minds of postwar progressives with the cultivation of an authentic, individual subject 
position.35 In this context, Ōe Kenzaburō and Kurahashi Yumiko wrote female characters as 
individuals who were in the position to articulate a truly independent new critique of postwar 
Japan and its outmoded institutions.36 The view that young women represented authentic and 
independent critiques of stale leftist dogma influenced popular reception of female participation 
in the New Left. 
 The actual politics of the postwar student movement did not necessarily reflect a new 
interest in the democratic subjectivity of female participants, since many key members of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Andrew Barshay, Postwar Social and Political Thought, 1945-1990, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
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that number active membership ranged from 2,000 involved in organizing to 20,000 who came out to 
support demonstrations. Packard, Protest in Tokyo, 96. 
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David Noble (Tokyo: International House of Japan, 2008), 105. See also: Andrew Barshay, “Democracy 
in Postwar Japan: Reflections on Maruyama Masao and Modernism," Journal of Japanese Studies 18, no. 
2 (Summer 1992): 365–406; Rikki Kersten, Democracy in Postwar Japan: Maruyama Masao and the 
Search for Autonomy (London: Routledge, 1996). 
35 Maruyama himself had rather conservative ideas about protest strategies, which will be explored further 
in his relationship to the radical student movement and the campus struggles of the late 1960s. 
36 Maruyama also supported female participation in labor and politics as a democratic advancement. 




Bund-led Zengakuren were more interested in activism as a means of escalating revolutionary 
struggle than in expanding democratic access. And most student activists remained male; indeed, 
most university students remained male.37 However, in light of the emerging consensus among 
intellectuals, articulated by Maruyama Masao, that civilian inaction enabled the rise of militarism 
in prewar Japan, advocates of postwar democracy adopted the idea that active political 
engagement, in discourse and in demonstrations, was key to protecting postwar democracy.38 
The postwar hegemonic ideal of pacifist female political participation lent meaning to active 
protest in which female students participated. 
  The theme of democracy resonated widely in student activism of the late 1950s, 
influencing demands for Japan's autonomy from United States Cold War policy  and also campus 
policies that ensured student access to self-governance.39 Key issues for the student movement in 
Japan in the late 1950s included protests focused on the expansion of Tachikawa Air Base, a US 
military bastion, and struggles against state policies that could be used to encroach upon 
educational and political freedoms, such as the reinstitution of moral education and a rating 
system for teacher efficiency, as well as the 1958 Police Bill.40 Above all these, however, the 
most iconic mass mobilization in the period was the movement against the 1960 renewal of the 
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U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, known colloquially as Anpo.41 Framed as a battle to preserve Japan's 
nascent postwar democracy against the fascist arrogance of Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke and 
his Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) administration, demonstrations against the Treaty's renewal 
mobilized not just left-leaning students, but also a wide swath of the Japanese population. 
Zengakuren became a key group in the prolonged series of extraparliamentary protests that 
countered the Treaty.42 
 Although American observers typically interpreted the anti-Anpo protests of 1959 and 
1960 as "anti-American rioting," internal conflict over renewal of the Treaty reflected a strong 
antiwar sensibility rather than out-and-out anti-Americanism. The Treaty originated in the 
negotiations between Japan and the United States that ended the Allied Occupation in 1952 and 
incorporated Japan into the larger framework of American postwar military strategies in East 
Asia.43 Under the terms of the Treaty, American troops waged the first hot war of the Cold War 
in Korea (1950–1953) from bases in Japan, and Okinawa remained occupied by the American 
military. Although the Korean War had jumpstarted manufacturing in postwar Japan and an 
American presence in Okinawa did not affect most mainland Japanese, for a war-weary 
population, the threat of being dragged into another conflict because of an alliance with the 
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United States felt very real. One major newspaper's public-opinion poll in the summer of 1959 
showed that almost half of the people questioned feared that the new treaty would increase the 
chances that Japan would become involved in war.44 Furthermore, the heavy-handed tactics of 
Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke increasingly worried political observers and citizens that the 
issue at stake in the revised treaty's ratification was less the what of the treaty than the how. 
Kishi's authoritarian maneuvering, in other words, was itself read as a threat to Japan's 
democracy.45 Even if many Japanese did not understand the terms of the Treaty and even favored 
an alliance with the US over one with the Communist Bloc, Kishi's administration came across 
as arrogant and insensitive to public concerns. People turned out in the streets for massive 
demonstrations to express their political engagement, and among them it was student groups who 
were most eager to test the limits of what forms of active dissent the state would tolerate. 
 In the context of public fears for the state of democracy, and with a war of aggression 
waged a generation previously that had been met with little domestic resistance, the activist 
students of the Bund-led Zengakuren drew the admiration of several influential intellectuals in 
Japan, and among large swathes of the general population as well. The bad behavior of elected 
politicians increased popular sympathy for Zengakuren. As opposition mounted in the streets, 
quarrels broke out within the Diet itself on 19 May 1960. Physical scuffles between the Socialist-
led opposition and the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) concluded with the admission of 
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45 Opponents to the Treaty and to Kishi's administration were also eager to remind the public of Kishi's 
wartime employment in the Tōjō Cabinet. Ibid., 197. The heated struggle over the Police Bill in 1958 
contained many of the similar elements of the Treaty Revision, including the threat by the opposition 
parties to physically block the bill, the authoritarian LDP Diet tactics that countered that threat, and the 
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five hundred police officers to remove the Socialists, who had attempted a sit-in to block the 
LDP.46 Amid the confusion, the vote to approve the new treaty was deferred, resulting in a 
situation where, instead of requiring an affirmative vote, the revision was to automatically gain 
Diet approval on 19 June 1960 if the House of Councilors took no action against it. The press 
reported the events as a unilateral approval of the treaty by the LDP.47 Maruyama Masao, in a 
speech appealing to his audience to fulfill the democratic promise of a postwar rupture from 
militarist history, likened Kishi's “surprise attack" of May 19 to Pearl Harbor.48 As illustrated by 
Maruyama's dramatic analogy, many observers of the chaos in the Diet defined the LDP as a 
threat to Japan's nascent democracy. 
 In both contemporary reports and later interpretations of the year 1960, it was the 
Zengakuren students who captured the public imagination and defined—for good and for ill—the 
year of political turmoil. Although their tactics were often aggressive, supporters justified the 
students' actions as an attempt to counter the violence of the nation's voted representatives within 
the chambers of the Diet. Zengakuren's willingness to take risks at demonstrations garnered 
respect from influential elements of Japanese public opinion, framed within a common 
interpretation that the inaction of ordinary people during Japan's wartime had allowed a militarist 
government to wage war.49 In light of this wartime history, student activists in 1960 represented 
in the minds of postwar progressives the active conscience of not just the Japanese left, but the 
postwar ideal of active citizen subjectivity. 
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 As mass demonstrations intensified in May and June of 1960, even intellectuals skeptical 
of Zengakuren described themselves as inspired by the activist language of the Bund-led 
organization. Students were a clear demographic category committed to action, often at the head 
of street marches.50 They forced themselves into the public conversation, provoking controversy 
and curiosity. Like many on the traditional left, poet and JCP member Sekine Hiroshi became 
interested in the Zengakuren when both the mainstream press and the JCP publication Akahata—
ostensible political enemies—denounced Zengakuren's 17 November 1959 physical incursion 
into the Diet.51 On that occasion, about 12,000 activists—not only students, although the leaders 
of the group were assumed to be Zengakuren—had rushed into the Diet compound during a 
demonstration and remained on the grounds into the evening, eventually leaving of their own 
volition.52 Sekine sought out members of the Bund-led Zengakuren in order to formulate his own 
independent evaluation of them, he reported in a June 1960 article. Sekine's inquiry led him to 
write a sympathetic portrayal of the New Left. Countering claims that the Zengakuren was too 
extreme, Sekine quoted a female student who participated in demonstrations at Tokyo's Haneda 
Airport on 16 January 1960. She had explained to him that Zengakuren's airport sit-in was a 
mostly symbolic protest against Prime Minister Kishi's upcoming trip to Washington to sign the 
renewed Security Treaty. The female student noted that, although Zengakuren activists  hoped to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 The high visibility of the students in the anti-treaty protests resulted in the student-centric research of 
the 1970s, e.g. Ellis S. Krauss, Japanese Radicals Revisited; Student Protest in Postwar Japan (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1974); Tsurumi Kazuko, Social Change and the Individual: Japan Before 
and After Defeat in World War II (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970). Recent scholarship 
moves away from that to work through how the demonstrations created a civic – shimin – political 
subjectivity, e.g. Simon Avenell, Making Japanese Citizens: Civil Society and the Mythology of the 
Shimin in Postwar Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010); Sasaki-Uemura, Organizing 
the Spontaneous. It is my impression that now the role of student activism is due for a re-evaluation 
informed by the work on civic subjectivity. 
51 Sekine Hiroshi, “Hitei no shūdan," Shisō no kagaku, May 1960, 69–82. 
52 Packard, Protest in Tokyo, 166. 
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prevent Kishi's departure, they were not fanatics hell-bent on clawing him out of the airplane. In 
her quoted words, “We never intended to stop him by biting the cars or dangling from the 
propellers."53 Sekine agreed that the protests had been successful in garnering public sympathy, 
and his use of a female student as the voice of moderation and self-aware activism had the effect 
of presenting the Bund-led Zengakuren in a positive light. 
 In the course of Sekine's interviews, it emerged that the political earnestness of the Bund-
led student movement worried many intellectuals. Literary critic Etō Jun remarked that, “in all 
senses, the fact that [the Zengakuren] are pure is a minus."54 However, the politics of political 
action carried great moral authority even for those who desired more careful political strategy. 
Marxist historian Hani Gorō, torn between the callow politics of the Bund-led Zengakuren and 
the ineffectiveness of the traditional reform parties, framed his evaluation in terms shared by 
many on the traditional left in Japan. He declared, “the actions of the Zengakuren are correct. 
[But] the thinking of the JCP is not incorrect."55 While Hani objected that the philosophy of the 
students was too underdeveloped, he recognized that their willingness to take action was 
valuable, and distinguished student activists from the traditional left as it existed in 1960.56 
 Although the Bund had split from the JCP in 1957, the anti-Anpo demonstrations in 
particular pitted generations of leftists against each other. The 1960 film Night and Fog in Japan 
(Nihon no yoru to kiri), which was directed by Ōshima Nagisa and dealt directly with the fallout 
of the June 1960 protests, illustrates how memories of "spy" imprisonments, betrayals, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Sekine, “Hitei no shūdan," 76. Sekine also notes that the Bund-led Zengakuren told him, upon his 
meeting with them that they also made sure to assign positions to female students within their 
organization. 
54 Ibid., 82. 
55 Ibid. 
56 By the time of the campus-based protests of the late 1960s, Hani would be one of the greatest allies of 
the student New Left. 
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power abused at the service of sexual desire continued to mar the public image of the Old Left 
and the JCP.57 Ōshima employs the fictional character of Nakagawa, a Party leader, to personify 
the moral bankruptcy of an older generation of JCP-affiliated student activists. Nakagawa serves 
as master of ceremonies in a wedding meant to join two generations in the wake of the mass 
demonstrations of 15 June 1960. In Ōshima's film, the experience of tumultuous protests around 
the Diet, in which several students were injured and a female student died, underlined again the 
betrayal by the dogmatic Left. As represented by the character of Nakagawa, the JCP only 
blames the students for undermining the Party, unable to recognize the students as victims. 
Ōshima also illustrates the politics of the Left in gendered terms. The Party man is empty; his 
wife presents the ultimate evidence for his lack of political earnestness. Provoked by accusations 
of "domestic bliss," she retorts that while watching the anti-Anpo protests of 15 June 1960 on 
television, her insistence that they ought to be at the Diet as participants rather than remaining 
distant observers was met only with her JCP husband's lustful demand for sex. 
Female Students as Legitimating Figures in the 1960 Anpo Demonstrations 
 Even for those Japanese who were not particularly invested in leftist ideology, the 
earnestness of the student movement confirmed the moral authority of its street activism, and the 
interest of young women in this mode of political participation held tremendous persuasive 
power. In articles, participant accounts, and even Diet debates, the presence of young women 
emphasized the approachability, vulnerability, and also the just nature of the new student 
movement. A Tokyo business owner told the Asahi Journal that it was at the urging of his 
teenage daughter that he had marched on the Diet against treaty renewal.58 The presence of 
young women in the Zengakuren demonstrations of 1960 made them approachable even to those 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Nagisa Ōshima and Ishido Toshiro, Nihon No Yoru to Kiri, 1960. 
58 Avenell, Making Japanese Citizens, 94–95. Originally from Asahi jânaru, July 3, 1960. 
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who would not otherwise participate in street actions. One middle-aged housewife recounted 
how she surprised herself by moving from the position of passive spectator to that of active 
demonstrator at the urging of an anonymous young woman. It was the “sunburned face" of the 
young woman who called out to her and urged her to join that convinced her to march.59 A 
daughter's conscience prompted a father to protest; a young woman in a demonstration opened 
that public space to an older woman who would not ordinarily enter it. Whether these stories are 
true or not, they fit the hegemonic ideal in which young women's outrage provides legitimate 
justification for public protest.   
 New postwar political ideologies that allowed young women into contentious political 
spaces did not mean that parents necessarily approved of their daughters' activism. Despite the 
strict control that many families still attempted to retain over their daughters—short-term and 
single-sex colleges were common compromises—many young women were able to join the 
street protests focused on the Diet Building in Tokyo because they had been allowed to leave 
home to pursue their education.60 At women's schools, dormitories regulated the comings and 
goings of the residents. Women's schools like Joshibi University of Art and Design and 
Ochanomizu University may have had radical reputations, but women's dormitories even there 
curtailed students' activism with strict curfews. Nevertheless, such institutional rules meant little 
without proper enforcement. One female Anpo protester recalled that her dorm matron at Japan 
Women's University had sympathized with her political engagement and offered what 
encouragement was possible: making rice balls for her to take to demonstrations and quietly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Ibid., 95. 
60 Miwa Yamamoto, ed., “Joshi gakusei no anpo tōsō," in Onnatachi no 60-nen anpo, vol. 5, Jūgoshi nōto 
sengohen (Kawasaki: Inpakuto shuppankai, 1990), 92–93. 
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opening the door for her if she returned after curfew.61 Parents' reactions to their daughters' 
activism also varied, ranging from letters and phone calls forbidding any form of political 
participation, to the tacit support of progressive parents, to—in the case of at least one family 
with mixed politics—a loud debate with one parent and a quiet "be careful" from the other.62  
 Inasmuch as student activists in 1960 seemed to deny the demands placed on them by 
parents and other senior figures, they seemed also to attempt a break from the Japanese past. The 
popular psychoanalyst Doi Takeo likened anti-Anpo Zengakuren activists to the folkloric figure 
of Momotarō, a boy sprung from a peach and therefore parentless. Like Momotarō, the students 
saw themselves as sui-generis children of the postwar period. Doi noted in 1960: “In our eyes 
[Zengakuren] can't help but resemble Momotarō. It doesn't recognize traditional authority. It 
burns with the desire to subjugate the bad guys."63 
 Although the tactics with which Zengakuren expressed its anger, such as breaking into 
the Diet grounds, unnerved those who felt violence had no place in a democratic society, the 
right of youth to express anger at the state of postwar Japanese society enjoyed a wide consensus. 
By 1960, the fiction of Ōe Kenzaburō and Kurahashi Yumiko had conferred upon both authors 
the status of public intellectuals. Echoing similar sentiments with different foci, both writers 
penned articles in response to the student protests of that year, affirming the motivations of the 
young activists while also articulating their own individual critiques. In February 1960, Ōe 
published an article in which he qualified his support for the Bund-led Zengakuren with an 
indictment of the latter's “naiveté." The term used by Ōe, kamatoto, evokes the image of a coy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Ibid., 97. 
62 Ibid., 98. 
63 Doi Takeo, “Momotarō to Zengakuren," in Doi Takeo Zenshū: “Amae" Riron No Haten, vol. 2 (Tokyo: 
Iwanami shoten, 2000), 8. Article originally published in 1960. 
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woman, thus likening Zengakuren to a young female playing dumb. Ōe introduced himself to 
readers as a “supporter of the student movement," but chided Zengakuren for swaggeringly 
embracing the bad reputation that had emerged from mainstream press treatment of their 
activities, especially after forcing entry into the Diet compound on 27 November 1959. 
Responding to those in the mass media who dubbed the Bund-led Zengakuren the “Red Thunder 
Gang," Ōe pointed out that, unlike real motorcycle gangs, Zengakuren “does not run over good 
citizens." He continued, “The [so-called] Red Thunder Gang conducts demonstrations to express 
their will as young Japanese nationals. That's all. And to demonstrate is an activity in keeping 
with democratic laws."64 Ōe, while criticizing the Bund's "naiveté," defended the group's 
existence in the political milieu of the time, recognizing that student activists exercised and 
thereby protected civil rights in general. For Ōe, it was the LDP politicians and journalists who 
ran about decrying lawful demonstrations as mob behavior that posed the real threat to Japanese 
parliamentary procedure and democracy. Their activities, rather than those of student activists, 
merited disgust and anger. 
 Writing several months after Ōe, Kurahashi Yumiko likewise criticized the "irritable" 
actions of the Bund-led Zengakuren, but recommended anger as a useful tool to question society. 
In a May 1960 journal article, she demanded a deeper critique of the position of students in 
contemporary Japanese society and the rigid requirements placed on them for entry into a good 
high school, middle school, elementary school, even kindergarten. Instead of being “irritable," 
Kurahashi declared, “We should be angry. There are plenty of reasons to be angry." She further 
elaborated the political views that her sensual fiction suggested, declaring, “Most of us don't 
have faith in thought and theory. More than anything it is our bodies, our bodies which are much 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Kenzaburō Ōe, “Zengakuren Kamatoto O Hinan Suru," Fujin Kōron, February 1960, 62. 
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better developed than those of before the war, that we believe in."65 Adopting the pronoun "we" 
to represent her generation of postwar youth, Kurahashi advocated an embodied political 
subjectivity.66 
 Just as the presence of young female bodies at protests legitimated the political activism 
of the student movement, police violence against female bodies provoked the deepest critiques of 
state power. Tanaka Sumie, a female screenplay writer for Kinoshita Keisuke among others, 
decried the violent tactics of the Bund-led Zengakuren in a February 1960 article in Shisō no 
kagaku (Science of Thought).67 However, she also noted that the “400 female students" who 
participated in the Zengakuren actions made her question her own more apolitical post-student 
life. Tanaka thrilled to the sight of young women in street demonstrations. Finding police 
violence against these female activists unforgivable, Tanaka saw female student radicals as 
earnest and vulnerable citizens. 
 Police aggression toward female student activists drew the sympathies of even tabloid 
journalism toward "angry" young women and student demonstrations. The tabloid Shūkan 
shinchō focused its coverage of the 26 April 1960 demonstrations, the first held at the Diet since 
27 November 1959, on what it dubbed the "angry daughters of April 26."68 As with the 
November demonstrations, students clashed with police on this occasion.69 However, a series of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Kurahashi Yumiko, “Gakusei yo, ogoru nakare," Fujin kōron, May 1960, 272. 
66 Yoshikuni Igarashi offers a reading that contrasts the bodily metaphors of the anti-Anpo movement and 
the 1964 Tokyo Olympics. He argues that the physical confrontations around the Diet Building "awoke 
disturbing memories of the past in Japan" that were remembered wordlessly in bodies. See Igarashi, 
Bodies of Memory: Narratives of War in Postwar Japanese Culture, 1945-1970, 139. 
67 Tanaka Sumie, “Senpai toshite, haha toshite," Fujin kōron, February 1960, 67–69. 
68 “Gurabia: Keikan to ikareru musumetachi," Shūkan shinchō, 16 May 1960. 
69 Makoto Nakajima, Zengakuren (Tokyo: San'ichi shobo, 1968), 2. 
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full-page photographs printed in the periodical rendered female students chiefly as victims, 
exposing through images the physical force that police had used against them (fig. 1-3). 
 




Figure 2. A young woman pushed to holster level. Shūkan shinchō, 16 May 1960. 
 
Figure 3. Female student protestors confronting police. Shūkan shinchō, 16 May 1960. 
 Shūkan shinchō's double-page spread (Figure 2) captures a young female activist, her 
head forced down by the anonymous hands of authority. All that can be seen of policemen is a 
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holster, a gun, and a hand gripping the cuff of the young woman's coat. It may be the young 
women who are "angry," but the rough treatment suggests undue force. Superimposed on the 
photograph is a quote from a student at the prestigious Women's College of Fine Arts who 
decried the force employed by the police against the weaker bodies of women. She also noted 
that the police she faced behaved like Korean police, referring to the force used by South Korean 
soldiers in concurrent protests by labor and students across the Tsushima straits and suggesting 
that it was the actions of the police, not the protestors, that threatened Japan's democracy.70 For 
many observers of student protest, the state's willingness to confront women's bodies with 
violence represented the excesses of state force. 
 The hegemonic ideal of the female student activist as inherently a good citizen, even if 
she became an angry daughter, affected political discussions in the House of Councilors. The 
upper house's Committee of Judicial Affairs met on 16 February 1960 to deliberate the correct 
application of the Subversive Activities Prevention Law of 1952. As part of the hearing, peace 
activist Takada Nahoko argued against police abuse of the law, giving as examples the 
detainment of female students—including “Kanbajima [sic] Michiko and Shimoinoue Yoshiko" 
from Tokyo University—at the Zengakuren sit-in at Haneda Airport in January 1960. Takada 
suggested that their arrests were based on their leadership positions in the student movement, 
rather than on their actions at Haneda. Takada implied that the police department collected 
photographs and files on student leaders, and emphasized that these young women came from 
good families, were passionate about their studies, and should not be the targets of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 In March and April 1960, South Korean students were key in overthrowing the rule of Syngman Rhee. 
Packard, Protest in Tokyo, 229. See also Charles Kim, “Moral Imperatives: South Korean Studenthood 
and April 19th," The Journal of Asian Studies 71, no. 2 (May 2012): 399–422. 
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Subversive Activities Prevention Law.71 Takada's purpose in bringing up female students was to 
illustrate state violations, based on a shared assumption that young women were the most sincere 
examples of citizen subjectivity. Policing of protest came across as most insidious when it 
targeted young women. 
 Although Takada misstated the name of the female student activist Kanba Michiko in her 
House of Councillors testimony, after 15 June 1960 no one in Japan could make such a mistake. 
Kanba's death at the south gate of the Diet compound in clashes between students and police 
marked the first, and most famous, sacrifice of the postwar student left. That Kanba was female 
meant that she stepped into a narrative already in motion that equated female students with 
postwar democratic political purity. The death of Kanba Michiko, a female university student at 
Tokyo University and a New Left activist, gave that postwar narrative real-life confirmation. 
While Kanba's “sacrifice" tapped into public sympathy for the purity of female students and 
prompted intellectuals and citizens to criticize the state, ultimately resulting in Prime Minister 
Kishi's resignation a month later, images of her feminine purity also eclipsed her political 
opinions. I turn to this tension between the symbolic power of Kanba as a pure maiden sacrifice 
and Kanba as a social critic and activist in the next chapter.
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Ironies of an Icon: 
The creation of a maiden sacrifice 
 
Beaten by the acacia rains 
That is how I want to die 
The night will end, the sun will rise 
In the morning's light 
He'll find my cold body 
That certain someone 
And I wonder if he'll shed tears for me 
 “When the Acacia Rains Stop," sung by Nishida Sawako  
 
 Nishida Sawako's hit ballad "When the Acacia Rains Stop" still recalls for many Japanese 
the anti-Anpo protests of 1960. The lyrics evoke beautiful failure, but also a specifically female 
sacrifice: "Beaten by the acacia rains / that is how I want to die / the night will end, the sun will 
rise / in the morning's light / he'll find my cold body." For many, this song, released just before 
the rainy season—the "plum rains (tsuyu)"—of June 1960, provided the soundtrack not only for 
the dramatic street confrontations of that month, but also for the aftermath of mourning for a 
young woman who had indeed died, tragically, on the evening of 15 June 1960. Her "cold body" 
was found by the entire nation in the morning's light of 16 June 1960. 
Introduction 
 The death of Kanba Michiko, a twenty-two-year-old coed, inside the South Gate of the 
Diet on the evening of 15 June 1960 manifested in highly physical form the social conscience of 
postwar Japanese society. This chapter analyzes the creation of a New Left heroine out of this 
young woman who was killed in clashes with police after forcing entry into the Diet compound 
with a contingent of Bund-led Zengakuren students. The symbolic power of her death not only 
illuminates the dynamics of gender in the early phases of the postwar student movement in Japan, 
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but also raises the issue of iconicity and its relation to social movements in general. The idea of 
an "iconic" figure, in the contemporary cultural sense of someone or something representative of 
a particular culture or moment, emerged historically within the specific context of 1960s 
culture.1 Although applying a Christian-derived term to a non-Western historical context may 
seem at first glance problematic, the Japanese reception of Kanba Michiko's death nevertheless 
brings into focus a dynamic played out again and again between radicalizing leftist youth 
movements and expanding mass media in various contexts in the 1960s and 1970s.2 The 
overshadowing of Kanba the real person by Kanba the iconic maiden martyr in the mass media is 
a process that would find parallels elsewhere.3 
 The present chapter draws on journalistic accounts and works submitted by "citizen" 
poets to examine the immediate impact of Kanba Michiko's death on public consciousness. It 
also examines Kanba Michiko's thoughts as articulated in her personal writings in order to 
identify an ironic discrepancy between Kanba's public significance and her personal relationship 
to radical politics. Kanba's personal writings reveal a very different side of the person we call 
Kanba Michiko, and one much more radical than the "iconic" maiden represented in the popular 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 2006 draft additions to the Oxford English Dictionary introduce this definition, and cite a 1976 
Newsweek article as the first example, in reference to Robert Smithson's 'Spiral Jetty' landscape art. The 
examples used to illustrate the term all refer to cases of "icons" created by post-WWII mass media, e.g. 
JFK, Marilyn Monroe, and the cinema of Ingmar Bergman. Oxford English Dictionary Online, 2nd ed., 
s.v. "iconic."  
2 For example, although David Kunzle points out that in the case of Che Guevara, the Christian 
implications of Che as "icon" remain key to his interpretation. Interestingly, that link between Che and 
Christ does the same ideological work as the discourse around Kanba in Japan: it "disarms" Che and 
associates him with social justice and peace. David Kunzle, “Chesucristo: Fusions, Myths, and Realities," 
Latin American Perspectives 35, no. 2 (March 1, 2008): 97–115. 
3 As Peniel E. Joseph notes in his article on the state of the field in studies on the Black Power Movement, 
"iconic" images often obscure the history of social movements. In his subsequent use of the term "iconic," 
to describe leaders (male and female) and posters, he reveals how the term denotes the aspects of the 
Black Power Movement emphasized by the mass media. Peniel E. Joseph, “The Black Power Movement: 
A State of the Field," The Journal of American History 96, no. 3 (December 1, 2009): 751-776. 
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press as a "pure" and gentle middle-class daughter. The power of Kanba's iconic status as a 
maiden sacrifice by the New Left in the immediate aftermath of her 15 June 1960 death rested on 
a hegemonic ideal of the young female student as the purest expression of civic political agency.4 
A comparison of Kanba Michiko the maiden sacrifice with Princess Michiko, the maiden bride 
of the Crown Prince, provides further illustration of the power of mass media–generated 
iconography to efface the voices of postwar female students even as it created public symbols 
out of them. 
Kanba Michiko as Female Victim 
 In the political confusion following the 15 June 1960 demonstration in which Kanba 
Michiko died, the only "truth" all parties could agree upon was the identity of Kanba as victim. 
The identity of the victimizer, meanwhile, became a matter of ideological conviction. Major 
newspapers issued a statement condemning violence (implying that students were responsible for 
Kanba's death), while student activists and their supporters countered with charges of undue 
"violence by authorities."5 A series of autopsies failed to confirm whether Kanba had been killed 
by blows from a police baton or had been trampled under the feet of fellow protestors. Many 
were injured in the dramatic confrontations among demonstrators, authorities ,and right-wing 
groups on 15 June 1960, but it was Kanba Michiko's lifeless body—her long hair betraying the 
gender of her trouser-clad body—that represented for most Japanese the ultimate sacrifice. Some 
publications, ranging from the mass-audience Asahi Journal to the campus newspaper of Tokyo 
University, even ran photographs of her corpse laid out in the police hospital.6 Such media 
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5 Hidaka Rokurō, “Kenryoku no bōryoku," Tokyo daigaku shinbun, July 11, 1960. 
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treatment represented Kanba as a passive subject and vulnerable victim.7 Although Kanba 
Michiko had been a vocal leader of the anti-Anpo student movement, public discourse in the 
wake of her death defined the meaning of her life differently. Conversations reported in the mass 
media defined Kanba first and foremost as a young woman, obscuring her connection to radical 
politics. 
 It was not only the tabloid or student media that set aside Kanba Michiko's politics and 
reacted emotionally to her "maiden" death. Almost immediately after Kanba's demise, public 
intellectuals also responded to the news in a personal way. Tsurumi Kazuko, a female intellectual 
and co-founder of the left-leaning periodical Shisō no kagaku (Science of thought), reported her 
first reaction to the news of the tragedy in a July 1960 as the thought that, “If I was young, that 
girl could have been me."8 Although Tsurumi did not know Kanba, nor her motivations, she 
believed that they shared a common political subjectivity. Tsurumi assumed that, if she herself 
were still young, she would have acted just as Kanba had, and become just as vulnerable. 
Tsurumi's article related several angry phone calls that she had received from female friends as 
news of a young woman's death flew between them via telephone. Tsurumi's milieu of powerful 
intellectual women expressed their anger as mothers and wives. “From a mother's position I can't 
stay silent. I'm calling Mrs. Kishi in protest," one woman declared. Another remarked, “How 
about calling the wife of the Chief Cabinet Secretary as well?" These women feel an imperative 
to speak, often “as mothers," not directly to power, but to the women married to power. The fact 
that the victim of this violence had been a young woman influenced their empathy. As women, 
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they felt they understood how Kanba felt; as mothers, they felt that it was their duty to appeal to 
other women and protect other young people from violence. 
 Male public intellectuals could not appeal as directly to a feminine subjectivity of 
pacifism and protection, but their analyses also revealed the rapid conversion of Kanba Michiko 
from a student radical into a depoliticized feminine symbol of the excesses of state force. Writing 
for the journal Fujin kōron in September 1960, Tsurumi Kazuko's brother Shunsuke, also a co-
founder of Shisō no kagaku, attempted an analysis of popular sympathy for Zengakuren. His 
piece demonstrated not only that the figure of Kanba transcended politics, but also, through a 
selective choice of sources, that female students in general symbolized political naiveté and 
purity. It is the voice of an apolitical female student, a sophomore at Tokyo's Rikkyō University, 
that represents ordinary students in Tsurumi's piece. The student, Asada Mizuko, also embraces 
that representative role when she declares that for “ordinary students," attending a demonstration 
is more a matter of becoming an onlooker than a participant. And the only cause for which she 
herself mobilized was that of commemorating Kanba Michiko. “I only came out for Kanba's 
memorial gathering," Asada declared. "I don't understand at all the distinction between 
mainstream and anti-mainstream student activists. I'm a liberal, and I think capitalism is good. 
Even so, I guess communism has its good points. It's because of Zengakuren that Ike couldn't 
come and Kishi was toppled."9 Tsurumi's “ordinary" nonpolitical student, represented in the 
person of Asada, a female, rejects the wholesale Zengakuren-formulated critique of capitalism 
although she embraces the moral authority of Zengakuren's actions in the anti-Anpo protests. 
Only the death of Kanba Michiko draws this apolitical female student into the streets, for an 
ostensibly apolitical demonstration. The voice of this nonpolitical female student, amplified 
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through Tsurumi Shunsuke's article, goes a long way toward depoliticizing the figure of Kanba 
and the nature of her activism. Although Tsurumi does not discuss his own reactions to the 
events, his article emphasizes a feminine sense of transcending political ideology through both 
the figure of the dead female student (Kanba) and the interpretation of the death by a living 
"ordinary" female student. 
 It was not only strangers to Kanba Michiko who erased personal politics from the social 
meaning of her death. Michiko's father Toshio, too, played a crucial role in interpreting the death 
of his daughter. Toshio, a professor at Chūo University, declared Michiko "a sacrifice for the 
people (kokumin)."10  He not only elided her radicalism, but also used her death to dismiss 
charges of Zengakuren violence. Toshio affirmed that the 15 June 1960 demonstrations, 
including the actions of the Zengakuren, represented the political will of all citizens. As a father, 
Professor Kanba emphasized that Michiko, and by extension the movement she participated in, 
always desired what was right in the world. In his commemoration of his daughter, Toshio also 
defended her choice to enter the Diet compound with the front line of student activists, even 
though she only possessed "the body of a female student." He emphasized that what many called 
a "dangerous place" for women was instead the proper place for a student demonstration 
protesting the government's anti-democratic actions.11 
 Up until Kanba Michiko's death, however, Kanba Toshio also opposed his daughter's 
participation in aggressive political actions. In an August 1960 article titled "The Daughter Who 
Disappeared in the Tempest at the Diet," Toshio described his conflicts with Michiko, in 
particular after her arrest during the Zengakuren demonstrations at Haneda Airport in January 
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1960. In March of the same year he had gone so far as to publish an article under the headline "A 
Daughter Stolen by Zengakuren."12 Half a year later, after Michiko's death, Kanba Toshio shifted 
his rhetoric from one that chided the student movement for "stealing" his daughter to one that 
indicted the larger political "tempest" that had made her disappear. Although Toshio described 
his daughter as confrontational, standing up to him on matters of politics, both of his articles 
frame Michiko as politically vulnerable and passive. In both cases, although the aggressor 
changes, Michiko the daughter remains the victim. 
 Kanba Toshio's opposition to his daughter's involvement in the student movement 
reflected his disapproval of Zengakuren's aggressive tactics. Like many other "ordinary" citizens, 
he supported the anti-Anpo movement, and he also took to the streets during the 15 June 
demonstrations around the Diet Building to protest the Kishi administration's "irrational" and 
"undemocratic" maneuvers.13 Kanba Toshio's observations during that protest colored his 
interpretation of Michiko as a passive victim. In his August 1960 memorial essay, he recounted 
seeing several bloodied students.14 Toshio even participated in the moment of silence demanded 
by a student standing atop an armored police vehicle at the South Gate to commemorate an 
unnamed "fallen female student." It was only when Professor Kanba stopped in at an eatery on 
the way home that he heard his daughter's name given as the killed student, broadcast on the 
radio.15 
 Many other non-student participants remarked upon the violence that broke out around 
them as they joined the crowd around the Diet, and few faulted student groups for the bloody 
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confusion. Students seemed instead to bear the brunt of police aggression, and rightwing groups 
also attacked various citizen marchers. Those "ordinary citizens" who witnessed the violence 
outside the Diet compound were quick to see Kanba Michiko, killed after breaking into the 
compound, as a victim instead of an aggressor. Many expressed a kinship of vulnerability with 
the fallen girl. One housewife wrote in an article first published in the daily Asahi and 
subsequently printed in the Tokyo University newspaper that she had just returned home in her 
ripped clothes, looking "like a refugee," when she heard about Kanba's death. She immediately 
associated the death with an attack she had herself witnessed in which a male right-winger 
clubbed a woman accompanied by a child. This violent man, the writer noted, remained 
untouched by the police.16 This account pointed to the gendered nature of violence—wrought not 
only by the police, but also by a male right-winger—while also citing the gendered victimization 
of a mother. For this observer, Kanba Michiko came to represent the injuries sustained by herself 
and all vulnerable and peaceful participants in the mass anti-Anpo demonstrations, although 
Kanba had fallen after pushing her way to the front of the fighting. 
 Although Zengakuren's aggressive tactics leading up to 15 June 1960 frequently divided 
generational opinions about the proper mode of "active" politics, the sacrifice of Kanba Michiko 
united public sentiment. In the wake of Kanba's death, a young woman attending college in 
Tokyo at the time sent her parents in Nagoya a letter that must have been hard for them to read. 
She declared that the general mood among students had shifted to one in which self-sacrifice 
seemed necessary, and that if she were to die in a demonstration her parents ought not to "say 
something embarrassing like 'Zengakuren took my child.'" The mother's reaction to this 
opinionated stand exhibited more pride than horror, however; she submitted her daughter's letter 
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to the regional edition of the daily Asahi.17 By sending her daughter's private letter to a public 
source, the mother in effect legitimated her daughter's desire to sacrifice herself publicly for the 
cause of postwar democracy. 
Kanba Michiko as Representative of Postwar Democracy 
 Kanba Michiko, delinked from her radical activist politics through her victimhood, 
represented a simplified ideal of postwar democratic agency. Echoing postwar debates about 
how to overcome what was interpreted as the passive acceptance by Japanese subjects of 
wartime militarism with an "active" democratic subjectivity, Michiko's father defined her death 
as a failure of democracy. This was because, although the postwar Constitution promised a new 
democratic order, without action that democracy remained only a promise. Kanba Toshio hoped 
that Michiko's death would mobilize "citizens awakened to democracy," for if peace and 
democracy prevailed, he would not regret the death of his only daughter.18 The idea of an active, 
awakened, liberal citizen of a postwar democracy borrowed from earlier debates waged among 
American Occupation reformers and progressive Japanese intellectuals. The idea of women as 
the most vulnerable members of an order that was not "peaceful" or "democratic" also evoked 
postwar discussions about the sacrifices of women during a "men's" war. Kanba Michiko, 
through the accident of her gender and death in a demonstration interpreted as an expression of 
democratic "citizens," confirmed the impression of anti-democratic violence as a masculine force 
that victimized women in particular. 
 Kanba Michiko's parents' access to mass-media outlets as the chief mourners of their 
daughter's death and guardians of its meaning also emphasized Michiko's social position as not 
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only female but also an "ordinary" middle-class daughter. Both mother and father published in 
the July 1960 special issue of Tokyo University's newspaper, their comments appearing next to 
each other.19 In later accounts of Kanba Michiko's death as well, the deep tragedy of her parents' 
loss remained a central element of the narrative. The fact that Kanba's father had joined in a 
silent prayer for the unnamed fallen student with the crowd around the Diet only later to hear his 
daughter's name broadcast on the radio, that her mother had heard the news while resting for a 
moment at her brother's home, that both had consoled each other "with trembling hands" as they 
identified their daughter at the police hospital early in the morning of 16 June 1960—all this 
became part of the tragic narrative of Kanba's death.20 However, Michiko's father already 
enjoyed access to mass-media sources by virtue of his social position as a professor. It was 
Kanba Michiko's mother, Kanba Mitsuko, who not only was launched into the public sphere 
after 15 June 1960, but also retained close links to later generations of student activists and was 
accorded respect as the mother of the postwar student movement's first sacrifice. It was Kanba 
Mitsuko who took the initiative in publishing an influential collection of Michiko's poems, 
stories, letters, and essays. She also published her own essays on Michiko in various news outlets 
and journals.21 
 Although the mourning parents occupied a privileged place in public discourse on Kanba 
Michiko's death, those further removed from Michiko also contributed to the iconography of her 
"sacrifice." When Kanba Toshio's faculty colleague, Kiyomizu Kitarō, gave the address at 
Michiko's memorial on 23 June 1960, he, too, described her as the greatest “sacrifice" of that 
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struggle.22 Tokyo University professor Yamashita Hajime, in an August 1960 article on 
Zengakuren similarly declared that "the name of Kanba Michiko, who became a tragic sacrifice, 
is already known by all citizens."23 The character of Michiko that emerges from the public 
statements of these intellectuals is not dissimilar to that of the fictional figures of young women 
who stubbornly want to see what is right in the world come into being, even to the point of self-
sacrifice. Through speeches and articles noting Kanba Michiko's "sacrifice" and linking it to a 
“citizens'" struggle, these male university professors fit her public image into the myth of the 
pure female student activist that had already become hegemonic by the late 1950s. Kanba 
Michiko's death seemed to make the myth real. 
 Outpourings of sympathetic gestures by "the people" both responded to these 
interpretations and confirmed the iconic power of Kanba Michiko's death. Altars built "by the 
people's hands" at the Diet's South Gate demonstrated how Michiko as maiden sacrifice 
resonated with popular opinion. Michiko's father noted an unexpected impact among "ordinary 
citizens," evidenced also by the "tens of thousands" of people, "old, young, men, women" who 
came out for her memorial demonstration on 18 June 1960.24 A widely circulated portrait of 
Kanba, used at her 18 June 1960 Tokyo University memorial service, offers viewers an image of 
a round-faced young woman with tidy, modestly coiffed hair and a face free of makeup (fig. 4). 
This photograph conveyed middle-class femininity more than radical critique. 
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Figure 4. Kanba Michiko's portrait at her 18 June 1960 Tokyo University memorial service. 
Photograph by Hamaya Hiroshi.25 
 
 
 Before the year was out, a group of Kyoto University students published a poetry 
collection to memorialize Kanba Michiko that demonstrated the broad cross-section of people 
affected by the tragedy. The poetry of all three demographic groups represented in the volume—
workers, students, and "ordinary people"—evoked Kanba's particularly feminine purity. The 
collection, titled Unending Footsteps (Ashioto wa tayuru toki naku), emphasized the emotional 
power of a young woman's death for many people who had never met her. The mostly amateur 
authors affirmed a collective mourning for the maiden sacrifice. Reflecting the hegemonic ideal 
of politically pure young women, many poems refer to Kanba's death as "pure," and to Kanba as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




a "maiden," or even a "white-throated female student."26 A lecturer at a technical high school in 
Kobe linked Kanba's femininity and youth to her political sincerity, describing her as both a 
"beautiful maiden" and a "righteous human."27 The introductory poem of the volume, by the 
female writer and peace activist Fukao Sumako, introduces Kanba as a flower: the “rose of 
justice, rose of resistance."28 Many of the volume's poems share this floral imagery.29 A flower 
can suggest not only female purity and beauty, but also a particular season, in this case the balmy 
late spring of Kanba's passing. Alternatively, several poems evoked the June rains, in reference 
to the rainy season that had witnessed the anti-Anpo protests' climax.30 Mentions of fragrant flora 
and spring showers make these poems seem almost of a piece with Nishida Sawako's popular 
ballad; a maiden death in the tempest echoes Nishida's "crying in the acacia rains." 
 By contrast, the cause of Kanba's death is described variously as a bestial evil—"this 
goblin known as government"—or even as "Satan."31 A poem written by "a worker," addressed 
"to Kanba-san's spirit," describes the death of her "white flesh" and the spilling of her blood as a 
purification ritual for the government.32 Such poetic interpretations cast the complicated political 
struggles over Anpo as a morality tale in which evil crushed a pure, budding maiden. 
 Many poets, in particular the female poets represented in the volume, expressed a 
gendered solidarity with Kanba Michiko. Like Tsurumi Kazuko, they assumed that their shared 
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gender with the dead woman implied a common set of values. The values shared among women 
included a sincere desire to demonstrate against injustice. As one poet, Umehara Haruko, noted, 
it was perhaps essential to Kanba's feminine nature that "she earnestly wanted to appeal to 
Kishi."33 Many women also based their feelings of intimacy with Kanba on information gleaned 
from the mass media. As we have seen, Kanba's actual political motivations dropped out of 
mass-media discussions about the social meaning of her death. Kanba's politics also dropped out 
of poetic interpretations of her actions. For example, an anonymous woman from the Osaka area 
described her emotional reaction to Kanba's death as arising from their "same sex." The 
familiarity that the woman felt toward Kanba Michiko transcends personal specifics: "I knew 
you / I don't know your face or your voice or your everyday / But even so I / had expectations for 
you / after the sixteenth day of this month I continue to have expectations for you."34 In the 
woman poet's view, "knowing" Kanba Michiko had more to do with understanding Kanba's 
social role as a maiden sacrifice than with knowing Kanba as an individual, with her own "face 
or voice" or "everyday." A woman who had been a graduate student when Kanba died described 
a similar sentiment, noting that although "Kanba Michiko was not even a passing acquaintance," 
she felt deeply that she could have been the one killed instead. The impression that "that girl 
could have been me" forged a lasting sentimental relationship to the figure of Kanba, which 
defined the woman's relationship to the political turmoil of 1960.35 The feeling that "the girl 
could have been me" also effaced Kanba's radical personal history, however. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Ibid., 34. 
34 Ibid., 160. 
35 Shima Yōko, “Hantaisei no yasashisa to hokori," in Onnatachi no 60-nen anpo, vol. 5, Jūgoshi nōto 
sengohen (Kawasaki: Inpakuto shuppankai, 1990), 126–127. 
	  
 71	  
 Although many female student activists participated in, and were even arrested for, Bund-
led Zengakuren demonstrations in the late 1950s and in early 1960, Kanba was one of the rare 
female student leaders within the Bund-led Zengakuren. Kanba, as a student at Tokyo University, 
was already a member of the social elite; as a female student at the primarily male university, 
and as a female leader in particular, she was exceptional.36 While her position of privilege 
actually marked her as unusual for her time, one observer recalled in retrospect that Kanba's 
status heightened the effect of her death on public opinion.37 In death, public memorializations 
emphasizing her general feminine vulnerability and sacrifice repressed her radical politics and 
her social status. 
The Other Icon of Postwar Democracy: Princess Michiko 
 The fact that Kanba Michiko was a female student at a moment when female students 
represented a new democratic subjectivity was coincidental to her death in the climactic 
demonstrations at the Diet on 15 June 1960. But the meaning that her maidenhood created in 
mass-media memorializations, not just of her person but also of postwar democracy in general, 
conflated her presumably vulnerable gender and the fragility of postwar democracy. Pointing out 
a similar coincidence that nevertheless created meaning, Tokyo University Professor Yamashita 
Hajime pondered the timing of Kanba Michiko's death, just one year after the "Mitchii Boom" 
created by the 1959 marriage of Crown Prince Akihito to a "commoner" (albeit fabulously 
wealthy) young woman also named Michiko. If the news coverage of anti-Anpo protests and the 
death of Kanba Michiko represented the spontaneous creation of a popular icon, the royal 
wedding and parade was a coordinated media event. The spectacle was broadcast into middle-
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class households on black-and-white televisions, the sales of which jumped in the weeks leading 
up to the April ceremony. It was on those same television sets that many would also watch the 
anti-Anpo demonstrations swirl around the Diet building. Those without a TV gathered in 
television-owning families' living rooms; crowds of others congregated in front of electronics-
shop windows to catch the flickering images. On remote islands, the Self-Defense Forces opened 
up base gates to allow neighboring residents a chance to watched the storybook event.38 
 The Crown Prince had met his Michiko in 1957 on the tennis courts of the resort town of 
Karuizawa, launching a discussion in the nation's press on the ideal form of the postwar family. 
The royal couple's first encounter, through social activities rather than through royal arrangement, 
and the bride's status as a college-educated coed suggested a turn to marriages based on love and 
a meeting of equals. The newlywed princess's immediate adoption of the role of the domestic, 
home-managing wife, however, set up an ideal of Japanese womanhood that remained modest 
and domestic in spite of the unorthodox choice of a "commoner" wife for the Crown Prince. 
While conservative observers decried the love marriage, others felt it particularly appropriate to 
align the imperial household with the middle-class family ideal. Echoing newspaper op-ed pieces, 
Suzuki Mosaburō, chair of the Japan Socialist Party, even declared the match "extremely 
appropriate to the new constitution."39 Writing in retrospect, one woman noted that the 
popularity of Michiko erased the Imperial family's wartime role for many Japanese. She blamed 
herself, a university student at the time, for dismissing the royal wedding as mere pageantry: 
"Even I, who disdained those faddish 'Mitchii Boom' fans and was intoxicated in the whirl of 
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Anpo demonstrations, was a supporter of the 'sanitized, harmless' emperor system."40 Political 
youth interpreted the "Mitchii Boom" as silly, and chose to gather in protest at the Diet rather 
than focus on how the royal spectacle erased the link between emperor and Japan's wartime 
actions in Asia by cultivating an image of an innocuous postwar Imperial Family. The processes 
by which college-educated Princess Michiko became an iconic figure were similar to those that 
transformed Kanba Michiko's death into an iconic tragedy; both icons concealed complex 
political histories. 
 Some criticism surrounded the royal wedding, but it rarely considered the historical 
relationship between the imperial institution and Japanese imperialism in Asia. One politically 
active young woman noted that, although around the time of the "Mitchii Boom," she had 
debated the role of the imperial family and argued for making citizens of the royals, she recalled 
being shocked that a resident Korean (zainichi) friend declared that the Emperor deserved the 
death sentence. For a resident Korean, the legacy of violence and exploitation suffered by 
peninsular Koreans under Japanese colonial rule remained fresh in memory. "Resident Koreans" 
were pushed out of postwar Japanese democratic citizenship as well, extending wartime 
dislocation into postwar alienation. It was only later that this woman, a Japanese citizen, could 
understand her zainichi friend's position, rooted in wartime policies of coercion enforced in the 
name of the Emperor.41 Mass-media coverage of the 1960 royal wedding, however, effaced the 
historical link between the imperial family and wartime imperialism. Television footage did 
capture one spontaneous moment of protest that spoke less of historical inequalities and more of 
contemporary economic unevenness. One of the most frequently remembered aspects of the 
televised marriage proceedings was the throwing of a rock in protest at the royal carriage by a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




nineteen-year-old student, known simply as "N" in the mass media because of his youth. Later 
questioned about his action, "N" did not offer a sweeping critique of the imperial institution. His 
motivation, rather, was disgust at the flamboyant display of wealth. The school he had attended 
had been destroyed by fire, and it proved impossible to collect the forty million yen needed to 
rebuild it. By contrast, 230 million yen in taxes were spent on renovating the imperial palace for 
the new couple. What motivated "N," then, was, "anger at that absurdity."42 Unlike Kanba 
Michiko, "N" failed to capture the imagination of the left in postwar Japan. His act of protest 
survived in public memory as an outlying oddity, divorced from any more sweeping narrative of 
conflict.43 
 A more intellectual critique was levied by journalist Saitō Shigeo, who decried the fact 
that, while the royal wedding was supposed to represent an opening up of the imperial household 
to the masses, it was actually the royal family that was forcing its way into the masses' living 
rooms.44 Princess Michiko, however, made the Imperial family seem less invasive and more 
familiar to mainstream audiences increasingly inclined to define themselves as middle class; her 
entrance as a "commoner" female college graduate into the forbidding Imperial Palace 
represented to many observers a democratization of Japanese society, as was the case with 
female student activists of the same period. 
 Although it was coincidental that two iconic representatives of the early 1960s in Japan 
shared the name Michiko, both icons rested upon the hegemonic ideal of the politically pure 
young woman in postwar democracy. Princess Michiko and Kanba Michiko embodied, 
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respectively, the political quietude of Japanese institutions and the political unrest of mass 
protest in the early 1960s, but both represented increased democratic access.45 Tokyo 
University's Professor Yamashita, after pointing out the nominal twist of fate, pondered in 
August 1960 what Princess Michiko thought about the death of Kanba Michiko. Although Kanba 
Michiko died just across the moat from the Imperial Palace, in a demonstration literally loud 
enough to reach royal ears, the question was a rhetorical one: the Imperial family, as befitted a 
symbol, remained quiet about the politics of Anpo. However, Emperor Hirohito bestowed 
imperial attestation to the Treaty on 21 June 1960, and the Crown Prince and Princess Michiko 
traveled to the United States in September 1960.46 The royal visit created a mass-media 
iconography of public apology for mass protest. Professor Yamashita appealed to the princess to 
respond to the death of Kanba Michiko, wanting her to know that some among his students 
described Japan as a "detestable country (iya na kuni)."47 The crown princess's silence on the 
issue reinforced the power of her image over her words. It is critical to note that Professor 
Yamashita petitioned the commoner bride rather than the royal husband in the matter of the anti-
Anpo protests. In doing so, the professor underscored the critical role that Princess Michiko 
played in reconnecting the Japanese population to the imperial family; both Michikos 
represented the potential for democratic access to traditionally closed social institutions.  
Kanba Michiko and the New Postwar Lifestyle 
 The two Michikos' position as young women symbolized not only postwar democracy, 
but also the bright new postwar consumer life of the high-growth era. Princess Michiko met the 
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Crown Prince on the tennis courts, a place more egalitarian than what previous generations of 
royals experienced, but one also associated with increasingly middle-class leisure activities. 
Whereas the "Mitchii Boom" that greeted the royal wedding marked the climax of a postwar, 
high-growth-economy "stability boom," according to Yamashita, the death of Kanba Michiko 
was the "absolute opposite," demonstrating that many students defined themselves as "outsiders" 
who refused to bathe in the "tepid waters" of mindless economic security.48 But Kanba Michiko's 
position as a female student made her death sympathetic even to those who did not define 
themselves as "outsiders," because the hegemonic ideal of the young woman as liberal 
democratic subject connected female students to the secure, bright postwar consumer lifestyle. 
Writing about Kanba Michiko after her death, poet Ono Tōsaburō noted that the "bright voices" 
of his women's junior-college students as they played tennis after class evoked Kanba for him, 
although he had never met her. Conflating their cheerful voices and healthy bodies with the idea 
of Kanba Michiko as the pure victim of the failures of postwar democracy, Ono urged his readers 
to "stand with the spirit of the young female student who confronted her enemy."49 Ono invokes 
the purity of the young female student: her enemy ought to be "our" enemy. 
 Kanba Michiko's mother Mitsuko appealed to the sympathy of those like poet Ono 
Tōsaburō by insisting on her daughter's ordinariness. Such statements as “Michiko was an 
ordinary daughter" affirmed the intimacy that others felt toward Michiko in spite of not knowing 
her personally.50 Kanba Mitsuko assembled and published a collection of Michiko's writings 
within months of her daughter's death. Although the volume, named The Smile Nobody Knows 
(Hito shirezu hohoeman) for a poem Michiko had written, included the political essays she had 
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penned for university publications, it was Michiko's private writings that generated the greatest 
impact. Few accounts of the influence of the collection—for example, those given by the later 
1960s generation of activists—included comments on the political essays. Indeed, many 
described the book as deeply affecting in spite of their disagreements with Kanba Michiko's 
political convictions. One young woman, a high-school student at the time, reflected that she did 
not care for Kanba's politics, but nevertheless devoured Kanba's posthumously published 
writings. Years later, the experience of reading the book made "her death feel like a part of my 
life."51 As the title suggests, the collection of intimate materials, from journal entries to personal 
letters, appealed to those who wished to encounter the "real" Kanba Michiko; the writings 
promised to reveal "the smile nobody knows." However, the publishing of private documents to 
define Kanba Michiko as an "ordinary daughter" of postwar Japan leapfrogged over Kanba 
Michiko's own attempts to articulate her political stance publicly. 
 The posthumous collection included writings stretching back to Kanba Michiko's 
childhood offer the reader a sense of an intimate and comprehensive view into Michiko's life. 
Michiko's writings as an elementary-school student reveal a postwar middle-class upbringing, 
defined by the consumer lifestyle available to an increasingly wider segment of Japanese society. 
She filled her girlhood journals—most likely kept as part of school assignments over summer 
and winter vacations—with references to the markers of a bright new life. Although Michiko 
was born in the fall of 1937, and the first seven years of her life must have been defined by war, 
her posthumously published works efface this earlier history and begin with school journals kept 
in fourth grade. Along with the pleasures of the ocean and fireworks, Michiko noted her trips to 
the cinema in the journal she kept of her fourth-grade summer vacation. She watched Elia 
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Kazan's A Tree Grows in Brooklyn, Otto Preminger's Laura, and remarked that the “savages" in 
Tarzan were scary.52 During her winter vacation, she decorated a Christmas tree.53 Cinema, 
shopping, ice cream, and tennis are all features of her leisure time during school vacations. These 
pursuits mark Michiko's upbringing as one defined by increased access to the high-growth-era 
consumer culture of Japan's urban spaces. Other activities of Kanba's were familiar to many 
suburban and also rural families: she joined her father and brother in weeding the family's 
vegetable garden in the summer, and sewed while she and her family followed the national high-
school baseball championships on the radio. Schoolwork and homework dot Michiko's journals 
as far back as elementary school, and her letters show an increasing fixation on schoolwork as 
she prepared for entrance exams. In high school, the collected correspondence deals almost 
exclusively with her efforts to study. These letters trace not only Michiko's personal history, but 
also a strengthening social trend toward meritocratic competition in postwar Japanese education. 
 Although Kanba Michiko was a product of a new postwar consumer culture, her 
intellectual interests focused on leftist thought. The various essays and articles she penned from 
middle school until her death offer an intimate portrait of the formation of one young postwar 
female student's political subjectivity. Kanba conducted her first investigation of leftist ideology 
in middle school, during the early 1950s, for a school report she wrote “On Socialism." In her 
attempt to get to the bottom of the issue, the young Kanba consulted newspapers and “adult 
magazines" such as Kaizō and Shio. The publications she found lying about her house revealed 
her left-leaning intellectual home environment, even as some of the articles they contained—for 
example, one on the conditions facing African Americans in the United States, the “so-called 
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representative of democracy"—shocked her. Although Kanba concludes her essay unsure of 
which "ideology," that of the communist Eastern Bloc or that of the West's "so-called 
representative of democracy," will become hers, her discussion reflects many of the issues, such 
as that of lingering racial inequality, that made student activists throughout the 1960s skeptical of 
the American model of "liberal democracy." 
Ironic Counterpoint: Kanba's Relationship with Postwar Student Activism 
 Tucked among the many letters Kanba Michiko wrote to friends as a teenager, often 
detailing her intensifying studies, one piece from her second year in high school demonstrates a 
deepening interest in collectively addressing social problems and an awareness of the lingering 
inequalities between men and women. The brief essay, entitled "We Want to Grow Up!," 
introduces an informal discussion group that Michiko had formed with some other female 
students. Written to attract members among other high-school students, a note at the end offers 
the caveat that, "Even though I say 'we,' our number remains small." However, the group adopted 
the collective voice of the postwar student generation in outlining what it saw as a dilemma: 
although the books and teachers that surrounded them as students offered abstract answers about 
how the world ought to be, members of the discussion group insisted that their own experiences 
were the best guides for action. In affirming their active subjectivity, this group of high-school 
girls reflected the influence of the postwar ideal of democratic citizenship. In particular, these 
young women identified gendered injustice as a key problem in current Japanese society: “We 
look with eyes of indignation and anxiety at our society. What ought to be done is not done. In 
particular, we notice too many problems with the way women in Japan live." 
 Kanba and her friends identified some of the problems facing women in Japan in their 
own experiences at high school, where they felt stymied in their academic and political pursuits. 
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They felt "powerless" at the moment to bridge the gap between their reality and the imperative of 
“equal rights for men and women" enshrined in the postwar constitution. Their desire to "grow 
up" stemmed from a "zeal to become strong." Kanba and her group located strength not just in 
growing up, but also in collective action. Envisioning a network that would eventually expand to 
include "male students and students from other schools," the young women sought to overcome 
individual weakness and create a space to link personal problems with social issues. They 
proposed diverse topics for group discussion, from the personal—going on to university, work, 
marriage, issues at home—to the political—student government, national government, religion, 
and education.54 
 Kanba Michiko and her high-school friends were not unique in their interest in 
collectively discussing the situation of women in postwar Japan in the late 1950s and early 
1960s. In May 1960, when Michiko was a fourth-year student at Tokyo University, the campus 
newspaper announced a "new" campus group devoted to discussing "women's issues"; it remains 
unclear if Kanba was a participant. Membership was modest at fifteen students, but that number 
also included six males.55 As the formation of this group and the writings of Kanba Michiko and 
others suggest, many young people were conscious of a gap between the reality and the ideal of 
gender equality little over a decade out from democratizing demands to integrate women into 
political and social institutions. Nevertheless, by 1960, organizing around the cause of "women" 
drew far fewer students than anti-Anpo activism did. In contrast to participating in small 
discussion groups that might try to analyze the continued gender imbalance in Japanese society, 
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joining in a street demonstration against the Kishi administration offered more excitement and a 
clearer set of demands. 
 Many young women entering university in the late 1950s and early 1960s also noted that 
men around them tended to steer them into analyzing "women's issues" in a way that made them 
feel excluded from "real" scholarship or politics. Some recalled male teachers and colleagues 
encouraging them to research women's history, for example. One woman expressed her hostile 
feelings when a professor proposed such a subject of study: "I just hated being told to do the 
woman thing because I'm a woman."56 Another described her similar experience as a student in 
the early 1960s: "At that time, I wanted to live aggressively as a person and thought that stopping 
at 'women's history' was a retreat. It felt like yielding to being a woman." Whatever degree of 
freedom this particular individual achieved from "being a woman" in the space of higher 
education, that freedom ended when she left school. "I soon passed out of campus-based 
democracy and confronted real discrimination."57 When young women of the Anpo generation 
graduated, they found that they had much less control than in their school days over defining 
their relationship to being a woman. 
 In the context of a highly gender-conscious educational system and society, many young 
women framed their participation in anti-Anpo demonstrations as an attempt to claim a gender-
neutral space for women in postwar democratic activism. The early 1970s feminist critique of the 
1960s student movement—that it lacked consciousness of issues facing women—sometimes 
obscures how a consciousness about particularly "female" issues could trap women in a 
particularly "female" field of study or mode of political participation. 
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 Kanba Michiko's premature death launched her writings into the public sphere, but it is 
impossible to know how she would have reacted to the sexist challenges of post-university 
society. What seems clear is that her popular reception as a "maiden sacrifice" and her radical 
critiques of postwar democracy made for uncomfortable bedfellows. As the mass media 
memorialized Kanba, she increasingly became representative of the vulnerability of the 
individual citizen—in particular, the individual female citizen—in political conflict. 
The processes of iconicity by which Kanba Michiko became a "maiden sacrifice" in the mass 
media undermined her radical critiques of postwar democracy. A college essay by Kanba 
critiquing postwar educational guidelines for teaching the social sciences offers an idea of how 
she framed her ideological stance vis-à-vis postwar democracy. Reflecting on the relationship 
between pedagogy and citizenship, Kanba rejected the postwar democratic ideal of a liberal 
individual citizen. She argued that Occupation-era educational reforms, drawn up to create 
democratic citizens, fell short because they emphasized democracy, but slighted history.58 The 
problem with a stress on "democracy," Kanba argued, lay with the liberal definition of 
democratic citizens as individuals. In describing how individual citizens relate to other 
individuals, to nature, and to society, Kanba noted that the 1947 social-studies guidelines erased 
the role of collective units, such as class. Emphasizing the individual citizen in contemporary 
society also effaced larger, structural historical causes. For example, in explaining international 
wars and conflict, Kanba identified in the postwar social-studies curriculum a failure to address 
the roots of war. The lesson for students was that atomized individual citizens should assume the 
responsibility to avoid war and embrace peace.59 Kanba felt that social studies pedagogy in 
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postwar Japan conflated "simple growth and progress," which only confirmed the current social 
order.60 
 Kanba's analysis in her college essay displays a left-leaning concern for the historical 
category of class and its role in producing social contradictions. But Kanba also argued that, 
perhaps counterintuitively, an emphasis on individual responsibility for democracy and peace 
actually failed to cultivate an "active attitude" toward history. For Kanba, creating an "active 
attitude" demanded understanding conflict and resistance.61 She concluded that educational 
guidelines “put to sleep an active attitude." Instead of cultivating an active citizen subjectivity, 
Kanba found that contemporary social science pedagogy “erases the people from contemporary 
society. Organized groups also disappear, leaving only scattered individuals who are supposed to 
cooperate."62 The popular interpretation of Kanba's individual death as a demand for democracy 
and peace became an ironic counterpoint to her own preferred mode of historical analysis. 
 In the creation of Kanba Michiko the maiden sacrifice after her death, memorializations 
dropped her analytical words for her poetic words. One of Kanba's own poems, frequently 
published after her death, was entitled "Brumaire," a reference to the second month in the French 
Republican Calendar established by the French Revolution and part of the title of Karl Marx's 
critique of the dictatorial rise of Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte in 1851. Marx's The Eighteenth 
Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, originally published in 1852, includes one of his most famous 
aphorisms, modifying Hegel, that history repeats itself "first as tragedy, then as farce." After 
Kanba's death, the "purity" she invoked in her poem was often ascribed to her, yet the poem 
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demonstrated in a simple way her belief that radical change was qualitative change, demanding 
violence and "ugliness:"  
There is ugliness 
Like there was in the American Revolution 
Like there was in the French Revolution 
There is human ugliness 
There is tragedy 
But 
There is unsurpassed, earnest purity 
There is a spirit that seeks freedom beyond freedom 
These are also there 
I think of it this way63 
 
 Her parents offered this and other poems by Kanba Michiko to bolster her image as a 
sacrifice. Kanba's father, while rejecting the idea of "glorifying Michiko's death," recommended 
in his introduction to Michiko's collected writings that readers should peruse her words and 
"think calmly about why this person had to die."64 His comment intimated inevitability, 
suggesting that the political battles of 1960 had required the death of someone pure. Although 
Kanba's father described himself as reluctant to glorify his daughter's death, Michiko's mother, in 
her afterword to the same volume, quoted from a letter written by one of Michiko's close female 
college friends. “Kanba's purity could surprise you. She was too pure. I've known since our early 
days at college that Kanba was braver than any of the male students, even those who said radical 
things."65 Although contributing to the popular appraisal of Kanba Michiko as "pure" with this 
statement, Michiko's friend also pointed out that "purity" did not necessarily equal a soft, 
maidenly purity. In her description, Michiko's "purity" is one of willpower and bravery. 
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 Although Kanba Michiko's death confirmed a hegemonic image of maidenly 
vulnerability, those close to Kanba recalled the potentially terrifying character of her political 
commitment. As one of her male professors noted in an article dedicated to Kanba Michiko's 
memory, Kanba's devotion to radical activities was impressive, but also a bit frightening. In 
particular, after her arrest at Haneda Airport in January 1960 and her father's disapproving 
article, Michiko declared to her professor that her father and older brother had abandoned her, 
forcing her to "get over the petit-bourgeois nature that was inside of me." The professor noted 
that in the face of Kanba's radical change, "timid male students" feared her.66 In light of this fact, 
her mother's continued protestations that Kanba Michiko was "ordinary" and "gentle" come 
across as a willful strategy to delink Michiko the maiden sacrifice from her frequently militant 
radical views. 
 Kanba Michiko became an iconic figure, representative of the citizen protests against 
Anpo and of the fragility of postwar democracy, because she could fit with a hegemonic ideal of 
the female activist as a pure and vulnerable citizen. The mass media circulated the words of her 
mourning parents, who were eager to stress their daughter's "ordinariness" and kindness. Such 
stories created a feeling of intimacy among those who did not know Kanba Michiko, but 
imagined her as a tender young woman. This public persona eclipsed Kanba's personal 
relationship with radical politics. Kanba offered a sympathetic icon, which favorably influenced 
popular perceptions of student activism in the anti-Anpo protests of 1960. The processes of 
iconicity, by which popular images circulated in the mass media come to represent a complex 
moment or movement, do not always create positive impressions, however, as I will show in my 
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discussion on the backlash against the female student as a potential "ruiner" of the nation. It is to 







“Coeds Ruin the Nation": 
Young women at the limits of postwar citizenship 
 
 The mass demonstrations against the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty that climaxed with 
Kanba Michiko's 1960 death provoked a crisis in Japanese society. The death of a young woman 
further legitimized the end of the administration of Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, exposing the 
power of popular protest. However, the vast numbers of citizens protesting in the streets failed to 
prevent the renewal of the unpopular Treaty, and the party of the disgraced Kishi, the Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP), carried the elections of July 1960. The Bund-led Zengakuren dissolved 
and the student movement lost momentum. Furthermore, a yearlong strike by coal miners in 
Kyushu ended in failure, demonstrating an end to open confrontation between labor and capital. 
Kanba Michiko may have been the sole casualty, but no one was left unscathed. Ikeda Hayato 
replaced Kishi as prime minister. He spearheaded high-rate economic-growth policies designed 
in part to lure the population away from politics; his "double-income plan" expanded public-
sector spending and lowered taxes. Ikeda drew attention away from Japan's political position vis-
à American power and Cold War influence, and focused instead on national economic growth. 
He pushed for expanded international markets for Japanese products, leading French President 
Charles de Gaulle to refer to Ikeda as a "transistor radio salesman."1 Domestically, Ikeda 
included education as an essential part of his economic program. 
Introduction 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




 In the student movement of the late 1960s, massified higher education both fueled student 
discontent with increasingly rationalized education, and also guaranteed the tremendous impact 
of student protest. The rapid expansion of higher education in the 1960s fed the late 1960s swell 
of campus-based activism. Although students in the immediate postwar period and during the 
anti-Anpo protests of 1959-1960 represented a significant political demographic, they also 
remained an elite group. By the late 1960s, not only did a greater percentage of young people 
continue to higher education, there were simply many more young people overall.2 Here I 
approach a moment of ostensible political quietude on Japanese higher education campuses to 
listen for the gendered dynamics critical to the late 1960s student movement and its reception. I 
find that, if young women were at the avant-garde of ideal postwar citizenship during the anti-
Anpo struggle, they became a key demographic to be integrated into the growing national 
economy in the post-Anpo period. Examining debates waged in the mass media and state 
bureaucracy, I illustrate how a range of mostly male "experts," usually male, but ranging from 
professors to politicians, reasserted the link between female education and the household. These 
efforts to control the hegemonic ideal of the postwar citizen, and her link to her family, drew on 
ideological strategies from Japan's prewar past. In the pages of the tabloids and in educational 
policy in the 1960s, a new order emerged that insisted that gendered difference among citizens 
remained necessary to maintain social stability. Many young women and men at the time 
dismissed such discussions, as circulated in the expanding mass media, as silly and out-dated, 
not realizing the enormous influence even tabloids held in influencing policy and popular 
opinion. 
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Women in Postwar Education: Democratic Reforms on Paper and in Practice 
 In spite of the heady optimism in the postwar period about the democratizing potential of 
the female student's admission to formerly all-male institutions of higher learning, the Japanese 
experience of postwar coeducation provides an example of how radical reforms on paper meet 
with both optimism and resistance in practice. Sweeping declarations of equality alone could not 
bridge the gender gap. The postwar Education Ministry gave local officials generous wiggle 
room in deciding just how schools addressed the stated ideal of "raising female education to the 
level of men's education."3 Even so, higher education for women did expand. In 1955, the 
percentage of young women pursuing education beyond the compulsory nine years of elementary 
schooling was a little less than half. Twenty years later, in 1975, it would be 93% – slightly 
more, even, than the percentage of young men.4 Over a period of twenty years, then, it became 
the norm for young women to go on to high school and even beyond. However, most women 
who pursued a higher degree did so through two-year junior colleges rather than four-year 
universities. Junior colleges were first developed in postwar Japan as another aspect of American 
educational reform meant to democratize education.5 In an effort to abolish the multilayered 
prewar hierarchy of higher education, postwar higher education was organized into two-year 
junior colleges and four-year universities.6 What emerged was a different hierarchy of higher 
education, and one that ultimately tracked students by gender. In 1950, not quite forty percent of 
junior college students were female (38.9%), but by the mid-1950s, they made up half of the 
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5 Ibid., 123. 
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student body.7 This trend continued, and it was in the 1960s that junior colleges became 
definitively female spaces of education.8 By 1975, 86.2% of the students at junior colleges were 
young women.9 In the case of junior colleges, democratization equaled feminization. The 
number of female students remained much more modest at universities, however, where the 
largest increase was between 1950 and 1955.10 Throughout the 1960s, the percentage of female 
four-year students remained under a fifth of the total university population.11 In the late 1950s, 
ten years after the legal imperative toward coeducation, inequality persisted in practice. 
 At the root of lagging efforts toward full integration of women into universities persisted 
the question of coeducation's purpose. As outlined earlier, in the postwar drive toward radical 
democratization of key social institutions, female participation held out the promise of 
"purifying" spaces associated with masculine wartime militarism. However, how much 
participation was necessary? According to many experts, it was enough to allow young women 
to attend dances with male students, or to form hiking groups. These kinds of social activities 
would allow young people to explore what was assumed to be their heterosexual attraction. 
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College became an opportunity not for intellectual exchange, but for forging romantic love, as 
the Crown Prince and Princess had done on the tennis court. One male author of several advice 
manuals for women disagreed with women's college students who desired more opportunities for 
coeducational scholarship. After all, he declared, “there's no need [for male and female students] 
to debate philosophy."12 His brusque statement cut to the heart of the issue. In the post-1960 
Anpo milieu, female students would continue to make demands for their education based on a 
desire to embody the hegemonic ideal of the postwar democratic citizen. In the context of an 
expanding higher education system driven less by a concern about cultivating a political 
subjectivity and more interested in how graduates contributed to the growing Japanese economy, 
what need was there for anyone to debate philosophy? 
Female Students as Representative of the Vagaries of Democratic Education 
 Professors of the humanities, witnessing the diminishing powers of their departments, 
blamed the rising admissions of young women. As presented in the periodical press, intellectuals 
often framed their concerns about the democratization of higher education, and the diminished 
position of the humanities in a technology-driven economy, through attacks on female students.13 
In 1962, for example, the violence done to universities through admitting young women became 
a sensational theme in the tabloid press. Waseda University professor Teruoka Yasutaka sparked 
what would become an infamous debate with an article in the March 1962 issue of the monthly 
Fujin kōron, in which he outlined his view of coeducation at the university level under the 
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hyperbolic title, “Coeds Ruin the Nation Theory" (Joshigakusei bōkokuron).14 Teruoka based his 
"theory" on the assumption that a humanities education was wasted on young women, who 
would retreat into the domestic sphere upon graduation. Through his overstated case against 
female students, Teruoaka set himself up as a pundit against expanded education for young 
women in the humanities, and echoes of his "theory" continued to resonate in popular culture for 
years.15 Ever alert for a polemic, the tabloid Shūkan shinchō consulted him as an expert when it 
ran an article in the same month on “student beauties," using the case of a female Waseda 
University student who had recently had won an Air France beauty contest as a timely 
opportunity to consider the character of coeducation. In the tabloid article, he complained, “Male 
students, if they listen to the lecture, will apply themselves to society in some way in the future. 
However, girls will, at best, go to bed with a guy and recall, 'You know, Teruoka said something 
[interesting]…' It's infuriating to think that my lectures are just material for these girls' pillow 
talk. I just can't get passionate about lecturing."16 He can only imagine women using literary 
knowledge in an intimate space very far away from the public sphere. While Teruoka assumes 
his male students will become productive members of society as workers based on the literary 
knowledge they obtain, he fears that his female students will selfishly employ his lectures to 
entice men. Teruoka goes so far as to declare that young men are sacrificed in the drive to 
educate these young women who waste knowledge, and he recommends quotas limiting the 
number of women admitted to humanities departments. “For the sake of Japanese culture, I'd like 
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to limit it at 2,500 [female students] if possible, and admit more men instead."17 For this 
professor of the humanities, his academic field lost its social value if his students did not enter 
the workforce, and he assumed that his female students would not. Even if the political ideals of 
Japan's postwar constitutional order included integrating women into the public sphere, Teruoka 
played on an assumption that women—and women's education—belonged to the domestic 
sphere. Furthermore, at a time when the humanities were increasingly de-emphasized in favor of 
the industry-supporting sciences, Teruoka chose to define the threat to Japanese culture not as an 
economic preference for training that had industrial applications, but instead as the admission of 
too many women to literature departments. Teruoka's attacks on female students for "ruining" the 
humanities seem especially misguided in light of at least one conservative party leader's 1960 
suggestion that the government abolish humanities and social-science departments altogether.18 
Anxieties about mass rationalized education in the service of the economy, however, targeted the 
figure of the coed rather than the authorities directing educational policy. 
 In decrying the vagaries of mass education via the figure of the ostensibly invasive 
female student, Teruoka also exploited the increased power of the postwar media to circulate 
catchphrases and pop theories about social problems.19 As in the prewar period, although in an 
ever more pervasive and massified form, the mass media after 1945 operated as an informal 
means of educating the Japanese “public" at large. Particularly in a time of rapidly changing 
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social expectations, the cultural debates that circulated in the print media exercised great 
influence.20 The late 1950s saw a dramatic rise in weekly publications—shūkanshi—published 
independently of the major newspapers; following the model pioneered by Shūkan shinchō, 
which was established in 1956, these tabloids depended upon the "street knowledge" of their 
staff, who lacked access to the major news sources. Framing themselves as anti-authoritarian and 
scrappy, these tabloid journals featured gossipy content and shunned larger themes like "civic 
rights" for human-interest stories. Unlike the major newspapers, which circulated through 
networks that included delivery right to citizens' doorsteps, the tabloids depended upon sales at 
train station kiosks and street vendors. They designed their sensational headlines to capture a 
passing commuters' attention. The unexpected success of Shūkan shinchō sparked a boom in 
tabloids, including several targeting women.21 Periodicals expressed heterogenous opinions 
targeting an increasingly nuanced taxonomy of reader-consumers. Yet the overall effect of these 
various publications created a cohesive sense of a Japanese nation knit together through a single 
language and an increasingly hegemonic mainstream ideal of the basic Japanese household, 
obsessed by the same events and fads. While tabloids hinted with each faddish “debate" at new 
sources of anxiety for society, their brief articles also obscured the histories of social structures. 
In the 1960s, with the dimming of a class-based political subjectivity, the potential for class 
struggle also seemed to pass. But as the threat of class warfare receded in a period of high-speed 
economic growth, that menace was in many ways displaced onto the potential in Japanese 
society for a battle between the sexes. 
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 The splashy reception the tabloids gave Teruoka's "Coeds Ruin the Nation Theory" 
revealed at least the immense curiosity, if not out-and-out approval, his arguments provoked in a 
wide swath of readers. He was not alone in articulating dissatisfaction with the disruptive 
presence of female students in higher education institutions. Shūkan shinchō found other 
professors and male students eager to deride coeds. One anonymously quoted literature professor 
classified his female students as falling into one of two categories: the “ultra-dry faction" (chō-
dorai) and the “ultra-feigned-naivety faction" (chō-kamatoto). His classification defined female 
students as either those who competed intellectually with men and lacked “charm" (in other 
words, the “ultra-dry"), or as those who sought to entice men sexually, and were therefore not 
entirely honest about their thoughts and their intelligence (“ultra-feigned-naivety").22 According 
to this professor's view, coeducation failed to instill a sense of "charm" in some young women, 
and encouraged the worst flirtatious excesses in others. Elaborating on his discomfort in 
interacting with both kinds of female students, the anonymous professor recounted: “When I 
lecture on Saikaku, I have to touch upon the subject of wakashu," referring to the younger lover, 
sometimes a male prostitute, in the male-male sexual relationships that commonly figured in the 
racy tales of Ihara Saikaku (1642–1693). “Female students will stand up and ask questions like, 
'What kind of things does a wakashu do?' Their false naivety is this extreme. There are always 
one or two brazen kids like that who ask such questions." Of their “ultra-dry" counterparts, he 
recalled that, “one girl came late to class and nonchalantly seated herself in the very front row. 
She pulled tissue from her bag, saying, 'Teacher, I have my period today so I'm late.' She didn't 
need to go so far as to pull out tissues and show me."  The examples suggest that, for this 
educator, it was not a lack of intelligence that defined young women as improper students, but 
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rather a lack of what he perceived as tact. Indeed, just like Teruoka, his colleague found that 
female students introduced the question of sexuality into the classroom. He would prefer to teach 
about wakashu without having to discuss explicitly the sexual acts that defined that figure. The 
worry here, similar to that of the articles in the ladies' pages of the general newspapers, was how 
to properly integrate young women into the homosocial male society of the university and 
prevailing middle-class standards for female conduct. Behind the concern about standards of 
conduct also lay the view that many women were uninterested in academic knowledge, 
concerned not with the greater good but only with how they could manipulate men. 
 Some young women also confirmed the popularity and the power of the "Coeds Ruin the 
Nation Theory." In a 1962 Shūkan shinchō interview with a female undergraduate on her part-
time work in the House of Councilors election, the interviewer solicited the young woman's 
opinion on the "theory." She replied, “It might sound strange coming from me, since I'm a 
woman, but I think I can agree with it. Women make up one third of my class, and there are a lot 
of them who seem to want to make school into a fashion show… [but] there are also the drudges 
in black skirts with white shirts…. Me? Hmmm, I'm neither a fashionista nor a drudge. I'm a 
Dōshikai [a political faction in the House of Councilors], I guess."23 This young woman 
preferred not to identify herself in one or another category frequently assigned to female 
students; she evaded the dichotomy through identifying with a political faction. Much like other 
iconic figures in the popular imagination, a true "fashionista" or "drudge" remained hard to find 
in real life. 
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 Alongside such discursive attacks on the potential threat posed to university education by 
the admission of female students, Shūkan shinchō ran less hostile articles that nevertheless 
dismissed female student activism. In contrast to sympathetic reports on "angry daughters" 
facing off against authorities in 1960, the 1962 coverage of a female student "barricade" at Jissen 
Girls' School mediated the female students' actions through the interpretations of older male 
"experts." Students at the school mobilized to support three popular teachers, who had been 
dismissed in part because of their involvement with union activities at the high school. While the 
language of the September 1962 dispute, as conveyed by interviews with female students, 
remained that of "freedom" and "democracy," interviews with school officials made light of the 
young women's demands, claiming, for example, that the teachers were either too easy on the 
students, or blinded the girls with their good looks. Subtly siding with the administration, the 
article also included gossipy, unattributed “quotes" from girl students themselves, related in 
speech easily recognizable as female.24 
 The young women at Jissen Girls' School demonstrated their belief in the postwar 
optimism that the "old-fashioned" ideals of a feminine education could be destroyed through 
expressing their democratic demands. They recognized that their education did not match 
democratic ideals. One bemoaned the fact that education had in her experience been a matter of 
“modesty, reliability, and 'Good Wife, Wise Mother,'" invoking a prewar and wartime slogan for 
the ideal product of women's education. She qualified her critique by stating that these things 
were fine, but also that “they've become formalities, and I feel like they are out of character for 
the times."25 Just like Kanba Michiko, who had been educated in the postwar coeducational 
system, the young women at Jissen were aware that cultural double standards for men and 
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women remained. They also assumed, however, that those standards were outmoded and could 
be overcome through their own actions. This is a strong theme that emerges from memoirs and 
interviews conducted with women who entered college in the mid- to late 1960s as well: a blithe 
optimism that older "outmoded" formalities would quickly pass away.26 They underestimated the 
power of social forces that linked women to the duties of the household in that period. 
Prewar Women's Education: Creating "Good Wives, Wise Mothers" 
 Postwar reforms had ostensibly killed the "Good Wife, Wise Mother" ideal upon which 
the wartime "family-state" was built, since students educated after 1945 no longer took the ethics 
curriculum designed to reinforce that ideology.27 However, as one historian has demonstrated, 
and as the female student at Jissen's comment illuminated, several institutions responsible for 
defining the role of women in society clung to, if not the image of the "good wife," then at least 
the importance of the "wise mother" to maintaining social order. The historical origin of the 
"wise mother" lay in a similarly tumultuous time of rapid change in Japan. As Mark Jones 
demonstrated, Japanese elites at the turn of the century, facing enormous social upheaval created 
by state policies of technological and institutional modernization, came to the conclusion that a 
middle class "as ballast and bulwark, an emblem of national strength, and an antidote to social 
instability" would offer "the sturdy foundation of a rapidly modernizing Japan."28 Central to this 
formula was the figure of the "Good Wife, Wise Mother," who "breathed life into their ideals" of 
such a middle-class, as the managers of the household.29 This was a new iconic formulation of 
household, wife, and mother, designed to represent the late Meiji middle class moral family, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Inoshishikai, June 9, 2011. FORMATFumiko Kosaka, June 5, 2011. 
27 Uno, “The Death of 'Good Wife, Wise Mother'?," 303. 
28 Jones, Children as Treasures, 23. 
29 Ibid., 116. 
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conceived by elites as a source of "modern" strength. The Ministry of Education signaled its 
endorsement of the ideal of "Good Wife, Wise Mother" in educational policy for women from 
the turn of the century.30 Government policies linked women's education with the cultivation of 
the domestic arts to bolster the nation, and the first government college for women was 
established in Fukuoka in 1922.31  
 Creating the ideal "Good Wife, Wise Mother" required an enormous amount of 
ideological effort, and even before the postwar period of radical democratization and the 
legitimatization of "angry" political daughters, educating women contained the potential for 
female student rebellion. In the Meiji period, young women submitted to morality classes for 
twice as long as their male peers.32 Dressed in the wide-legged trousers usually seen on men, the 
young woman attending girls' higher schools cut quite a figure in urban spaces and in the popular 
imagination. While conceding that more mobility was necessary for the exercise included in a 
"modern" curriculum, the Ministry of Education noticed the potentially androgynous territory in 
which female students trod. In 1883, the Ministry forbade women from wearing "men's attire."33 
Authorities strove to forge "Good Wives, Wise Mothers" immune to the seductions of both mass 
culture and dangerous political thought. However, the social necessity for mass literacy and 
education always produced an uncontrollable excess: once people could read, they could read 
anything. Reflecting on the interwar period in Japan, Maruyama Masao, one of postwar Japan's 
leading social scientists, noted that for parents of the 1920s sending their children to colleges, 
two threats loomed large: the first was that their children would fall prey to the hedonistic culture 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Ibid., 120. 
31 Beauchamp and Rubinger, Education in Japan, 142. 
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33 Rebecca Copeland, “Fashioning the Feminine: Images of the Modern Girl Student in Meiji Japan," 
U.S.-Japan Women's Journal 30-31 (2006): 13-35, 20. 
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of the dancehalls and the cafes ("the moga [modern girl] and mobo [modern boy] craze"); the 
second was that “their children might become infected with 'dangerous thought' [i.e., radical 
thought]."34 Maruyama's 1962 description of the 1920s shared much in common with the 
moment in which he issued it. In many ways, then, the ideological struggles of the post-Anpo era 
echoed prewar concerns about how to manage rapid socio-economic change, an expanding 
middle-class, and a growing and potentially subversive student population. 
 In the post-1945 milieu, the government could not adopt the language of "Good Wife, 
Wise Mother," which had associations with the wartime ethics curriculum. However, discussions 
about the degraded state of the postwar family implied a misplaced emphasis on women's role in 
public, at the expense of their important roles at home. Attempts on the part of government 
commissions in the 1960s to forge a homogenous national ideal of a Japanese family drew on 
prewar models, which required both female labor in the home and a link between the family and 
the nation. 
The "Ideal Person" 
 In the early 1960s, government commissions and documents also began to reflect the 
anxieties underlying the debates first waged in magazines and newspapers.35 Policymakers' 
reports and documents from this time expressed their concern for the health of the family at a 
time of rapid postwar social changes; their distress indicated that complete equality between men 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Maruyama Masao. “Patterns of Individuation and the Case of Japan: A Conceptual Scheme." In 
Changing Japanese Attitudes Toward Modernization. Ed. Marius B. Jansen. Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle, 
1965. P. 489-531. P. 519. As Maruyama elaborates on page 520-1: “Along with the moga and mobo, there 
were also the 'Marx-boys' and 'Engels-girls,' terms of derision directed against the flippant pretensions 
displayed by those youths who considered Marxism fashionable… [However] those youths were not so 
much the direct offspring of the 'subversive' types in the late Meiji as the transformed figures of the 
mahon seinen (exemplary youths) of the Japanese Empire." 
35 Sandra Buckley, “Altered States: The Body Politics of 'Being-Woman,'" in Postwar Japan as History, 
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and women might spell out the ruin of the nation after all. A rise in youth crime in the late 1950s 
and early 1960s drew attention to how the household ought to function. It actually was not until 
1960 that a Central Child Welfare Commission document linked this juvenile violence—usually 
petty theft—with the health of the family; in the late 1950s, the main culprit was seen as mass 
culture: movies and late-night coffeehouses. However, the 1960 report made it clear that the 
experts at the Commission saw a "healthy family" with "husband and wife and children at the 
heart" as a necessary basis for a democratic society, and found the roots of its negligence in the 
postwar "collapse of the family system."36 In 1963, a government white paper on child welfare 
pointed to "a deficiency in the level of nurturing" that put postwar children at risk; this "decline 
in child welfare" came "in the wake of women's increased penetration of the workforce."37 State 
labor policies in the mid-1960s needed to mobilize female labor to manage a shortage in workers. 
However, as the Economic Deliberative Council's 1963 report emphasized, the ideal form of 
work for married women remained "reentry employment" and "part-time" work. This allowed for 
women to fulfill their expected roles of domestic laborers, while married women also functioned 
as a flexible workforce that supplemented the full-time employment of unmarried women and 
unmarried and married men.38 
 In the mid-1960s, the Ministry of Education also considered the importance of the family 
as a site for the development and education of youth in its efforts to address the education of 
women; the Ministry included “considering the necessity of improving women's qualities as 
citizens and their important role as educator at home" in its objectives for women's education, 
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38 Uno, “The Death of 'Good Wife, Wise Mother'?," 305. 
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thereby particularizing domestic labor as female, and including education as an essential part of 
that work.39 This mid-1960s Ministry of Education statement, although employing the 
democratic language of "citizenship," nevertheless emphasized the gendered future of a young 
woman's labor in the home. In this way, the pronouncement shared an underlying logic with the 
text from a 1907 edition of a girls' higher education morality textbook: "Women, like men, must 
fulfill their lifetime purpose by developing and cultivating their personhood. Unlike a man, 
however, a woman develops her personhood by fulfilling duties such as aiding her husband, 
governing her house, and raising her children. In other words, a woman fulfills her duty by 
becoming a good wife, wise mother."40 Much like late Meiji definitions about the particularly 
female duties of women subjects, government policy in the early and mid-1960s accepted the 
rhetoric of equal citizenship and democracy, while emphasizing the specifically domestic duties 
assigned to women. 
 One of the most publicized reports created by the Ministry of Education's Central 
Educational Commission of Inquiry, although eliding gender particularities to present a vision of 
a universal “ideal person," carried deeply gendered implications, smuggled in through the social 
function of the family and its necessity to national unity. The 1965 “The Image of the Ideal 
Person" (Kitai sareru ningenzō, which can also be translated as the "Image of the Expected 
Person") included the ideal role of the family in the creation of this ideal person. Crafted by a 
committee of leading cultural figures with links to prewar fascism, the document reflected many 
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similarities with the 1937 "Fundamentals of Our National Polity" (Kokutai no hongi), in spite of 
its repeated claims about "democracy."41 An attempt to set a moral agenda for Ministry of 
Education policies, the ideological driving force of the report is a specifically statist 
interpretation of “democracy." The ultimate goal for the ideal human is defined as happiness, and 
this human happiness is declared as dependent on stable economic and political conditions.42 The 
proper political conditions envisioned in this report are, rather than democratic pluralism, a 
perpetuation of the status quo. The document states, for example, that those who interpret 
democracy as “class struggle" cannot prevail or “the essence of democracy will be destroyed." It 
is not only popular protest that threatens an orderly democracy according to the document; while 
arguing for efforts to strengthen the national economy, the report also warns against mass 
culture. The creators emphasized instead a strong work ethic and devotion to family and nation, 
both of which require resignation to one's socially assigned role rather than an aspirational ideal 
of democratic equality.  
 The report is organized into three sections: “As People in the Household," “As People in 
Society," and “As Japanese" in sequence, implying that the family, society, and the nation are 
units nestled within each other, in a structure not dissimilar to the prewar family-state. The "ideal 
person" was rooted in a household that operated within society, and the nation linked the 
fortunes of that society to the world. The household was to offer an organized space of familial 
love to cultivate a more general love of the nation. As the report stated: “The household is a 
component of society and the nation (kokka), and is its foundation. If the household is in disarray, 
it follows that society and the nation will also be in disarray." The ideal household is declared to 
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be a hygenic “place of rest," where workers can retire from “today's hectic social life." Again, 
the dangers of mass society are invoked: “In mass society and mass culture, the household is 
where one can find oneself and recover one's humanity."43 What is not clarified is who makes the 
household this kind of place. While defined as a “place of rest," it is implicitly female labor that 
prepares this place, and keeps it clean. The insistence that the home is the place of education, "in 
cooperation" with schools also confirmed the gendered labor of the household. 
 To protect against political confrontation and contestation, the report avoided discussions 
of class and ethnicity (only defining the Japanese as one ethnos, minzoku) and emphasized the 
need to organize society around production. It also elaborated a demand for people who honor 
social norms and social order.44 In this document, “society" meant simply “the workplace;" it 
was not amenable to more idealistic or political interpretations of society as a pluralistic public 
sphere. “Society" in the report equaled the place of work and production of wealth, and not the 
place for negotiating ideas. Nor was it the place of leisure and consumer culture. The wealth 
accrued in the workplace would lead to a "strong Japan." Continuing the trend Kanba Michiko 
noted in the educational guidelines of the 1950s toward a recuperation of Japanese foundational 
mythical histories affirming the divinity of the Emperor, the document cautions against losing 
"Japan's beautiful myths and national character" amid postwar reforms.45 
 Strangely for a Ministry of Education document, it offered few clues as to how education 
should function to cultivate ideal persons, although the informal educational space of the 
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household emerged as a key. The “healthy" cultivation of love in the family was to prepare 
citizens for the “healthy" love of the Japanese nation. The “Good Wife, Wise Mother" remained 
unnamed in the discussion of a clean, safe, humane household; the use of these specific terms in 
prewar women's patriotic education may have made the words unnamable in this postwar 
document, tainted as they were by Japan's militarist history. Instead, the document made 
overtures to a postwar ideal of an equal, universal subjectivity: that of the "ideal person." But the 
role of women in postwar society was smuggled in via the emphasis on the family, considering 
the prevailing perception that the work of managing a household remained a woman's 
reponsibility. 
 The report was announced to the Japanese public via the mass media in January 1965. 
The generally conservative national daily, the Yomiuri shinbun, included the Central Council for 
Education's statement under the headline, "Toward a Healthy Democracy, with Self-Awareness 
as Japanese," summarizing the report's goal of organizing a specifically nation-centric form of 
orderly democracy. The headline alone demonstrates a shift in the popular newspaper's 
sympathies; an article on a similarly moralistic 1951 Ministry of Education document ran under 
the title "The Amano Doctrine: A Declaration of War on Democratization."46 In the 1965 article 
on "The Image of the Ideal Person," the Minister of Education encouraged the Japanese public to 
discuss the document, hoping that even such discussion alone would define more clearly how 
society could maintain a sense of its humanity in the midst of rapid change.47 
 Judging from a series of cartoons that subsequently ran in the same paper mocking the 
"The Image of the Ideal Person," the document failed to ignite debate in the way that the 
Ministry desired. In one reader-submitted comic strip published shortly after "Image of the Ideal 
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Person" went public, a professor set to lecture on the document paces the stage of a community 
center, awaiting an audience (fig. 5). The caption jokes that the turnout did not meet 
expectations, making a pun on the title of the Ministry of Education document, which can also be 
translated into English as "Image of the Expected Person." The cartoon played on the 
underwhelming response the document provoked. 
 
Figure 5. Reader-submitted cartoon. Caption reads: "The turnout is not ideal..." 
The sign reads: " 'The Image of the Ideal Person' with Professor XX." Community Center. 
Ishikawa Shōji, Yomiuri shinbun, 24 January 1965.48 
 
 
Another reader-submitted cartoon represented a curious but puzzled populace regarding an 
abstract sculpture boasting the title "Image of the Ideal Person" (fig. 6). The drawing contrasted 
the various spectators, in all their specificity across generations and genders, to the "ideal 
person," which is a formless blob. As if revealing that the emperor stands naked, a little girl asks 
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her father, "What is it?" This illustrator exposed the vagueness of the document, which descibed 
"ideal / expected" personhood in elusive and spiritual terms. 
 
 
Figure 6. Reader submitted cartoon. Caption: "What is this?" 
Title of sculpture: "The Image of the Ideal Person" 
Taki Katsuki, Yomiuri shinbun, 24 January 1965.49 
 
 Among young people, reactions recorded by the author and peace activist Oda Makoto in 
April 1965 ranged from hostility to indifference.50 Oda titled his report on interviews with young 
men and women on "The Image of the Ideal Person" with a question: "ideal for whom?" None of 
the young people he interviewed felt that the report addressed the concerns facing them. Oda also 
declared himself more interested in the potential for student activism than in the documents 
drafted by conservative intellectuals. By 1966, a rise in campus-based protest movements, 
mostly organized to protest fee increases, also demonstrated increased student interest in the 
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power of collective action. As we shall see, these protests soon exploded at universities 
nationwide. 
 However, regardless of the indifference or puzzlement provoked by "Image of the Ideal 
Person," the document demonstrated a battle for revising the radically democratic hegemonic 
ideals of citizenship ascendant during the anti-Anpo demonstrations. A key element of these 
efforts by conservative elements in the nation's bureaucracy was to reforge an ideological link 
between the family and the nation, and to place the nation at the center of educational policy. 
Whereas the socialist opposition in the Japanese Diet of late 1940s heralded the postwar 
educational reforms for "eliminating thoroughly the error of an education that would put our 
state at the center of the universe and instead proclaiming solemnly the concepts of democratic 
education aimed at rearing a humanity that stands for truth and peace," the Ministry of 
Education's 1965 "The Image of Ideal Person" attempted to emphasize again the particular duties 
of the Japanese citizen to the Japanese nation. Stressing the importance of the family implicated 
the gendered roles of citizens.51 Leaning on an earlier formula for social stability, the foundation 
of the nation became the Japanese household, and the responsibility for the household lay with 
the mother. 
 As mid-1960s student protest and university crises eclipsed the "Coeds Ruin the Nation 
Theory," female students could imagine that youth revolt would sweep away demands confining 
women to the home. However, as Maruyama Kunio (1920-1994) noted in a 1966 article in the 
intellectual journal Shisō no kagaku, female students underestimated conservative opposition at 
their own risk. Maruyama, the younger and more radical brother of liberal intellectual giant 
Maruyama Masao, revisited the “Coeds Ruin the Nation" debate, even though it had faded from 
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tabloid headlines.52 However, Maruyama described a higher education atmosphere in which 
university administrators and professors continued to blame young women for ruining university 
departments. Addressing the ahistoricity with which the popular discourse often discussed the 
importance of the household and the training of an expert in home economics, he ironically 
proposed instead the establishment of “household studies" as an academic department. Instead of 
assuming that the family ought to play a certain role in society, Maruyama described a real 
course of "household studies" as one that, “would have to include raising questions, from those 
about the processes that formed the household to those about what the household is at this point 
in time." He went on to describe how he would organize his hypothetical “household 
department," including which public intellectuals he would hire and insisting that it—like other 
higher education departments—would be coeducational. "Since men and women would study 
together, it would be sure to be seething with controversies between students. Among them 
probably some 'new Noras' [invoking Ibsen's dramatic protagonist] would arise who reject 
modern home life, reject the one-husband one-wife system, and leave the home on their own." 
Although Maruyama's proposal was tongue-in-cheek, he urged young women to articulate a 
serious counter-attack to the "Coeds Ruin the Nation Theory." He reported several conversations 
he'd shared with female students who dismissed the argument as simply outdated sexism, or even 
welcomed the kind of "ruination" coeducation would bring. One young woman told him, "If this 
is a country that will be ruined by women occupying the universities, then it doesn't matter if it is 
ruined."53 Although young educated women tended to dismiss such "debates" as too silly to 
counter in an organized way, Maruyama believed that young women needed to assert 
themselves, or else they would "half affirm their critics." 
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 Certainly, women were aware of the violent potential of such public debates, and 
responded in force to the more threatening pronouncements of gendered politics. For example, 
women of all ages reacted with organized resistance to the statements of Prime Minister Satō 
Eisaku, made shortly after his 1964 election, that Japanese women ought to bear more children. 
Satō's declaration raised the specter of the state's wartime pro-natalist policies, and the sensitivity 
of women's groups to such rhetoric illustrated what one historian has called "the multiplicity of 
feminisms" that emerged not only in the 1970s, but also in the 1960s.54 However, state policies 
interpreting women's work and education as essentially bound to domestic responsibilities 
triumphed in the 1960s. While young women were scoffing at tabloid debates that derided 
women's place in coeducation, the Ministry of Education issued a directive in 1969 that required 
high school girls to take homemaking courses.55  
 The debates examined in this chapter demonstrate that in the early 1960s, the figure of 
the female student provoked distinct social anxieties. Her presence in formerly homosocial 
educational institutions threatened conservative academics. The mass media offered these 
intellectuals a forum in which they could argue their positions, and weekly tabloid publications 
affirmed their opinions by presenting them as experts. The transition in popular discourse about 
the female student from model new citizen to social threat set the ground for the public reception 
of young women as they participated in the student movement of the late 1960s. The enduring 
and de-historicized link between the social role of women and the household influenced also the 
politics of the late-1960s student movement. Even as the student left sought to reject bourgeois 
Japanese morality, the movement's failure to analyze the historical processes by which women 
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became linked to ideals of the nurturing figure of the household contributed also to the 







The Barricades as Rupture and Continuity: 
The gendered labor of the campus-based student movement 
 
Introduction 
 In light of the increasingly rationalized "everyday life" of higher education in service of 
national economic growth, student activists in the late 1960s embraced the occupation of 
university space as a key strategy. The erection of barricades built within university buildings on 
campuses claimed an autonomous zone for students, disrupted the operations of schools, and 
became a place not just to plan strikes and make fliers, but also to remove oneself from society at 
large. The barricades, defended by walls made of desks and chairs that marked out spaces in 
which activists organized, ate, slept, and from which they launched marches, challenged the 
everyday life that sustained the Japanese state and capital. The barricades were also the site in 
which students performed the everyday operations that reproduced the movement. The theories 
student activists discussed in the barricades were various and rich in utopian and romantic 
imagination. This liberatory promise greeted female participants as well as male. Indeed, the 
loose and open organization of the late 1960s “Zenkyōtō" (Zengaku kyōtō kaigi: "All-Campus 
Joint Struggle Councils") reflected the philosophy of the female student activist and essayist 
Tokoro Mitsuko.1 However, the gendered expectations that came to define the work in the 
barricades exposed a major gap between the theories and the practices of the student movement. 
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 Examining the experiences of female student activists in the various nonsectarian campus 
movements of the late 1960s—commonly referred to by the generic term Zenkyōtō—shows how 
the student-erected barricades were spaces removed from the quotidian time of Japanese society, 
and offered a place of escape for all participants, regardless of gender. Here I will introduce 
Tokoro Mitsuko's influence, trace the rise of the Zenkyōtō movement and its key concerns, and 
consider how the experiences of female students demonstrated the contradictions between the 
theories and practices of New Left activism. Although Tokoro's ideas of a non-hierarchical leftist 
organization influenced the student movement of the late 1960s, opening up a moment of 
potential liberation for female student activists from the strict gendered codes solidifying in 
Japan's increasingly rationalized economy and society, the dichotomy of "violence" vs. 
"nurturing" created a new hierarchy in the campus-based student movement of 1968–1969. 
The New Left in late-1960s Japan: The Zenkyōtō 
 In discussing the late 1960s student movement under the widely employed term 
"Zenkyōtō" it is important to note that a rich heterogeneity of “Zenkyōtō" experiences become 
lumped together under one term, obscuring variations of region (urban vs. rural schools), class 
(public vs. private schools), and age of participants (junior high school students vs. junior 
professors). All these cases shared a politicized ideal of the student, and a myth of spontaneity: 
that open, non-hierarchical, non-sectarian movements blossomed on hundreds of campuses 
nationwide in 1968–1969. However, in very few cases were the ostensibly non-sectarian 
Zenkyōtō actually free from sectarian power plays, and the two emblematic Zenkyōtō that 
were—that of Tokyo University and Nihon University—reflected moments rich in possibility 
that were ultimately foreclosed.2 The student movement of the late 1960s mobilized mainly as 
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opposition to the rationalization of higher education and the Vietnam War, and the ideal of the 
loosely organized Zenkyōtō defined this generation of student activists' associative aspirations. 
The decentralized style distinguished the late 1960s student movement from that of the 1960 
Anpo generation of Bund-led Zengakuren activists and also from the mid-1960s generation that 
fought against the Japan-Korea Treaty.3 Without dismissing the potential of the Zenkyōtō ideals 
and strategies, I argue that, although state repression and sectarian violence presented significant 
obstacles to the continuation of even these more "ideal" type movements, a less noted but equally 
menacing obstacle was the gendered division of labor behind the barricades that reflected an 
acceptance of the "common sense" that defined that division. Although many vectors of 
difference existed among the various groups—groups defined by of a handful of students or 
hundreds of thousands of members—that organized under the banner of a “Zenkyōtō," this 
gendered division remained particularly salient in the creation not only of different experiences 
of a supposedly shared movement, but also in the creation of its legacy and commemoration. 
Tokoro Mitsuko and the Zenkyōtō 
 The Zenkyōtō ideal of sect-less horizontality and “endless debate" drew in part from the 
thought of student activist Tokoro Mitsuko. Tokoro had been an undergraduate at the all-women 
Ochanomizu University during the 1960 anti-Anpo protests and continued to join demonstrations 
as a peace activist after a period as a graduate student at Osaka University and Ochanomizu 
University. She based her opinions about the direction of leftist politics in Japan, which she 
published in such journals as Shisō no kagaku and Asahi Journal, on her experiences of activism 
throughout the 1960s. Tokoro's experiences as an activist, and also as a female activist in 
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particular, colored her analyses. Although, with her death in 1968, she was unable to participate 
in the movement that made some of her male comrades famous, her posthumously published 
essays, journals, and correspondence became part of the Zenkyōtō literature of the time. Like 
Kanba's posthumously publishing writings, the volume that came out after Tokoro's death, My 
Love, My Rebellion, included not only her intellectual work, but also intimate diary entries and 
letters.4 Her collected writings expose her innermost anxieties about loving and being loved, 
being accepted or rejected, and her worries about money and work. Similar to the case of 
Kanba's pubished works, My Love, My Rebellion encouraged the reader to sympathize not just 
with Tokoro as a thinker, but also to see Tokoro as a vulnerable and specifically female person. 
Tokoro's collected writings, also published after an untimely death, drew a parallel with Kanba's 
premature death, echoing the role of the maiden sacrifice. 
 The media-identified "leader" of the Tokyo University Zenkyōtō, chairman Yamamoto 
Yoshitaka, in a blurb advertising Tokoro's book, memorialized Tokoro's death as a kind of 
sacrifice marking the beginning of the Zenkyōtō: "The Zenkyōtō movement began on the day of 
Tokoro Mitsuko's funeral. The Zenkyōtō movement inherited her approach to life, and it was in 
the movement that it blossomed."5 The term "Zenkyōtō" itself originated in the Tokyo University 
struggle in early July 1968, when an All-Student Joint Struggle Council (Zenkyōtō) was formed 
at a meeting attended by occupying student activists and "ordinary students" alike.6 In many 
other cases Tokyo University set the national standard, perpetuating a hierarchy of higher 
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education institutions even in an ostensibly horizontal and spontaneous movement. Tokoro 
Mitsuko died on 27 January 1968—the very day that Tokyo University medical students voted 
on an indefinite strike, 229 to 28.7 In her short life, Tokoro had participated in all the key battles 
of the student New Left: she had been at the Diet on 15 June 1960, when Kanba Michiko was 
killed. She'd been at protests against the Korea-Japan Security Pact in 1965 and in 
demonstrations against the Vietnam War. She had also been at Ōji, Sunagawa, and at the 
"Enterprise struggle." Her presence at these iconic moments built her activist pedigree.8 Her 
death at the very beginning of the Tokyo University struggle—which would last a year, capture 
the imagination of the nation, and attempt to employ the nonhierarchical structure Tokoro 
theorized—can be seen as a great irony. Indeed, the movement at Tokyo University strove to 
employ her ideas of horizontality and “endless debate," but dropped Tokoro's insistence that a 
less coercive organizational style demonstrated a nurturing "women's logic."9 Although the 
Zenkyōtō movement ultimately did not address issues of gendered subjectivity, dropping 
“women's issues" for a universalist ideal of a revolutionary subjectivity, these ideas were not first 
discovered by post-Zenkyōtō feminists either. Tokoro's articulations of “women's logic" force us 
to consider how “women's issues" were erased in the course of the movement. While replicating 
many essentialist discourses about women as basically vulnerable and nurturing, Tokoro 
attempted to understand how a gendered subjectivity created meaning in society. Her writings on 
how the student left ought to relate to both violence and its imagined, and likewise gendered 
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opposite, nurturing, proposed bringing non-violent and nurturing feminine values to the student 
movement as a whole. 
 Tokoro Mitsuko was aware of her gendered position as an activist, and her awareness 
informed her view of how a political organization ought to be structured. The essay many point 
to when they link Tokoro's ideas to the development of campus-based Zenkyōtō is "Toward the 
Coming Organization."10 What Tokoro attempted to discuss in “Toward the Coming 
Organization" addressed the issues brought up in the late 1950s in the fictional stories of Ōe 
Kenzaburō and Kurahashi Yumiko regarding the JCP-led student left; Tokoro too was concerned 
with how an organization could respect the individuality of its members, and her essay 
articulated the guiding principles for the nonsectarian New Left Zenkyōtō that arose in the late 
1960s on college campuses. Similar to the critique launched by Ōe and Kurahashi, Tokoro 
decried an organization that demanded its members subsume their desires to the group's goals. 
However, she also rejected an individualist solution, retaining hope for collective action. In her 
judgment, this would require ongoing debate, and noncoercive and nonhierarchical structures. 
Zenkyōtō groups attempted to employ these strategies through, for example, inviting all 
members to participate in debates, and refraining from requiring that all members participate in 
the group's actions. 
Tokoro and "Women's Logic" 
 Key to Tokoro's essay, however, and her political romanticism in general, was the idea 
that women embodied an essentially nurturing logic that ought to inform radical organizations. 
Although her piece on the "coming organization" has been cited as a key influence for the ideals 
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of the late 1960s student movement, the essay failed to win the contest held by the journal Shisō 
no kagaku for which Tokoro wrote it. Ōno Tsutomu, an editor at the journal at the time, recalled 
that her essay showed exciting new thinking, but got only one vote. Ōno identified the problem 
with Tokoro's essay as its second half, in which she began making claims that were too 
ambitious.11 This latter section is where Tokoro began to elaborate a theory of feminine logic. 
The inspiration for much of Tokoro's theories of a different future organization was drawn from 
her own experiences as an activist, but she also responded enthusiastically to thinkers such as 
Takamure Itsue and Simone Weil, finding in the writings of both these female intellectuals a 
broader theory of "women's logic." She posited "women's logic" as one against the utilitarian, 
rationalist scientific thinking of capitalism and the wartime state. Tokoro's ideas about "women's 
logic" repeated the assumptions common to her intellectual milieu, namely using differences 
between the sexes as the key marker of social difference, and subsuming discussions about how 
distinctions of class, ethnicity, nationality, or age might also influence the experiences of 
"Japanese" women. Her emphasis on female experience as that most indivisibly linked to 
embodied experience, however, evoked the concerns of other thinkers who rejected the 
subordination of everyday life to rationalist theoreticism. 
 Tokoro expressed a clearer articulation of her theories on "women's logic" in a later essay 
that made it into the pages of a special 1967 issue Shisō no kagaku dedicated to the question 
"What is the Nation to Us?"12 Writting under her pen name, Tomano Mimie, she explores further 
the theme of "women's logic" in her essay, “How Do Women Want to Be?" Invoking again the 
thought of Takamure Itsue, she defines "women's logic" as that which determines existence itself 
to be enough, and sees value in everything, from the "head of a salted salmon" to the "tail of a 
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radish."13 This is supposed to come from women's urge to nurture even the "useless" bodies of 
weak or disabled children, and stands in stark opposition to utilitarian logic or the logic of 
American military scientists, who are busily computing how to most effectively kill people in the 
Vietnam War. It is the logic of women, Tokoro argued, to exhaust all resources to nurture life 
without calculating the "value" of the life; the "male" logic of science exerts itself to assess the 
most effective means of eliminating lives considered valueless, regardless of the villages, 
villagers, jungles, and rice fields that might also be destroyed.14 For Tokoro, it is this positivist 
utilitarian logic that is the result not only of the rise of science, but also of capitalism. As 
productivity became the test of worth, machines could even become considered superior to 
humans. This logic, for Tokoro, is also where the "nation" as an existence worth more than 
individual lives appears; the value of people's lives becomes determined by their contribution to 
the "national interest."15 Inasmuch as Tokoro emphasized delinking the value of a human life 
from the "national interest," this element of Tokoro's thought also resonated with late-1960s 
student activism against rationalized education. 
 To counter the demands of the "national interest" over the innate value of each life, 
Tokoro argues for "women's logic," and refers to the historical example of women on the 
homefront in wartime Japan to illustrate how the "national interest" makes victims of the nation's 
people. Tokoro's account of wartime women elides the role women played in Japan's empire and 
militant mobilization; in describing Japanese women as the victims of war, she echoes the 
arguments of postwar democracy advocates who insisted that incorporating women into the 
political process would prevent a resurgence of militarism. In advocating for a political 
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organization that responded to "women's logic," she continues this essentialist philosophy of 
women's political purity and pacifism. However, her mention of "American scientists" who 
calculate how to kill Vietnamese villagers demonstrates also that she reaches into Japan's recent 
history to draw parallels between the horrors of war experienced by so many Japanese in the 
recent past—starvation, fire bombings, dead husbands and children—to the horrors taking place 
at the time she wrote in Southeast Asia. She blamed not only "Americans," but also condemned a 
general logic of science, capital, and nation. Her idea of "women's logic" prioritized the 
experiences of women, but she argued also that men could understand "women's logic" through 
inheriting their mother's sorrow. She also noted, too, that many contemporary women felt the 
allure of "men's logic." In particular, "so-called 'career women' have the same relationship to 
production as men" and dismiss the intuition—based on the reproduction of life—they ought to 
be proud of.16 
 Tokoro defined the "intuition" of women by a biological relationship to space and time, 
based on the experience of birthing a life created within one's body; “logic" itself, Tokoro argues, 
derived from subjective experiences. “Logic" for Tokoro is not an objective formula; she defines 
“logic" as the way in which various individual desires are expressed to others. The experience of 
childbirth, for example, is one of feeling personal individual desires subsumed by the desires of 
another. In this sense, she diverges from a liberal individualist view of activism as individual 
self-expression. She takes issue with how the logics of capitalist production and empiricism 
make claims to objectivity, for under this logic, one cannot criticize the value of prioritizing 
growth and productivity.17 The "mother-child time-space," however, is different from that of 
Newtonian physics, and is one in which one thing cannot be equaled to another; one worker 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Ibid., 177. 
17 Ibid., 174. 
	  
 121	  
cannot equal another, nor equal a machine.18 In women's logic, the uniqueness of any existence 
makes it impossible to quantitatively compare it to another. In answer to “how do women want 
to be," Tokoro responds that they want to be able to affirm their own subjective experiences; 
they don't want to be forced into acting on the “logic" of capital and nation—the logic of 
empiricism and productivity—but want instead to assert the validity of their own subjective 
logic.19 
 Tokoro opened her essay, however, with a discussion of a time in which the logic of war 
created a space literally occupied by only women and children, which she treated with both 
empathy but also ambivalence: the wartime homefront. She made a parallel between the 
homefront during war and with contemporary rural villages that depend upon the salaries of men 
who left to work in factories and urban areas.20 Still in its nascent stages, the communities of the 
danchi—the high-rise housing projects—were similarly feminine environments. Although 
danchi living targeted nuclear families, the demanding hours of work and commuting for the 
white-collar husbands / fathers of these families meant that the apartment high-rises resembled 
women-and-children only communes for most of the time, and made women the leaders of 
community projects.21 The ideal of the household as a space of rest and regaining humanity—as 
managed by a woman—became in practice a space of women and children. Although Tokoro 
affirms a nurturing "women's logic" against the destructive logic of capital and the nation, she 
also describes the experience of women on the homefront as one of being trapped in a "mother-
child space-time": "Women have a solemn existence in an uninterrupted, unseverable mother-
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child time-space. They can't escape it, can't fulfill any other dreams. Their compassion for 
children sinks other enlivened spirits. They are faced with a history-less existence."22 This 
description bespeaks her ambivalence to the social separating of women into a space-time of 
maternal care. Although, Tokoro argues, nurturing creates a logic antithetical to rationalism and 
violence, she also noted that the homefront—and perhaps by the extension, the household—was 
also a space that confined. As we shall see, student activists' attempts to sever the "space-time" 
of the bourgeois lifestyle often became a struggle against the mother as a manifestation of the 
strangling bonds of "mother-child space-time," dropping Tokoro's awareness of a mother's own 
entrapment in the home. 
 Indeed, the Zenkyōtō emphasis on events of spectacular confrontation as sites of potential 
revolutionary rupture over considering the everyday tasks that reproduced the movement's daily 
life in the occupied barricades effectively forced many female participants into the nurturing 
roles of “mother-child space-time." This was a space-time outside history. Illustrating the 
potentially gendered subjective experiences of historical rupture and continuity, Tokoro opened 
her “how do women want to be" essay with a brief mention of what many noted as a key moment 
of rupture in Japanese history by quoting the science fiction writer Komatsu Sakyō, who was a 
fourteen-year-old boy when he listened to the emperor's voice read the Imperial Rescript on the 
Termination of the War. In formal Japanese, the previously unheard voice of the Shōwa emperor, 
Hirohito, announced the end of the war on 15 August 1945 via a prerecorded radio broadcast. 
During wartime, Hirohito had been a distant and divine figure. In this moment, his voice entered 
the public spaces of cities, towns, and villages for the first time. In Komatsu's quote, he noted 
that it was this "hard to hear" voice on the radio that suddenly transformed the "battleground" 
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into "ruins." He recalled this as a moment of absolute internal temporal rupture: "A clock inside 
of me broke at that moment." Komatsu was a male adolescent at the time, and Tokoro wonders 
about how the situation must have been experienced by the many women gathered around radios 
all over the nation listening to the same broadcast, struggling to decipher the stilted classical 
speech of their emperor. Tokoro wonders if "for women who had been forbidden to mourn 
husbands lost in battle or sons deployed to the front, this 'moment' in which all became 'ruins' 
also existed."23 Tokoro is interested in how this key moment—which many described as one of a 
vertiginous shift in reality—operated in the space of the homefront, a space from which adult 
men had disappeared, where only women remained alongside the fragile lives they had to 
nurture: those of the elderly and children. Perhaps, Tokoro ventures, women did not experience 
this "moment" in which men's dreams of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere crumbled 
as a rupture. Women occupied a "battleground" in which it was not enemies they fought, but 
starvation. It was not battles fought by guns and swords in strategic missions, but battles 
organized around mealtimes. It was not the war of violent spectacles, but of everyday needs. 
 Although Tokoro's assessment of "women's logic" bears many of the marks of an 
essentialist and romantic analysis of gender and feminine vulnerability, her writings also reflect 
an attempt to understand how a society or social movement can organize around a recognition of 
varying positions of power and vulnerability through the examples offered by women's 
experiences. Although her ideas about horizontal decision-making based on "endless debate" 
inspired the organizational ideas of the late 1960s student movement, the practices of student 
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activists in the barricades replicated a marginalization of the labor of everyday care that was 
gendered female. Whether or not embracing an intuitive "women's logic" offered a solution to 
the logics of science, capital, and nation, the late 1960s student movement certainly valorized a 
kind of "masculine logic" that ultimately betrayed the experiences of its female participants. 
Although attempting to employ horizontal structures to increase access to the movement and to 
disrupt the hierarchical structures of science, capital, and nation, the iconic “battleground" of the 
late 1960s student movement remained that of violent spectacles. The work of reproducing the 
everyday needs of the movement—the rice balls, the mimeographed pamphlets, the jail support 
for those arrested—remained invisible, trapping female activists relegated to these activities 
again in a space-time in which they tended a “homefront."  
The Violence of Postwar Peace and the Student Movement 
 Although much in the practices of the late 1960s student movement undervalued the 
everyday labor of female students in the barricades, recognizing the violence perpetuated in the 
name of "peace" in Japan motivated the movement to prioritize disrupting the space-time of the 
everyday order that undergirded Japanese capital and the state. In an article he published in 
November 1968 on the "philosophy of the barricades," Tokyo University Zenkyōtō chairman 
Yamamoto Yoshitaka echoed Tokoro in noting that "the ideology of capitalist society is 
recognized as rationalism."24 He identified the barricades and unlimited strikes of the mid- to 
late-1968 campus movements as a key tactic to interrupt the process by which university 
"factories" produce students that served capital.25 Student activists also became involved in the 
movements that barricaded campus buildings because they made links between the "peaceful" 
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social order in Japan to the geopolitical situation that facilitated war in nearby Southeast Asia. A 
"peaceful social order" in Japan included the organization of the universities, especially in cases 
in which poor facilities and hastily chartered institutions proved that the goal of education was 
not to enrich students' lives, but to manufacture laborers for Japanese industry.26 Many students 
active in the Zenkyōtō of the late 1960s trace the motivating event for their participation to the 
dramatic death of Yamazaki Hiroaki, a student at Kyoto University, who died at the 8 October 
1967 protests at Haneda Airport protesting Prime Minister Satō Eisaku's visit to South Vietnam. 
Yamazaki's death called to mind earlier struggles at Haneda Airport during the 1960 anti-Anpo 
demonstrations, and evoked also the 1960 death of female student activist Kanba Michiko. These 
past events framed students' interpretations of Yamazaki's death. Although the subsequent 
Zenkyōtō movement often based its struggles on campuses and even campus-specific demands, 
his death at an anti-Vietnam War demonstration led many to interpret his death as one "in 
solidarity" with those dying in Vietnam as well; it was a reminder that the violence of the war 
across the sea could also spill over into "peaceful" Japanese society. 
 Unlike the 1960 death of Kanba Michiko, which many pointed to as the mark of the end 
of 1960 student activism in “failure," Yamazaki's death defined the beginning of the late 1960s 
wave of activism. In part because of the specter of Kanba's death, the death of Yamazaki 
provoked many to take up activism. Even if their politics were vague, a sense of the necessity of 
immediate political action gripped several students at the news that a fellow student had died. 
One female student related conversations she had with otherwise nonpolitical students who felt 
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unclear about leftist jargon like overthrowing imperialism or Marxism, but nevertheless felt they 
needed to do something in the wake of Yamazaki's death.27 A graduate student reflected that she 
had been immersed in research instead of the struggle, and that she reproached herself upon 
hearing of Yamazaki's death: “It was not state power that killed Yamazaki. The one who killed 
this person who gave his life in solidarity with the Vietnamese people was [I]."28 An activist 
group, in a flier distributed at Tokyo University, drew out the parallels between the death of 
Kanba Michiko in 1960 and that of Yamazaki. In refuting mass media claims that a student who 
had hijacked a police bus killed Yamazaki, they sought sympathy for this most recent sacrifice in 
a struggle against state authority by evoking the generally sympathetic figure of Kanba.29 
Although the actions of university administrations and the Japanese government distressed 
students even before Yamazaki's death, that a fellow student had died expressing active 
resistance to unpopular policies induced others to evaluate their inactivity; many felt compelled 
to act as students in common with Yamazaki. 
 The death of Yamazaki as catalyst illustrates another common characteristic among 
several campus-based movements in the late 1960s: the rapidity with which students linked 
conflicts with university administrations to the larger geopolitical struggles of neo-imperialism, 
represented most vividly through the war in Vietnam.30 At both Tokyo University and Nihon 
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University, for example, student frustration with university administrations' responses to their 
concerns—whether those were about allowing the police onto the campus or opaque finances—
increased the allure of university-wide activism, a dynamic in common with activism at several 
other campuses. At Tokyo University, for example, what began as a limited campus dispute on 
the part of medical students against an internship system that forced them to work without pay 
quickly sparked much larger debates about the role of Tōdai and its students in Japanese society 
in general. In particular, the administration's dogged refusal to rescind an unfair punishment 
demonstrated the institutional inflexibility of the university. The quick chain of events that 
followed showed how swiftly demands escalated. The penalty was meted out against the student 
activist Tsubura Kunihiko, included in a list of seventeen medical students who allegedly 
attacked an administrator, although it was revealed that he had been over 700 miles away in 
Kyushu at the time of the incident. The sentences in general were judged too harsh, and a key 
slogan for the spring 1968 movement was "Reconsider the Unreasonable Punishments," which 
led to attempts to block graduation and entrance ceremonies. At the 1968 entrance ceremony at 
Tokyo University, the administration requested police protection to maintain order.31 After 
repeated failed negotiations between the administration and the expanding student movement—
which organized as a Zenkyōtō on 2 July 1968—all departments at Tōdai went on strike in 
September 1968. By the time President Ōkōchi resigned and Katō Ichirō, Dean of the Law 
Department, became the emergency acting president, the slogans of the movement expressed 
how expansive student demands had become. One declared: "Destroy Tokyo University!"32 
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 The two emblematic Zenkyōtō campus disputes of 1968-1969 at both Tokyo University 
and Nihon University came about in the wake of the activism provoked by the tuition-hike 
disputes at several campuses nationwide and the spectacular confrontations with police at 
demonstrations targeting the link between Japan's hosting of U.S. military personnel and support 
for the war waged in Vietnam. Even as Zenkyōtō formed at several campuses nationwide, each 
with their own histories and specific sets of concerns, the nation's attention fixed on these two 
schools based in central Tokyo. Both Tokyo University—Tōdai—and Nihon University—
Nichidai—were supposed to be examples of truly nonsectarian Zenkyōtō, even as the schools 
occupied very different positions in the national hierarchy of universities.33 Although student 
strikes, boycotts, and stoppages disrupted over one hundred campuses throughout Japan in 1968, 
the nonsectarian integrity with which these two very different schools' organizations supposedly 
manifested the ideals of Zenkyōtō in general, as well as their high-profile locations, contributed 
to their mythic status.34 In many ways, however, "Tōdai Zenkyōtō" or "Nichidai Zenkyōtō" came 
to stand in for the entire Zenkyōtō experience, thus replacing a profusion of voices and positions 
with two distinct narratives. 
 The intensity of the national focus on the campus occupations at elite Tokyo University 
in particular silenced the diversity of activist experiences that made up the "Zenkyōtō 
generation." Its position as the nation's premier university and recipient of ten percent of the total 
money allocated to state universities by the Japanese government made Tōdai national news, 
although at the peak of campus disputes in the late 1960s, about 80 percent of the nation's 
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campuses—165 schools—were involved in some kind of struggle.35 At seventy of these, students 
built barricades.36 Many school administrations called in the riot police to break up these 
occupations; the entrance of the riot police on the Tōdai campus in particular, however, 
prompted debates in the Diet.  A student leader involved in blockading the nine-story Yasuda 
clock tower, a symbol of the university and home of the president's office, declared the 
occupation of that building as "the bastion of Japan's student movement, no, the bastion of 
Japan's class struggle."37 The final siege of Yasuda Tower by riot police ejecting occupying 
students induced six of seven Tokyo television stations to drop their planned programming and 
offer audiences all-day live coverage.38 The aspects and events of student and citizen activism 
that the mass media covered influenced movements, even as activists contested the flat and 
narrow representations carried in the news. Nevertheless, demonstrations required an audience, 
and media coverage offered access to a nation-wide viewership. 
 Given the faculty's concern for the safety of the university as an institution, students felt 
that disrupting the university was an affirmation of the students' power to counter the system. 
One student at Tokyo University noted her disappointment with university President Ōkōchi 
Kazuo's meeting with student representatives at Yasuda Auditorium in late June 1968. Instead of 
listening to the students' views on the use of police force or the unjust punishments meted out to 
medical school students, President Ōkōchi demanded to be heard by the students. From the 
meeting, all she could recall was that the President repeatedly asked them to be quiet, and then 
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he emphasized that the student movement had robbed 400 people of their workplace. She was 
angered that he saw Tokyo University as an organization that needed to be guarded against the 
students. What was the university there for, she wondered, if not for the students? She felt that 
this was the view of the university administration, which privileged the institution over the 
people it served.39 But the issue of for whom the system existed was bigger than that of the 
university versus its students. Tokyo University, as several student slogans reminded the public, 
had originally been Tokyo Imperial University, an institution founded to meet the needs of the 
imperial state. Even with the collapse of the empire and the erasure of the qualifier "imperial" 
from the university's title, the state and the university retained a deep intimacy. Tōdai students 
were the nation's elite because they were being groomed to enter coveted positions in the state 
bureaucracy. 
 Demonstrating the relative position of Nihon University and the diversity of Zenkyōtō 
experiences, from the beginning, Nichidai students did not share the same protection from state 
force that the Tōdai students enjoyed. The Nihon University administration was particularly 
quick to squash any signs of a movement. Not only were the riot police called for several 
demonstrations, right-wing students and student athletic clubs meted out vigilante justice to 
Nichidai demonstrators, to which university officials turned a blind eye.40 The “peasants" of 
Nihon University did not share the protected status of Tokyo University; many people in places 
of power considered the Tōdai campus to be an inviolable space, beyond the reach of the state 
and the police. Intervention by force at Nichidai only increased the numbers that turned out for 
demonstrations, however. When right-wing students broke up the first demonstration on 23 May 
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1968, it drew 5,000 students to the protest two days later on May 25 in Shirayama Avenue in 
Misakichō.41 Soon the number of protesters doubled, and the administration cancelled lectures 
and locked students out.42 On May 27, a Nihon University Zenkyōtō formed when students from 
the economics, literature and sciences, law, art, commercial science, and dentistry departments 
met and decided on a series of demands that ranged from requesting transparency of university 
accounting to allowing students freedom of assembly.43  On June 11, right-wing students and 
members of the student affairs office attacked another activist gathering at the economics 
department. Over 2,000 students were injured in that clash. Rather than quelling student 
activism, the violence intensified it, and Nihon University students called a strike and occupied 
university buildings with barricades.44 Also in June 1968 at Tokyo University, in response to the 
admittance of the riot police, the student self-governing associations of several departments 
declared unlimited strikes, effectively stopping all university classes.45 
 Unlimited strikes were a shared tactic of the Nihon University and Tokyo University 
movements, and it was out of these unlimited strikes that a Zenkyōtō formed, emphasizing a 
radically democratic organizational structure and occupation of campus space. While activists 
framed confrontations between students and campus authorities as attempts to disrupt the 
everyday operations of universities and, by extension, the aims of the Japanese nation and 
capital, the barricades offered spaces in which students could conduct their own experiments in 
reconfiguring education and everyday life. 
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 Students built barricades at several campuses, although the prominence of Tokyo 
University Zenkyōtō in both the mass media and also the general social imagination meant that 
the experience of the barricades at Tokyo University was often generalized to describe the 
Zenkyōtō experience as a whole. According to the Tokyo University Zenkyōtō chairman, 
Yamamoto Yoshitaka, the meaning of the barricades was to disrupt the logic of capital and 
authority.46 The highly visible and long-lasting student occupation of Yasuda Tower at Tokyo 
University lasted from early July 1968 through January 1969, when students were finally 
besieged and dislodged by riot police. In many ways this event defined the climax of student 
power. The drama of the final siege of Yasuda Tower also overshadowed the everyday life of the 
barricades, although it was perhaps the everyday life of the barricades, rather than the spectacular 
battles waged from them, that offered the greatest potential to disrupt received social wisdom.  
The Everyday Life of the Campus-Based Student Movement 
 Although the symbolic focus of the Tokyo University occupation was the clocktower, a 
“nonpolitical" (nonpoli) group of students erected a tent village in front of Yasuda Tower two 
days after activist students re-occupied the building in July 1968. The tent village in front of 
Yasuda Tower attracted many non-sectarian students – “nonpoli," to indicate “nonpolitical," 
although they were certainly politicized – who participated in the middle ground between 
occupation and apathy in the tent village. This in-between space—not quite an occupation—for 
student supporters represented the varying levels of commitment possible within and at the 
peripheries of the Zenkyōtō. The activities of students there included morning campus 
“persuasion picket" demonstrations, lectures, and debates. Students rotated sleeping there, and 
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held their own courses.47  They assigned themselves readings and wrote reports.48 In a flier 
issued by students creating the tent village, they declared their support for students who retook 
the tower, and noted that they could not be disinterested in the development: "Why is that? 
Because this issue involves us as well, and it's something we have to actively grapple with. Also 
because one of the reasons for this occupation, a decisive step that should have been avoided but 
was unavoidable, is the powerlessness of our current movement."49 They encouraged 
"nonpolitical" students—those who share concerns about the unfair punishments for medical 
students and about the riot police on campus—to gather at the "tent village" to show support and 
discuss the issues. The students gathered at the tent village supported occupation not as a 
preferred tactic, but as one necessary to affirm student autonomy in the university. 
 The occupation strategies of the late 1960s student movement, in which students claimed 
space away from the everyday processes of the university and attempted to forge new, non-
hierarchical methods of protest, were matched by attempts to renegotiate the content and form of 
university study. This was an attempt to address issues embedded in the everyday life of the state 
and capital. While students boycotted classes, those occupying Yasuda Tower hosted 
“autonomous seminars" to address issues not usually discussed in formal seminars. An example 
was one held to discuss the Kin Kirō (Kwon Hyi-ro) incident of February 1968 and the issue of 
resident Koreans in Japan in general. Kin had come to national attention when he was chased 
down by police for killing a gang leader, and he held hostages in a hotel when besieged by 
officers. His demands for apologies from the police for discriminatory comments linked his 
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plight with that of all resident Koreans in Japan. In the flier, the students noted that such violence 
toward ethnic minorities were hidden by "the 'everyday life' of the 'good people' in Japan." The 
flier also advertised an "extracurricular lecture" held on July 26 on Black Power and jazz, which 
included a "record concert" of the music of John Coltrane, Ornette Coleman, and others.50 One 
female student who had been involved in organizing these "concerts" noted that she felt the 
sounds of Coltrane and Coleman expressed the African-American struggle against authority.51 
The space of the barricaded clock tower promised an autonomous area within which students 
could reflect upon the “everyday life" outside the barricades, and criticize the inequalities and 
struggles hidden therein. One student who had some experience with demonstrations noted her 
disappointment when a protest would end and she would return to her “everyday cycle," 
saturated with paradoxes.52 The barricades promised a continuous disruption of the everyday 
cycle. Another flier addressed to nonpoli students, written by the self-proclaimed "Nonpoli Anti-
War Group," collected the statements of various students, urging others to action. The 
proclamation printed in the largest lettering on the flier reads: "Isn't a 'return to the everyday' 
actually a defeat? Doesn't 'another strike' actually open up the prospect of victory? Let's 
overcome the sectarian battles with an all-campus wave of energy!"53 These “nonpolitical" 
efforts emphasized the importance of questioning the structures of power that undergirded 
“everyday" life in Japan. Student activists used occupied university space as an attempt to 
redesign the everyday practices of campus life. 
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 The barricades and strikes of the student movement offered an exciting disruption to the 
everyday cycle of work and “common sense," and opened up "liberated spaces" in which 
students could relate to each other and society in new ways. For many student activists, the 
barricades offered the possibility of even an alternative, "motherless" origin. The barricades 
could become a space to become reborn. An anonymous poem that opened the documentary 
history of the Nihon University struggle, organized by student activists, described their 
experience of the space they had created outside of the "everyday" in metaphorical terms that 
evoked a womb: 
 We are living we are living we are living 
 In this belly called the barricades 
 We are living 
 Every day we take this nourishment called self-directed lectures 
 We drink this refreshing dose called "talking among friends" 
 Every day we are living vigorously54 
 
The Zenkyōtō promise of nonhierarchical, open participation set up an alternative to the 
structures of power and domination in Japanese society at large, including the structures of the 
bourgeois family. The barricades could forge new kinship ties among friends. Free from the natal 
or nuclear household, young people envisioned a new kind of nurturing in the name of the 
movement. However, female participation in the movement exposed major gaps between theory 
and practice. While the ideal of non-horizontal participation offered the potential for mutual 
nurturing, many female student activists found that the tasks of providing actual nourishment fell 
to them. 
The Gendered Everyday of the Campus Barricades 
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 The movement's gesture toward openness made it possible for many young women to 
participate in Zenkyōtō; yet their experience of a gendered division of labor within the 
movement led many to question the structures that privileged masculine modes of activism. The 
persistence of a gendered hierarchy of labor in the movement's barricades reflected a failure to 
note the double meaning of the "everyday," which can constitute the perpetuation of systems of 
power by foreclosing alternative visions of the future, but is also the terrain in which people 
define their intimate relationships and live the multiple contradictions that constitute a constant 
challenge to any hegemonic ideal.55 This failure ensured that the radical student movement in 
Japan—dramatic and combatative as it was—ultimately failed to disrupt the greater social 
structures against which it battled. 
 As campus-based activism intensified at coeducational universities nationwide, men and 
women negotiated activism in a context in which the demands included deep and radical 
challenges to social norms. The desire to usurp “everyday life" in the barricades came up against 
the requirements of everyday life in the barricades. The promises of a greater liberation—from 
boring lectures, from a rationalized society, from social expectations—attracted many otherwise 
apolitical students to Zenkyōtō. Young women who were drawn to this expansive call for 
liberation found new freedoms and also encountered familiar constraints. 
 The memoir of Ōhara Kimiko, written in the spring of 1969, when the dust of the final 
siege of Yasuda Tower had not yet truly settled, describes one Tokyo University female student's 
path from reluctance to join sectarian activism to participation in Zenkyōtō, and the promises and 
disappointments she faced therein. It wasn't until fall 1968, Ōhara noted, when Zenkyōtō had 
driven JCP-affiliated Minsei members from the student council of the science department, that 
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she felt engaged at a meeting of sciences students in late September. At the meeting of about 250 
students, rather than the usual sectarian dogmatism, she recalled that participants asked more 
fundamental questions about the radical democratic goals of the movement and the role of Tokyo 
University in servicing the Japanese state and capital more generally.56 Through the social bonds 
created by chatting late into the night over a post-meeting plate of spaghetti, Ōhara felt like she 
was able to see her individual worries as something shared with others.57 Casual socializing 
united the students affectively, even as the opening up of a larger, more ambitious framework for 
thinking about issues at the university gave them a sense of a great mission and of overcoming 
the narrow sectarian debates that often dominated student politics. 
 In general, Zenkyōtō attracted many students like Ōhara who were otherwise intimidated 
or alienated by sects and conflict. As one former activist at Nihon University noted, it was 
difficult to draw attendees if one advertised under the name "Sanpa" ("Three Main Sects"), the 
sectarian coalition that spearheaded radical Zengakuren actions such as the Haneda protests of 
1967. The term "Zenkyōtō" implied a more open and democratic structure.58 Many former 
student activists recalled feelings similar to the ones Ōhara described: there was a moment in 
which campus politics shifted from entrenched sectarian debates to an earnest attempt at 
communication, and this is the moment they point to as defining “Zenkyōtō." For a student at 
Waseda University, she noted that this happened early in 1966, when negotiations over rising 
tuition costs with the school administration broke down and student barricades prevented classes 
from being held. Although the two major competing sects at the time were Kakumaru, which 
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controlled the official university student council, and Minsei, which had set up their own 
unofficial student council, she recalled that the small meeting of thirty-five students in her class 
on how to react to the barricades was the first non-sectarian political meeting in which people 
expressed their individual opinions instead of entrenched political stances. She recalled it as very 
fresh, and an attempt at real communication. After a month of continuous debate, the class of 
thirty-five students decided they were against the tuition hikes, and also agreed to go on strike. 
She felt that, unlike the street demonstrations she had participated in before, which required a 
commitment to extreme action, this was a kind of "everyday activism."59 Her use of the term 
"everyday" drew on a definition of the “everyday" as a potential site of resistance to the 
“everyday" of nation and capital. Although the activism she described was not organized as a 
Zenkyōtō, this campus-focused form of anti-tuition hike activism at Waseda informed the 
campus-based activism of the late 1960s, and demonstrated how loosely the term “Zenkyōtō" is 
used to refer to late 1960s campus-based student activism in general. Another former female 
student activist who had been involved in the student self-governing associations during her 
undergraduate time at Ochanomizu Women's University and continued activism upon entering 
graduate school at Tokyo University felt drawn to the slogans of the Chinese Cultural 
Revolution, such as "To Rebel is Justified," and "Continuous Revolution." But she distanced 
herself from sects, especially repulsed by the actions of the JCP-affiliated sect (Minsei) at Tokyo 
University, and their prioritization of the organization over individuals.60 
 Although activism exposed many young women to the deeply ingrained sexist attitudes 
of their male comrades, many still recalled the barricades as spaces that offered a new degree of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Tokuyama Haruko, “Watashi ga ugokeba yo no naka ga hitori bun ugoku to iu jikkan," in Zenkyōtō 
kara ribu e, ed. Onnatachi no ima o tō kai, Jūgoshi nōto sengohen (Kawasaki: Inpakuto shuppankai, 
1996), 85. 
60 Funabashi, “Zenkyōtō undō to jendaa," 97. 
	  
 139	  
freedom. Shigenobu Fusako, later infamous for her involvement with the Japan Red Army, 
attended night school at Meiji University while working for Kikkoman, a major soy sauce 
manufacturer, in the mid-1960s. She stumbled upon the student movement just before the 
entrance ceremony in spring 1965, and was impressed by the students sitting in protest of rising 
fees, since it seemed they were acting not on their own behalf, but for the next generation of 
students. She described the Meiji University barricades as a place where young people were able 
to come together and discuss their lives. It wasn't just Meiji University students, either: "At some 
point students from nearby Bunka Gakuin, some high school students and girls who'd run away 
from home joined our group. It became a kind of counseling service."61 Although these 
barricades predated the more famous Zenkyōtō occupations of the late 1960s, the social 
functions of a student-run space were similar. They were peer groups in which, removed from 
everyday social hierarchies and constraints, students felt they were able to articulate concerns 
they could not otherwise discuss. Yonezu Tomoko, who would become a well-known women's 
lib activist, recalled that she was first able to talk about the physical disabilities that had long 
convinced her that she'd never live the life of a “normal" wife in the "extraordinarily liberated 
space" of the student barricades.62 Another young woman reflecting on the barricades of Tokyo 
University in 1970 recalled: "When in the 'exitless' space of Building 8 [Tokyo University 
Komaba campus barricades], I was released from my social positions (as a female, as 
somebody's child, as a Tōdai student, etc.). I lived only in a 'now' that floated away from its 
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position in connecting the past and the future."63 For this female student, the barricades promised 
a kind of temporal rupture that facilitated new forms of engagement with others, even if access to 
that space was limited to those who were young. 
Female student activists who sought to attract other young women to the student movement 
appealed to a sense of intellectual liberation as well. One appeal written by a female student and 
circulated among Nihon University students affirmed that young women could establish their 
own active "human" agency and transcend their sex and society's belief that women belong in the 
home by participating in the movement at Nichidai. The anonymous female author declared that, 
"If we want to truly be university students, we need to think for ourselves, assert, and act." It was 
"no good," she argued to assume that male students would solve the university's problems for 
them: "Female students are students." For this female student activist, participation in the 
movement was a way for young women to believe that "women themselves are also truly 
people." 
 Many female students noted, however, the incongruity between the liberated space of the 
movement's barricades and the quotidian sexism that assigned them tasks because of their gender 
while increasingly privileging the masculine roles associated with more and more aggressive 
strategies of protest. In the Tokyo University barricades, Ōhara Kimiko found herself making 
rice balls (onigiri) until late at night with other female students to prepare for meetings. She 
reflected on how it fell to the women to cook while the men ran the demonstrations. Ōhara noted: 
"I was frustrated that I didn't have a stout frame that could wield a sword like a boy."64 This 
created two clear-cut and gendered roles within the movement: rice balls or "Gewalt sticks" 
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(gebabō, an improvised weapon often made from bamboo or wood used in street fighting). That 
female students activists were relegated to kitchen duty—often described as making endless piles 
of onigiri—remains a common complaint of the gendered structure of the movement's work.65 
 
Figure 7. A female student making rice balls in the Kyoto University barricades. The activists 
named the puppy "Che Debara" as a pun on "pudgy" (debu) combined with the name of Latin 
American revolutionary Che Guevara. 
Asahi gurafu, 6 June 1969.66 
 
 At times, it was not only male students' expectations of women's roles, but also young 
women's own reluctance to lead that limited female presence in the more public roles of the 
movement. Ōhara felt that her female comrades shrank from roles like agitation, some of them 
out of fear that they would ruin their chances at marrying or upset their families. Mori Setsuko, a 
former student activist at Tama Arts University, noticed that the women in the barricades cleaned 
up after the men of their own volition. Her refusal to do this was challenged by a male student. A 
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male student leader came to her defense, noting that "even though" she was a woman, she also 
did "real" work: she wrote fliers and gave speeches.67 Even when a woman could step into other 
roles, she often did so as an honorary exception, setting up hierarchies of tasks—“masculine" 
leadership roles were more valuable than “feminine" support roles—and also hierarchies of 
women: women who performed intellectual work were more fully activists than women who 
organized food preparation, the mimeographing of fliers, or jail support. The Tokyo University 
female student leader, Kashiwazaki Chieko, was in a similar "honorary" position. Her unusual 
status as a female leader gained her notoriety, and her ability to engage in battles and wield a 
"Gewalt stick" was underscored by her senior position as a graduate student. We shall see later 
how the mass media seized upon these exceptional women and transformed them into hysterical 
and infantile figures. 
 It was not only male students who privileged the "masculine" work of writing and 
agitating; a former female activist looked back on her participation in the student movement and 
Marxism, wondering if she joined up in order to become "male" and escape the weaker social 
position allotted to women.68 Another young woman at Tokyo University noted that she had first 
approached the Zenkyōtō movement as a way to liberate herself from a feminine passivity.69 The 
allure of activism for some young women was its promise of offering an alternative subjectivity, 
one that was not marked by passive vulnerability. 
 The increasing valorization of masculine displays of violence, however, contributed to 
the alienation of female former activists. Standard narratives of the movement traced the 
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spectacular events in which students clashed with authority, such as on Anti-War Day (October 
21, known as "10.21") in both 1968 and 1969. Ōhara's comment above about wishing she had a 
body like a boy's that could wield a sword also affirmed the romantic ideal of the student activist 
as a street-battling revolutionary. At one of the major demonstrations, the 21 October 1968 
International Anti-War Day protest in Shinjuku, the crowd assembled all manner of young 
people, "student types, salaryman types, older brother types, vagabond types," all of whom burst 
into applause and cheers when the helmeted student activist groups showed up, greeting them 
like celebrities.70 The emblematic image of the Zenkyōtō student was a masculine, helmeted 
street fighter grasping a "Gewalt stick." 
 Yet many young women like Ōhara Kimiko were also skeptical of the political 
significance of this violence. Battles between Zenkyōtō and the JCP-affiliated Minsei, or 
between leftist sects, however, failed to evoke the threat of state violence. Although Ōhara at 
Tokyo University blamed Minsei for the intersectarian violence with Zenkyōtō on campus, she 
also emphatically described both the Minsei and Zenkyōtō participants in the great battle of 12 
November 1968 in front of the main library as "boys."71 When a female student from a women's 
university stayed overnight in Yasuda Tower and noted how she disliked the collected gebabō 
there, Ōhara concurred and wondered, "Is it because we're female that we dislike them?"72 She 
appreciated the activism of Zenkyōtō that had disrupted the empty and paradoxical everyday life 
of the university with a strike, and even felt that violence was a potential political tool; she 
admired Malcolm X over Martin Luther King, Jr., for example. But by the fall of 1968, she 
objected to the increasing emphasis on violence in the Zenkyōtō. The violent actions of the 
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movement—organized into confrontational events such as "10.21"—prioritized the power of the 
students to disrupt the everyday life cycles of capitalist Japanese society. However, as the 
students became an anti-institutional collective, they needed to reproduce themselves as a kind of 
counter-institution. The labor that reproduced the daily needs of the movement—food, printing 
pamphlets and signs, jail support—was made invisible, thus rendering the mostly female labor 
that did this work invisible as well.  
 In contrast, female student activists at women's universities experienced the Zenkyōtō 
movement shielded from some of the injustices of barricade sexism. One woman who had been 
an activist at Ochanomizu Women's University felt she couldn't really relate to the stories of 
Zenkyōtō sexism that other women told when she joined the women's liberation movement in the 
1970s. She first discovered the gender gap when she left college and was looking for a job.73 
Until she entered the greater social structures in which she worked alongside men, she was not 
forced to address the social expectations that curtailed women's freedoms. However, a former 
student at Tokyo Women's University qualified the lack of sexism in the activism she 
participated in by noting that even in a women's college, she felt the shadow cast by "men's 
governance."74 Another woman who had been active at the same university referred to the 
liberation within their all-women's movement as "freedom in a birdcage."75 However, even a 
movement protected from the gendered expectations of male students was not immune to 
emerging hierarchies. One student activist who entered Tokyo Women's University and the 
Zenkyōtō a bit later, in 1969, felt busy all day with the movement's tasks: mimeographing 
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pamphlets and drawing billboards, attending assemblies and debates, and distributing fliers 
occupied all her time. But she didn't feel a sense that she was expressing herself; she felt like she 
just did as she was instructed to do by the older girls.76 Other hierarchies—of age in this case, 
and most likely of race and class in many other cases—developed in the ostensibly horizontal 
barricades. 
 Coeducation played a significant role in allowing many young women to experience the 
contradiction between the theory of universal human liberation and the practices of differentiated 
labor and values attached to labor, sharpening their awareness of this gap as a social problem at a 
young age. The participation of young women in an activist movement that was made up of men 
and women and framed its demands in such expansive and universal terms made female students 
aware of sexism, and that they were somehow shut out from a universal subjectivity because of 
their gender. As one former activist noted, the Tokyo University struggle was supposed to be a 
total struggle in the name of humanity, but she felt like she was treated differently because she 
was a woman.77 Tokoro Mitsuko had hoped the “women's logic" of nurturing would influence 
leftist movements the more that women participated. Although her ideas about a less hierarchical 
and more open organization influenced the late 1960s campus-based student activism, certain 
tasks in the movement became gendered and re-trapped young women in a kind of “mothering" 
role that affirmed for many of them the necessity of creating a women-only movement. Instead 
of embracing the influence of an essentializing feminine logic of nurturing, the culture of the late 
1960s New Left sought to affirm an aggressive and violent pose to counter the demands of 
liberal society. This, as we shall see, constituted a kind of "masculine logic."
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"Don't Stop Me, Mama!": 
The New Left's valorization of masculinity 
 
Sometimes like a motherless child 
I want to try to scream loudly 
But then my mood soon changes 
 "Sometimes Like a Motherless Child,"sung by Carmen Maki, 
  lyrics by Terayama Shūji 
 
 A former student activist recalled listening to the popular 1969 hit, "Sometimes Like a 
Motherless Child," in the campus barricades. The mournful song expressed a longing to cut 
oneself off from the key familial relationship, and he found that it resonated with how he felt at 
the time.1 The lyrics, by poet and playwright Terayama Shūji, detailed a yearning to, "at times," 
live "like a motherless child." Terayama's words described a tension between the desire to break 
free of the mother-child affective bond and thereby experience total liberation, and the 
recognition of the safety and comfort of that connection. In the case of the New Left in late 1968 
and 1969, the song's ambivalence echoed how many would-be student militants framed their 
revolt against mainstream Japanese society. As mid-1960s educational directives attempted to 
enlist the family in the service of the nation, students rebelled against the representative of 
domesticity: "Mama." 
Introduction 
 The New Left student movement of the late 1960s, in rejecting postwar liberal 
democratic society, recognized mothers as manifestations of the social order. Here I explore how 
student activists' rejection of "Mama" led to an embrace of a particularly masculine ideal of 
violence, aligning the student left in many ways with the far right at a moment in which its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Takahashi Hiroshi, Tsuwamonodomo ga yume no saki (Tokyo: Ueitsu, 2010), 58. 
	  
 147	  
appeal to popular sympathy waned. This covers the period of late 1968 and 1969, in which the 
student movement faced not only rising state oppression, but also became increasingly estranged 
from public sympathy. As I discuss the diminishing of popular support, I will illustrate the 
ascendant privileging of a heterosexual male logic that came to dominate New Left culture by 
1970 with writings produced by student activists, and commentaries on the meaning of the 1969 
student movement by two prominent and complex writers and cultural figures of the time: 
Terayama Shūji and Mishima Yukio. Terayama criticized the student movement, particularly at 
elite Tokyo University, from a radical position, and right-wing author Mishima engaged the 
Tokyo University Zenkyōtō in a debate that was later circulated by the mass media. Here I 
explore how, in a movement at many moments defined by female participation, the changing 
context of masculinity shifted the site of political action in a way that not only diminished the 
gendered labor of female activists but also attempted to reject any affiliation with femininity. In 
late 1968 and 1969, the New Left swung toward embracing masculine-coded aggression. In 
doing so, the student movement lost its broader appeal as a potentially vulnerable segment of 
society. 
The Loss of Popular Sympathy for the Student Movement: From Vulnerable to Violent 
 Popular support for the student movement and its actions often depended upon an ideal of 
student vulnerability. The deaths of student activists Kanba Michiko in 1960 and Yamazaki 
Hiroaki in 1967 marked high points for general sympathy toward the New Left. When students 
faced off against the better armed riot police at Haneda Airport in fall 1967 and at Sasebo Bay in 
early 1968, popular opinion sided with the gutsy student activists; this sympathy waned when the 
targets of activism were no longer clearly authoritarian institutions.2 Rather than images of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




unarmed students beaten by armored police, intensifying intersectarian battles between New Left 
groups and the JCP-affiliated Minsei, and between New Left sects themselves beginning in late 
1968 offered the public images of student-initiated violence. Instances of "internal violence"—
uchigeba (short for uchi Gewalt, "internal violence")— between leftist sects became more 
frequent, and weakened student activists' claims that their "Gewalt" was a counter-violence 
disrupting the state's monopoly on force. The intensification of intersectarian violence also drove 
many student activists away from participating in the late 1960s student movement. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, many young women had a particularly ambivalent 
relationship to the aggressive street battle tactics of the Zenkyōtō and other sects. By late 1968, 
the uniform for many student activists included not only the defensive helmet painted with their 
affiliation and a towel over the face to protect against tear gas, but improvised weaponry such as 
staves and bamboo sticks. The student activist was no longer just a social critic and activist, but 
also a militant. The democratic access symbolized by female participation in the student 
movement gave way to the figure of the street-fighting student. 
 In part, this emphasis on force responded to forceful measures on the part of the state and 
university authorities. The quelling of the two most influential campus-based movements at 
Nihon University and Tokyo University involved decisions made at the highest levels of 
government at the behest of university administrations. After Nihon University students 
assembled 35,000 students on 20 September 1968 and succeeded in extracting promises from the 
university president and other members of the university's board of directors, the Prime Minister 
stepped in and determined that the twelve-hour-long "mass negotiations" constituted "group 
violence."3 The results were voided, barricades were dismantled, and arrest warrants were issued 
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for Zenkyōtō leaders.4 After vigorous debate in the Diet, Tokyo University's administration 
invited the riot police to enter the campus and expel the long-standing student occupation of 
Yasuda Tower on 18 January 1969. The resulting siege lasted seventy-two hours. Between the 
police attempting to dislodge students from Yasuda Tower and those mobilized to counter 
student demonstrations in support of the Tokyo University battle in other neighborhoods, 710 
were injured.5 Of the 400 students arrested at the campus, 270 were wounded. Although there 
were no casualties, many injuries were serious: one student went blind.6 Although barricades and 
organizing continued at various campuses, including at Tokyo University, by early 1969 the 
concerns of the campus-based New Left shifted from maintaining a non-hierarchical and open 
relationship between the individual and the organization toward a focus on the confrontational 
relationship with the law and society in general. 
The New Left and the Politics of Masculinity 
 Student activists embraced violence as a strategy not only to counter figures of authority, 
but also to set the student movement at odds with bourgeois Japanese everyday life, and, in 
particular, to distinguish New Left youth from the rationalized, domesticated masculinity of the 
corporate man. The white-collar worker, the "salaryman" (sarariiman), represented the new, 
high-economic-growth era ideal of masculine responsibility in the late 1960s, in a family 
structure that required men to earn enough wages to support women's work within the home. 
However, for student radicals, the sarariiman represented an emasculated cog in the machinery 
of the state and capital. A comic strip published in the tabloid Shūkan yomiuri played on the idea 
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that the street fighting of student radicals offered otherwise downtrodden men moments of 
romantic masculinity. In the strip, a helmeted male figure attacks the riot police, seduces a young 
woman, and then, finally, removes his militant gear to reveal a balding sarariiman (fig. 8). He 
shuffles home and puts himself to bed in his futon alongside his wife and children (fig. 9).7 New 
Left slogans making claims about manliness set activist masculinity against what was seen as 
this subjugated nature of postwar liberal society and the expanding managerial class within it. 
 
Figure 8. Cartoon of a man battling the riot police and impressing women. Ishimori Shotarō, 
"Anpo hantai!," Shūkan yomiuri, 2 January 1970, p. 49. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Figure 9. Cartoon of a sarariiman going home to his family after rioting. Ishimori Shotarō, "Anpo 
hantai!,"  Shūkan yomiuri, 2 January 1970, p. 51. 
 
 Although radical student activists embraced street violence as a way to set themselves 
apart from the emasculated figure of the white-collar worker, the key figure of authority against 
which students of the influential Tokyo University Zenkyōtō defined their rebellion became the 
mother. If the postwar order had domesticated manhood, it had emboldened women, and mothers 
represented the most powerful link between students and bourgeois society. The emblematic 
poster for the Tokyo University Komaba Festival of November 1968 displayed aspirations for an 
alternative ethos, embracing violence set against the middle-class family, represented by the 
mother (fig. 10). In the poster, a tattooed man displays an enormous tattoo of gingko leaves on 
his back. The figure evokes the actor Takakura Ken, famous for playing yakuza outlaws (fig. 
11). Referencing the famous gingko trees of Tokyo University, the text on the poster reads: 
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"Don't stop me, mama / the gingko on my back are crying / male Tokyo University is going 
somewhere."8  
 
Figure 10. The 19th Annual Tokyo University Komaba Festival Poster. Hashimoto Osamu, 
November 1968. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Figure 11. Takakura Ken in a 1967 advertisement for the fourth film in the nine-film series 
Remnants of Chivalry in the Showa Era (Shōwa zankyōden). 
 
 In the Komaba Festival poster, the mother is set up as the one who might attempt to 
obstruct the movement's purpose, which is not only gendered male, but is also cast as a yakuza.9 
Toei Studios' yakuza films were wildly popular with students in the late 1960s, for reasons not 
only of entertainment, but also for their romantic portrayal of masculinity.10 The image of 
manhood in yakuza films contrasted sharply with that of the sarariiman; yakuza films portrayed 
a code of masculine honor undergirded by violence. The graffiti scrawled on the walls of the 
barricades of Tokyo University often returned to the theme of Tokyo University affirming its 
masculinity through the Zenkyōtō movement. One line from the wall of an occupied building 
read, "with this, Tokyo University has also become a man."11 Such scribblings on the walls of 
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occupied buildings suggested that many students, much like the sarariiman of the tabloid comic 
strip, found masculine affirmation part of the allure of activism. 
 In contrast, barricade graffiti often used "female" to indicate a passive and vulnerable 
contrast to "male" activism. One parody played on the Komaba festival slogan to question the 
masculinity of the student movement: "Please stop me, Mama / the gingko on my back are 
laughing / feminine Tokyo University / can't go anywhere."12 In another scribble, a student 
denigrated the Kakumaru sect using this gendered distinction: "male Tokyo University fought / 
female Kakumaru does not fight."13 Demonstrating the diversity of voices, other graffiti affirmed 
"women's autonomy" and "women's liberation."14 However, as a contrast with a position of 
active "male" fighting, "female" became an insult in the slang of the New Left. One former 
female student activist at Waseda University recalled reading a student movement billboard that 
declared, "Actresses can also enter, women can also enter, tuition also rises, the riot police also 
enter, there's no university student council, what a degraded thing is Waseda."15 Echoing the 
"Coeds Ruin the Nation" debates of the tabloids, student activists at Waseda University made a 
parallel between the degradation of higher education and the admission of female students, 
aligning the logic of the New Left with the logic of more mainstream concerns about postwar 
masculinity. 
The New Left Versus "Mama" 
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 Beyond attacking "female" weakness in general, however, a major target of the Zenkyōtō 
at Tokyo University in particular became the maternal link with the bourgeois household in 
which many had grown up. In late 1968, in the pages of the Tokyo University Zenkyōtō 
publication, Shingeki, alongside articles about disrupting "everyday life" and negating the 
bourgeois self, activists also penned calls urging students to "Overcome Mama!"16 This 
"overcoming" was most likely emotional, rather than intellectual. In Tsurumi Kazuko's mid-
1960s student survey on relationships between mothers and their children in Japan, only one 
student activist out of one hundred surveyed described their mother as influential, although the 
ideas of students seemed to influence mothers. This, Tsurumi concluded, showed that "the 
mother-children relationship turns out to be like a one-sided love affair."17 Student activists even 
saw their mothers as relatively ignorant, identifying them as "fit targets for 'enlightenment' in 
political thinking."18 The generation gap produced a great affective distance between many 
students and their fathers, but many more students identified the gap between themselves and 
their mothers as a particularly intellectual one. In spite of the postwar emphasis on mothers as 
educators in the home, few student activists felt they had grown up with a "Wise Mother." 
 The aspect of maternal dominance that student activists felt they had to overcome, then, 
was less an ideological one than an affective one. And mothers who sought to exploit that 
emotional bond to dissuade students from activism became representatives of "Mama" as an 
obstacle to the New Left. For example, "caramel mamas" soon became figures featured by the 
mass media and derided by student activists. Even female student activists, such as Ōhara 
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Kimiko of Tokyo University's Zenkyōtō, ridiculed the older women sometimes seen at sit-ins 
and other demonstrations, who attempted to dissuade students from activism while handing out 
caramel candies. She found them intellectually vapid, as they, "without trying to understand 
anything only talked about how you have to take care of your body."19 These "caramel mamas" 
sought to evoke the warm affective feelings students had for their mothers when they were 
children, hoping that would dissuade them from radical activism. In Ōhara and other student 
activists' view, mothers were cast in the role of the everyday life of the household that 
undergirded the Japanese state, ignorant of the larger ideological stakes. They were antithetical 
to radical thought, and represented the family and its bourgeois morality and concerns. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Figure 12. A "caramel mama" passes out sweets at Tokyo University  
Shūkan yomiuri, 6 December 1968. 
 
 In the mass media, the presence of "caramel mamas" at Tokyo University in particular 
offered an opportunity to emphasize the larger, bourgeois family structures to which the student 
activists were attached. A full-page photograph published in December 1968 in the tabloid 
Shūkan yomiuri featured the image of a kimono-clad "caramel mama," armed with her box of 
sweets, outside the placards around the Komaba campus of Tokyo University. The mother stands 
confidently between the viewer and the festival poster that demanded, "Don't Stop Me, Mama!" 
In contrast, a uniformed guard behind the photo fidgets and gazes at the ground. The famous 
gingko trees and clock tower of the Komaba campus, although not the iconic Yasuda Tower that 
would be besieged by riot police in January 1969, lie beyond a placard painted with large 
characters calling for, "self-criticism." The slogan resonated in both form and substance with the 
big-character posters created by young people mobilized to root out bourgeois and capitalist 
elements during the Chinese Cultural Revolution of the mid-1960s. This photograph pits the 
"caramel mama" against the tattooed illustration in the poster, and situates the mother as the 
vigilant patroller of the campus's borders. 
 This anti-mother discourse on campuses informed the context in which Carmen Maki's 
hit single "Sometimes like a Motherless Child" resonated with student activists in the barricades 
of 1969. For Terayama Shūji, the writer of the song's lyrics, the mother-child bond constituted a 
common theme in his various poems, plays, and films. His works featured extreme permutations 
on this relationship, from matricide to incest, and cannot easily be summarized. However, for 
Terayama as well as the Zenkyōtō students, the mother embodied the laws of society. For the 
slightly older Terayama, who was born in 1935, the social order his mother represented was that 
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of the wartime state. The familial bonds with which she tied him were those forged in the 
Ministry of Education's 1937 " Fundamentals of Our National Polity" (Kokutai no hongi), in 
which the emperor represented the familial relationship between Japanese nationals.20 Terayama 
didn't see much real change between the prewar family and the ostensibly democratic postwar 
family; though the language shifted from that of the ie to that of the katei, Japanese society failed 
to create a "self" outside of the ethics of the family.21 Countering the language of the "The Image 
of the Ideal Person," Terayama saw the family and society not as related, one nestled within the 
other, but rather as antithetical entities. After all, he noted, people in contemporary Japan didn't 
take comfort in the home. It was in the cabarets, the brothels, the baseball stadiums, and go-go 
halls where people sought comfort. They found relief when they watched Takakura Ken weave a 
tale at a late-night screening of a yakuza film.22 Terayama privileged affiliation over filiation, 
advocating for the creation of "society people" rather than "family people" in his piece, An 
Encouragement of Running Away (Iede no susume).23  Playing on the title of Japanese 
Enlightenment enthusiast Fukuzawa Yukichi's late nineteenth-century work, An Encouragement 
of Learning (Gakumon no susume), Terayama subverted Fukuzawa's emphasis on molding 
educated individuals to contribute to a strong nation. 
Terayama's Radical Critique of the Tokyo University Student Movement 
 Terayama's words may have resonated with student activists, but his wariness of any 
project that contributed to the nation made him cynical of the slogans of the Tokyo University 
student movement in particular. Terayama, always aware of his origin in the backwater of 
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Japan—an Aomori accent marked him as a son of the Tōhoku region—and a college dropout to 
boot, first entered the Tokyo University campus when it was in ruins in late January 1969. 
Although he acknowledged that the slogans of the Tokyo University Zenkyōtō quickly expanded 
to include broad social questions about the nature of the university in Japanese society, 
Terayama also noted that it was only because Tokyo University was incapacitated that he felt 
able to enter its grounds. After all, the issue of the struggle at Tokyo University had such great 
social significance because of Tokyo University's exalted position in Japanese society. Terayama 
pointed out the deep, metonymic relationship between the one school and higher education in 
general in Japan: "The history of Tokyo University is also the history of Japan's modern 
universities." Tokyo University was built to make Japan modern. And the fervor with which the 
average citizen greeted the Tokyo University student movement's slogans such as "demolish 
Tokyo University" reflected, "not only the issue of how the education system ought to be, but 
also the citizens' (shimin) desire for revenge. It expresses the vigor of a personal grudge toward 
Tokyo University as the training school for bureaucrats, as a university that assigns class 
distinctions to brains, as a university that creates the ruling class."24 Even as the general postwar 
social trend expanded higher education through waves of democratization, Tokyo University 
retained its elite standing. Tokyo University was the university of the state. In a moment in 
which "enlightenment" was no longer necessary, however, there was a new questioning of the 
role of Tokyo University. According to Terayama's observations, this took on an existential 
questioning aspect for Tokyo University students, in which they battled the social image of 
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themselves as coddled Tokyo University students, excessively protected as they transitioned 
from the safe spaces of their family to the space of the nation.25 
 In Terayama's opinion, it was this urge to prove that they were not brainy, physically 
weak, and overprotected that informed the masculine assertions characteristic of the Tokyo 
University struggle. Terayama suspected that the graffiti remaining in the campus ruins voicing 
sentiments about "male Tokyo University" or becoming "male" expressed a desire to affirm that 
Tokyo University students could also act as masculine urban guerillas, although the repression 
they faced was not as fierce as that on other campuses. As an example, Terayama recalled a 
roundtable between Tokyo University and Nihon University student activists. The Nihon 
University students recounted how they faced off against right-wing students armed with deadly 
weapons such as a sword or a rifle. These activists, Terayama noted, did not need to invoke a 
"male Nihon University."26 He compared the Komaba festival slogan—"Don't stop me, 
Mama"—to a wartime song for young male soldiers, although the Tokyo University students 
replaced "woman" with "mama."27 In attempting to affirm their potential for violence, Tokyo 
University students expressed a rejection of any links to nurturing "feminine" relationships, and 
thus replicated the tenor of militarist songs. Terayama suspected that, although the Tokyo 
University struggle at many points provoked popular sympathy, the students involved would 
eventually wake from the "dream" of "male Tokyo University," end the strike, graduate, and take 
up the task for which they had been selected: that of "building Japan." 
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 Terayama's comments articulated a more general cynicism about the authenticity of the 
Tokyo University Zenkyōtō cries of "demolish Tokyo University" or the broader, and more 
ambiguous, theories of "self-negation." By destroying their university, the student activists 
threatened to topple the educational hierarchy and the social hierarchy it produced. The theory of 
"self-negation" offered a way for elite university students to reject their privileged social 
position. However, one Tokyo University student recalled with unease how a person prevented 
from applying to Tokyo University by the student movement's interruption of the 1969 
admission exams noted, "To harm others and then to self-negate the self that is a Tokyo 
University student is just settling the whole matter with words."28 In his view, it was all too 
characteristic of hyper-intellectual Tokyo University students to develop a theoretical solution to 
a social problem. 
Celebrity and the Student Movement: Man to Man with Mishima Yukio 
 The elite status of Tokyo University assured the influence of the Tokyo University 
Zenkyōtō and conferred a celebrity status upon its leaders that undermined declarations of "self-
negation." In spite of the movement's claims for horizontality, the Tokyo University Zenkyōtō 
chairman, 26-year-old graduate student Yamamoto Yoshitaka, became famous. His speeches 
were sold as phonograph recordings and women's magazine Josei jishin wrote profiles on his 
relationship with his graphic designer wife.29 A great deal of this publicity emerged from a mass 
media desire to identify a leader from within an ostensibly leaderless movement, but the student 
activists also sought out the press at several points. 
 Depending on the mass media to disseminate its slogans, many student activists relied 
upon mass media attention. When a group of Tokyo University students invited Mishima Yukio, 
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a right-wing celebrity author, to debate them on 13 May 1969, they demonstrated no less 
publicity savvy than the flamboyant writer. Mishima arrived at the debate with a cameraman and 
a stenographer from the publisher Shinchōsha in tow, only to find that the Zenkyōtō students had 
already alerted journalists. The TV station TBS incorporated a segment on the debate into its 
evening primetime news show, while the transcribed volume Shinchōsha released a little over a 
month later became a minor bestseller.30 Mishima and the students split the royalties.31 
 The mass media flocked to the event because the conversation between Mishima Yukio 
and the Tokyo University Zenkyōtō promised a clash between two extremes in the contemporary 
political and cultural milieu. Mishima represented his idiosyncratic extremist right-wing 
ideology, and the student group took part under the banner of the Tokyo University Zenkyōtō, 
presumably participating anonymously, representing the collectivist and leftist project of the 
student movement. The resulting "debate" demonstrated a search for an ideal political subject, 
which remained rich with contradictions and half-baked ideas. Mishima himself was an alumnus 
of Tokyo University, having graduated from the Law Department in 1947, and so he shared the 
elite social caste of the students. All participants were not only all affiliated with Tokyo 
University, but all were also male. The underlying tone of the debate proceeded from a shared 
assumption of a masculine subject from which political action emerged. 
 The romanticized politics of violent action upon which both the Tokyo Zenkyōtō students 
and Mishima agreed underlined in particular the late-1960s New Left's definitive privileging of 
"masculine" action. The late 1960s student movement built upon the ideas key to the anti-Anpo 
demonstrations of the late 1950s and 1960, in which actively expressing one's politics became 
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the ideal of citizenship. However, the Zenkyōtō took to task intellectuals such as Maruyama 
Masao, a Tokyo University law department professor and famous liberal intellectual, for not 
extending postwar theories of active citizenship to the campus-based struggles. Turning 
Maruyama Masao's words against him, Tokyo University Zenkyōtō chairman Yamamoto 
Yoshitaka, who had gone underground and was not present at the debate with Mishima, had 
previously pondered why the professor could write such a keen study of fascism under the 
Emperor system, but could not extend his analysis to how Tokyo University functioned in 
postwar society. Referencing Maruyama's 1961 essay "To Be and To Do," Yamamoto 
considered Maruyama's own statements about Tokyo University as "being the seat of reason."32 
In Yamamoto's view, declaring that a university is ignores what the university does, and repeats 
the logic of absolutism. Yamamoto's line of reasoning ran through slogans such as, "Demolish 
Tokyo University!" The violence demanded in that slogan revealed that, by 1969, the idea of 
"action" became equated with "violence." 
 Mishima arrived to the debate with the Zenkyōtō eager to align himself with the radical 
students' attacks on heady intellectualism. At the outset of the conversation, Mishima and the 
New Left participants explicitly stated a shared hatred of the contemporary liberal Japanese state 
and a willingness—an eagerness, even—to use violence as a political strategy.33  Referring to 
student assaults on scholars representative of postwar liberal intellectualism, Mishima casts 
himself as an ally in romantic, physical action, noting that of course his admiration for such 
actions might be because he is not an intellectual: "If Maruyama Masao himself were to shed his 
skin and to advocate anti-intellectualism it might satisfy public opinion, but as long as Professor 
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Maruyama exists he stands for the position of intellectualism. For that, he got a beating."34 That 
the students of Zenkyōtō assaulted the intellectual icon of "postwar democracy," an ally in many 
ways to the 1960 Tokyo University anti-Anpo student movement, further demonstrated to many 
their emphasis on violent action over rhetoric. Indeed, Mishima earned their respect—one of 
them unthinkingly referred to him as "teacher" (sensei) in the debate—by coming into their midst 
alone.35 Such an act was unthinkable for many Tokyo University professors, let alone someone 
who had come out as a public enemy of the movement. Using this logic, a student who slipped 
up and called Mishima "teacher" defended his mistake, noting that Mishima deserved the title 
more than many of their so-called teachers. To the comment Maruyama Masao was rumored to 
have made about students who confronted him and occupied his office, that "not even the Nazis" 
would have committed such violence, the student dubbed "Zenkyōtō A" noted that of course the 
Nazis would not have attacked Tokyo University, since the institution was in the service of 
fascism during the war.36 Although the students and Mishima himself participated in the 
institution of Tokyo University as students—and in many ways gained popular celebrity through 
their Tokyo University affiliation—they all framed themselves as critics of the postwar liberal 
intellectualism for which the university stood. 
 It is unlikely that the student participants in the debate with Mishima Yukio understood 
exactly how attracted the author was to the politics of violence. The author maintained a colorful, 
high-profile public persona, and his oeuvre ranged from minor works with an avid housewife-
reader audience to novels that drew the attention of the Nobel Prize committee. In conversation 
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with the Tokyo University Zenkyōtō, he described his political views as an "extremely radical 
conservative political philosophy," but delivered the line in such a manner that he prompted his 
audience to laugh.37 It is hard to know where Mishima stood; he practiced a kind of social 
transvestitism, slipping into various poses. In his debate with student activists, he flattered their 
actions; in an article for the popular journal Bungei shunjū he appealed to civil society against 
the student activists, encouraging them to "turn Tokyo University into a zoo." He was, 
simultaneously, a militant, a fop, queer, and a womanizer. Mishima's fascination with military 
culture and masculine violence led him to train with the Self-Defense Forces in 1967. While 
there, the readership of a popular weekly tabloid awarded him the number one position in its 
"All-Japan Mr. Dandy" contest.38 His 1951 serial novel Forbidden Colors introduced audiences 
to the underground world of gay bars in Tokyo, although Mishima's love affairs included those 
with high-society women. Shōda Michiko, who married the Crown Prince in 1959, had even met 
with him for a formal marriage interview.39 The ease with which Mishima wore these various 
roles made it seem like he was ever playful and never sincere. Mishima's tone of aristocratic 
irony obscured to many of his contemporaries how invested he was in his militant rightist 
politics in the late 1960s. The student leftists' view of Mishima was also shaped by the author's 
dandified public image, and while they traded words with him in an often earnest effort to 
distinguish their own views from his romantic rightism, it is not likely that they realized the 
seriousness behind Mishima's frequent provocative flourishes.40 In spite of whatever fears 
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Mishima's associates may have had for his safety entering the company of "violent" students, the 
mood of the May 1968 Mishima vs. Zenkyōtō debate as recorded by film and transcription seems 
light: Mishima charms laughter out of his thousand-person strong student audience, dressed 
casually in a polo shirt.41 
 Mishima Yukio's interest in political violence as a foil to the postwar liberal democratic 
order responded to a different set of geopolitical concerns than those of the Zenkyōtō he debated, 
although both sides ultimately privileged masculine violence as a response. While the late 1960s 
student movement battled Japanese authorities to disrupt the everyday life of the state and capital 
that perpetuated violence in Vietnam, Mishima declared his support for the U.S.'s military 
involvement in Vietnam when Newsweek consulted him in 1967. The Japanese weekly tabloid 
Heibon Punch consulted Mishima to clarify his statements made in the American publication; 
when Mishima replied that, "You can take it as they put it," he also added, "I'm still someone 
who affirms the Great East Asian War and I support America's Vietnam policy, too."42 
Mishima's support of not only the current U.S. war in Southeast Asia, but also his unabashed 
admiration of the wartime imperial project made him an "enemy" of the Zenkyōtō. And yet, 
Mishima's outreach to college youth addressed a concern common to both the right-wing men 
who joined his "Shield Society" and many who joined in militant left-wing activism. 
 At the bottom of both Mishima and the 1969 Tokyo University Zenkyōtō's formulations 
of the ideal political subject remained an anxiety that postwar liberal democracy emasculated 
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men. For Mishima, this was linked to the postwar order in which, according to Article IX of the 
"peace constitution," "the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the 
Nation." In his 1967 "Temporary Proposal for JNG" (the "Japan National Guard" that Mishima 
outlined in this pamphlet, to be used for fundraising among corporations), Mishima—writing 
anonymously—declared: "The most important issue for Japan under present circumstances is the 
establishment of a national ideal and to make young men understand with their own bodies 'What 
is the Great Principle?'"43 Notable in this statement is Mishima's desire to activate a physical 
knowledge in young men's "own bodies," and also to link it to "the Great Principle," (taigi), a 
term that echoed wartime Japanese militarism and ideology. Although militant New Left 
activists framed their protest against the Japanese state, they too sought a way to physically 
embody great principles. That "Mama" became an obstacle to overcome with a militant 
subjectivity demonstrated the gendered interpretation of the postwar liberal order, in which 
mothers represented key figures of authority. Both Mishima and the many in the Tokyo 
University Zenkyōtō found postwar masculinity particularly vulnerable, however, and sought to 
affirm it through violence. 
 In the course of the debate between the right-wing author and left-wing students, several 
asides about sexual desire also revealed an underlying heterosexual male identity shared among 
the male participants. Although Mishima was well known in the gay underground of Tokyo, his 
debate with student activists remained within the heterosexual logic of mainstream Japanese 
society, demonstrating a limit in the student movement's ostensibly wide-ranging imagination. In 
their discussions of "free sex," in particular regarding the monogamy that defined the modern 
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imperial institution, "free sex" remained defined as sexual access to women.44 In a segment in 
which they considered the self and the other, Mishima pointed out that it was not only violence 
that made the distinction clear, but also erotic desire. Mishima made a parallel between both 
violent and erotic confrontations in which the subjectivity of the other presented an obstacle for 
the desiring self. Defining sexual desire in heterosexual terms, Mishima declared "one of the 
paradoxes of male-female equality" remained the othering of the desired object.45 Reflecting the 
general erasure of gendered concerns within the New Left by 1969, the students do not pursue 
the political implications of this line of thought about male versus female active and passive 
subjectivity. To this group of students, the emphasis on militancy pushed out considerations of 
how affective interpersonal relations also formed political subjectivities. 
 Mishima Yukio may have mentioned erotic desire in conversation with the students, but 
it was the late 1960s New Left's focus on violent action that both inspired and terrified him. His 
sympathy with the violent actions of the student movement stemmed from his evaluation that 
contemporary Japanese society lacked opportunities for its male youth to enjoy a glorious 
death.46 Both Mishima's attraction to the Zenkyōtō and his fear of it arose from the possibility 
that the leftist student movement may offer young men such a death. Mishima's brand of 
activism did not consider the political potential of female youth, in spite of the tremendous 
impact of Kanba Michiko's 1960 death in the anti-Anpo protests. Mishima was almost certainly 
more interested in the death of Yamazaki Hiroaki at the Haneda Airport protests of 1967, which 
mobilized popular sympathy and re-ignited student activism. In public comments, however, 
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Mishima accused those involved in the 1967 demonstration against Prime Minister Satō Eisaku 
as lacking the "guts" to commit an act of "simple" terrorism by killing the PM.47 Mishima's 
cadets recalled that he instructed them to "observe and remember" the Zenkyōtō besieged in 
Yasuda Tower on 18-19 January 1969, for, "when the final moment came, there was not one of 
them who believed in what he stood for sufficiently to hurl himself out of a window or fall on a 
sword."48 Even as Mishima berated the Tokyo University Zenkyōtō's failure to engage in suicidal 
sacrifices during the siege of Yasuda Tower in retrospect, at the time of the confrontation he 
feared their self-sacrifice. During the police siege of the tower, Mishima called the riot police 
chief of staff, Sassa Atsuyuki—who was also the younger brother of a woman Mishima once 
dated—concerned that if a student jumped from the Tower in a sacrificial gesture, it would 
provoke the watching nation.49 The symbolic power of the student movement, and its ability to 
capture the mass media and disrupt cities captivated Mishima; by many accounts, those were 
elements that he hoped to harness for his own political beliefs, which he framed as both a 
defense against—and an exploitation of—the opportunities created by the leftist student 
movement. 
 Throughout 1968, Mishima was excited at the prospect that the student left would 
provoke such massive chaos that the riot police would require his civilian military group's 
assistance. Indeed, after the October 1967 Haneda demonstrations and the series of other protests 
from Sasebo to Shinjuku in 1968, the riot police often found themselves in danger of being 
overpowered by the students and civilian sympathizers, who—far from remaining a neutral 
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48 Nathan, Mishima, 248. 
49 Sassa, Tōdai rakujō, 16. 
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group of onlookers—frequently joined in throwing stones at the police.50 The 21 October 1968 
Anti-War Day demonstrations in Japan, as part of a global call to commemorate the 1967 march 
on the Pentagon in the United States in which demonstrators and U.S. Marshalls had clashed, 
drew an estimated 1.4 million people.51 This was in spite of Public Safety Commission 
prohibitions on public assemblies and demonstrations for the day. Thousands of students 
gathered at the University of Tokyo, groups broke into the grounds of the Defense Agency and 
the Diet, and clashes between protesters and police—described by one Japanese military 
observer as synchronized "guerilla warfare"—embroiled several Tokyo neighborhoods, from 
Roppongi to the Ginza.52 The evening convergence of demonstrations at Shinjuku Station in 
particular, at which about a thousand students overran the railroad junction used to transport U.S. 
military supplies, induced the Metropolitan Police Department to invoke Article 106 of the 
Criminal Code. In the most sweeping mass arrest in postwar Japan, police detained almost a 
thousand people nationwide, and 450 in Tokyo alone.53 The crime of "riotous assembly" had not 
been invoked in sixteen years.54 Newspaper reports showed that onlookers often enthusiastically 
cheered on the student demonstrators; they threatened to overwhelm the mobilized police force 
of twelve thousand.55 According to the reports of Colonel Yamamoto Kiyokatsu, intelligence 
officer for the Self-Defense Forces and an associate of Mishima's, Mishima thrilled to the 
spectacle of 21 October 1968. Accompanied by a journalist and another intelligence officer, 
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53 Ibid. 
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Mishima rushed between the embattled areas. He watched with interest as the students of Tokyo 
Medical and Dental University and Meiji University build barricades in Ochanomizu. Chaos in 
the Ginza transfixed him for hours. Colonel Yamamoto described Mishima as trembling slightly, 
amid the "rain of stones," like one witnessing his first battle.56 Mishima's mother noted that the 
event created a change in him, wondering in retrospect if it was the excitement of 21 October 
1968 that drove him to more extreme action.57 
 By the time Mishima debated Tokyo University Zenkyōtō students, he may have 
imagined that these were young men he would meet in combat on the streets of Tokyo. However, 
the mass Anti-War Day protests on 21 October 1969 also failed to incite a revolution, 
disappointing Mishima's hopes. Already in October 1968, Mishima had insisted that the police 
mobilize the Shield Society to counter student activists. Colonel Yamamoto declined, reading the 
street violence as more temporary carnival than incipient revolution. Colonel Yamamoto astutely 
defined the limits of the students' actions as a failure to deeply disrupt the everyday rhythms of 
the social order: "Even the masses in the demonstration return to their everyday life as 
commuters when the morning comes." For Yamamoto, the street battles of the New Left, 
although destructive, remained, "struggles without roots in the space of everyday life."58 As 
invested as the late 1960s student movement became in violent spectacles, the authorities 
assigned to quell those disturbances understood them only as a superficial threat. 
 Although deeply embedded in the elite circles of Japanese society, Mishima remained 
dissatisfied with the "everyday life" of the postwar liberal democratic order. He felt that the 
postwar "peace constitution" emasculated Japan and its young men. As Mishima noted to the 
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Tokyo University Zenkyōtō students, he believed that the postwar order with its bourgeois and 
Western-influenced values thwarted the full expression of manhood for even the Emperor 
himself.59 Although the student radicals could have won him over, Mishima told them, if they'd 
declared their final battle at Yasuda Tower in the name of the Emperor, Mishima's ideal emperor 
was one of ancient myth, not the domesticated and compromised postwar monarch. Both the 
student activists and Mishima desired to create a masculine code of violent activism that would 
define society's priorities through conflict. Because of this, both would almost certainly have felt 
aversion at hearing the Emperor's response in the aftermath of the battle between the riot police 
and the Zenkyōtō at Tokyo University's Yasuda Tower in January 1969, although their reasons 
would differ. According to the police agent who reported on the matter to Hirohito, the 
Emperor's main concern was only whether anyone had been killed, as if the confrontation were a 
quarrel among his sons.60 To an ostensibly apolitical but paternalistic Emperor, harmony among 
his subjects—the family of Japanese—remained the most important outcome. Mishima would 
have been disappointed by the sentiments of a pacifist postwar Emperor, while student activists 
would have winced at an Imperial embrace of kinship, in which the Emperor regarded himself as 
a paternal figure. 
 It was most likely not a only a desire for social harmony, but also a fear of the 
uncontrollable power of martyrdom that motivated the Emperor's relief in the wake of the siege 
at Yasuda Tower. As Mishima Yukio's own final, extreme gesture of violent self-sacrifice 
demonstrated, however, the making of a martyr required more than death alone. Most likely 
inspired by how the death of Kanba Michiko and Yamazaki Hiroaki fueled popular sympathy for 
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the New Left, Mishima planned his own suicide as a sacrifice meant to incite a coup among the 
Self-Defense Forces. On 25 November 1970, after barricading the commandant's office at the 
Tokyo headquarters of the Eastern Command of the Self-Defense Forces in Ichigaya, Tokyo, 
Mishima delivered a speech meant to mobilize the sympathies of the soldiers assembled below. 
Instead, the men greeted his manifesto with jeers. Back in the commandant's office, Mishima 
committed ritual suicide, assisted by accompanying Shield Society members. His dramatic death 
shocked the nation, but did not draw a wave of sympathy for his politics. Not only did Mishima 
fail to inflame the imaginations of the Self-Defense Forces, he also failed to capture the 
imagination of youth beyond his small circle. It became a common fad among high school 
students, dressed in their high-collared uniforms, to mockingly imitate Mishima's final speech at 
Ichigaya (fig. 12).61 The author's gesture failed to take into account how pre-existing hegemonic 
ideals influence the political meaning of death. Mishima Yukio remained an iconic figure, but he 
did not become a political martyr.  
 
 
Figure 13. Photograph of high school students imitating Mishima Yukio's final speech. Yomota 
Inuhiko, Hai sukuuru 1968.  
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 Zenkyōtō, on the other hand, retained a romantic appeal for many, but its political 
efficacy evaporated as popular sympathy declined. The late 1960s student New Left, eager to 
define itself by "masculine" violent spectacle, disintegrated into sectarian conflict. The ethos of 
"Gewalt" sought to disrupt the growing conservative consensus that prioritized national 
economic strength as the goal for family and education, but it also alienated popular sympathy. 
In the early 1970s, the police conducted a successful campaign to woo the public; student 
activists became portrayed as dangerous elements from which the police would protect citizens.62 
Self-representations of the late 1960s movement as aggressively masculine and violent fed into 
police representations of the social order as vulnerable to student activism. In the end, the 
nurturing model carried the day, although it was the masculine figures of the police that 
represented protection of citizens, rather than feminine figures. For while the increasingly 
masculinist elements of the student New Left saw in mothers a frightening obstacle to liberation, 
the mass media turned toward the figure of the female student activist in the late 1960s as an 
emblem of the student movement's excesses.
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






The creation of the terrifying, titillating female student activist 
 
 On a day in the early 1990s, the scene outside Yasuda Tower differed tremendously from 
that of the late 1960s. Far from declaring "Destroy Tokyo University," one female admit in 
bridal dress gushed to journalists, "I'm marrying Tokyo University!" It was this enthusiastic 
young woman in particular who emphasized for Sassa Atsuyuki, a National Police Agency 
security agent and a key figure on the riot police side of late 1960s clashes with student activists, 
the gap between the past and the present. Watching her, Sassa felt the Shōwa Era (1926-1989) 
slip into irrelevance; he opened his 1993 memoir on the "fall of Yasuda Fortress" with this sign 
of how dramatically the times had changed. He expressed a kind of nostalgia for the street 
fighting of the late 1960s, echoing other right-wing longings for those dramatic moments of 
romantic, masculine conflict.1 The figure that best represented the changes between the past and 
the present for Sassa, however, is the female student in the media spotlight: his "flashback" to 19 
January 1969 focuses on the figure of a handcuffed female student, roughly forced to stand by 
the riot police. Sassa noted that she was androgynous; it was only her long black hair, tangled 
beneath her helmet "like a bird's nest," or her "shrill protest cry" that marked her as female to 
him. The press surrounded her, urging her to look into their cameras, illuminating her face with 
their flash.2 
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Figure 14. A special report on the Tokyo University "ruins," featuring a photograph of a young 
woman arrested in Yasuda Tower. Shūkan yomiuri, 31 January 1969. 
 
Introduction 
 Much like Sassa, who directed police counter-measures against student protest in the 
period, the mass media in the late 1960s fixated on the "Gewalt girls" of the New Left, who were 
by turns titillating and terrifying.3 The mass media used the figures of young women who 
adopted radical politics—proportionally less active in the movements than young men, but made 
much more visible in their reportage—to make sweeping statements about women in politics and 
the student movement. Through interpreting female student radicals' actions primarily through 
gendered ideas about behavior, tabloids undermined young women's political positions. In many 
cases, the mass media also used the prominence of female student activists to challenge the 
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political significance of the student movement in general, suggesting that female participation 
reflected irrationality. In a sense, this journalistic interpretation of feminine political agency fit in 
with earlier formulations of a "pure" female student subjectivity, but emphasized the negative 
aspects of political purity, such as inexperience, naiveté, and emotionalism. The role of the mass 
media, an institution responsible in many cases for defining social facts, demonstrated also the 
gendered inequality of power between male-dominated institutions such as news journalism and 
female student activists in particular.4 Here we will examine cases in which mass media print 
journalism determined gendered categories for female student activism. I will also introduce 
materials produced by two female student activist targets of mass media attention to demonstrate 
the relative ineffectiveness of these young women in determining the social meaning of their 
activism. The discussion will conclude with comical fictional representations of female student 
activists, which channeled anxieties about an ascendant "Era of Woman Superiority" into 
gendered categories that tamed the radical potential of the student movement and a truly extreme 
shift in gender relations into comedy. In the late 1960s, when female participants in the student 
movement proved that women could also participate in radical politics, and also in violence, the 
mass media responded by containing their threat through characterizing it as feminine, 
emotional, and therefore (even comically) apolitical. 
Kikuyabashi 101 and Female Commitment to Activism 
 The 1969 case of "Kikuyabashi 101" demonstrated both what became interpreted in the 
mass media as the exceptional commitment of young women to radical politics and also the mass 
media's intervention in creating meaning out of female student activism and in affecting legal 
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outcomes of student activism. "Kikuyabashi 101," a young woman, was one of 786 students the 
police arrested as they broke up the Tokyo University campus occupations in January 1969.  Of 
these almost 800 arrested students, 540 were indicted, and 469 of them elected for a unified, 
rather than individual, trial.  This request was refused, and many students and their lawyers 
boycotted the trials.  “Kikuyabashi 101" refused to disclose her name, a common strategy of 
legal resistance, so she was entered into the police records and referred to in the mass media by 
the number of her cell at Kikuyabashi Police Station.5 She remained silent long after many other 
students had identified themselves, and her identity was not revealed until the tabloid Yūkan fuji 
ran her photograph on their front page on 12 March 1969. The magazine Young Lady picked up 
the story, republishing the photo of Kikuyabashi 101 in April, and by 1 May 1969, Yūkan fuji 
was able to reveal details about her name and identity, again on the front page. For the Tokyo 
University Zenkyōtō, the tabloid's choice to run the photo of a heretofore unidentified student 
activist—making her legally and personally vulnerable—reflected a deep alliance between mass 
media journalism and state authority. The Tokyo University Zenkyōtō newspaper, Shingeki, 
mobilized the language of human rights to decry the actions of Yūkan fuji as a violation of the 
"basic human right" of Kikuyabashi 101 to maintain silence while under arrest.6 
 Although the student activists framed their opposition to the tabloid's publication of 
Kikuyabashi 101's photograph as a battle between the politics of the radical movement and 
"bourgeois journalism," Yūkan fuji made no ideological case for exposing Kikuyabashi 101. 
Instead, the publication simply reported on the "facts" of the case, while obscuring the greater 
legal and political meaning of its reportage. In the case of Kikuyabashi 101, information on her 
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emphasized the link between her actions and her gender. In determining the facts of her case, the 
tabloid relied on the testimony of police authorities to establish objectivity. This pattern, in 
which mass media sources report frequently impressionistic police accounts as expert opinion on 
student radicalism, demonstrated the deep links between the police and the mass media in 
defining student activism in the late 1960s.  For example, the March 1969 Yūkan fuji article on 
Kikuyabashi 101 quoted a police officer's estimation that logic will break down male activists, 
but "once women are bent on something, they won't open their mouths for a while."7 In 
Kikuyabashi's case she displayed what a police officer classified as a feminine commitment 
immune to logic. Within this feminine category, however, she struck him as rather extraordinary; 
she reportedly "brainwashed" a prostitute with whom she shared a cell, provoking the "woman of 
the night" to use the language of human rights in subsequent interviews with police. Although 
some police reported finding Kikuyabashi 101 a little "creepy" because of her extreme refusal, 
another policeman relayed to the magazine Young Lady his opinion that her loyalty to the cause 
demonstrated that she'd make a proper wife.8 Her potential as a figure of terror (brainwashing 
weaker-willed women) is mitigated by her demonstration of feminine loyalty (that, once 
domesticated, would make her a good wife). 
 Although the Tokyo University Zenkyōtō accused the tabloids of identifying Kikuyabashi 
101, the actual investigative role of the mass media is not clear. What is unambiguous is the role 
of tabloids in rapidly disseminating whatever private information had been collected on her. On 
1 May 1969, Yūkan fuji exposed Kikuyabashi 101's identity, identifying not only her name, but 
also her place of birth and current residence, the names of all the schools she attended, and 
names of her academic advisor and family members. In doing so, the tabloid demonstrated the 
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power of the mass media to establish the facts about Kikuyabashi 101—named as Katō Hiroko, a 
young married graduate student at Tokyo University—and also the access that the mass media 
could gain to people close to those exposed to press scrutiny. Yūkan fuji sought out Katō 
Hiroko's neighbors and colleagues, capturing the surprise of her various acquaintances and 
relations—including her father—at the news of her arrest.9 The various interviews conveyed the 
sense that extreme political commitment might lurk underneath the quiet exterior of any 
"ordinary female student." 
 In her personal writings, Kikuyabashi 101 comes across as much less committed to 
radical extremism. In letters Kikuyabashi 101 wrote while in jail, published under her alias in an 
April 1969 volume of student "prison letters," she wrote with a sense of wonder about how 
someone who had been so "mild" had come to hate certain people and things. She described 
herself as experiencing conflicting feelings, unable to forgive what she tentatively called a 
"quasi-ruling class?" personality defined by fear of the unknown and an urge toward self-
preservation: "Grappling with how to escape from this existence defined my whole history since 
entering college."10 She interpreted her involvement in the leftist student movement as a process 
of questioning and working through conflicting feelings, rather than a compulsive commitment 
to the movement. 
 Although Kikuyabashi 101 does not see herself as particularly committed to the cause of 
the student movement, her protracted silence becomes a symbol of radical refusal for both the 
Tokyo University Zenkyōtō and the tabloids. In the second letter of hers published in the 
volume, dated 11 March 1969, she struggled in particular to counter interpretations of the 
confrontation between occupying students and the riot police at Yasuda Tower in January 1969 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 “Doro numa ureu 'shufu gakusei,'" Yūkan fuji, May 1, 1969. 
10 Tōdai tōsō gokuchū shokanshū, vol. 1 (Tokyo: Gokuchū shokan hakkan iinkai, 1969), 1. 
	  
 181	  
as a demonstration of extremism. Her interpretation opposed those, such as right-wing author 
Mishima Yukio, who felt unimpressed by the lack of student sacrifice at the Tokyo University 
showdown. The stubborn fight of the occupying students, she argued, was by no means an 
attempt at self-sacrifice. She rejected any interpretation that would align the Zenkyōtō with a 
"shattering jewel" (gyokusai), the euphemistic wartime term for patriotic suicide. For 
Kikuyabashi 101, a young woman described in the mass media as an example of extreme 
feminine self-sacrifice, the more urgent matter remained one of building a collective. Written 
almost two months after her arrest and before her identity was exposed, in the letter she 
described the siege as a "decision for a new collective." She identified the context of an 
"oppressed everyday life" as the major obstacle to this goal of creating meaningful alternative 
communities.11 Mass media portrayals of Kikuyabashi 101 and her silent refusal excluded these 
political convictions. 
Kashiwazaki Chieko and Female Activist Violence 
 Kashiwazaki Chieko, another female graduate student activist at Tokyo University, 
presented a case of a much more unambiguously radical (and certainly not silent) female student 
activist. Nevertheless, the mass media's gendered analysis of her position mitigated her voice. 
Unlike Kikuyabashi 101, Kashiwazaki was a well-known and openly active member of the late 
1960s student movement at Tokyo University, who attracted media attention from early 1969. 
Similar to the treatment of Kikuyabashi 101, however, the mass media frequently interpreted 
Kashiwazaki's actions through her gender. Such gendered interpretations undermined her own 
attempts to define the social meaning of her activism. 
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 The term "Gewalt Rosa," which rapidly became a generic term in the mass media for 
young women involved in the Zenkyōtō movement of the late 1960s, came from a nickname 
attributed to Kashiwazaki Chieko. The term drew on the German word "Gewalt" (violence) and 
the name of Rosa Luxemburg (1871-1919), the female Marxist theorist and revolutionary. Of 
Polish descent, Rosa Luxemburg became famous for her activism in Germany, and died a victim 
of the right-wing militarist Freikorps (Volunteer Corps) in their efforts to quell the communist 
movement for which she agitated. Kashiwazaki, a student of Polish history, embraced Rosa 
Luxemburg's revolutionary legacy with her nickname, which emblazoned the cover of the 
memoir she wrote while in jail in spring 1969. 
 Although within her memoir Kashiwazaki attempted to reject any gendered interpretation 
that made her participation "as a woman" a curiosity, her protestations had little effect on the 
memoir's advertising campaign, launched in mainstream newspapers. One such advertisement, 
which ran in the mainstream Yomiuri shinbun, declared Kashiwazaki's voice as, "the authentic 
cry of a female student!"12 When the newspaper included her book as one of the standouts 
among the flood of new publications on Tokyo University "Gewalt," the author included 
Kashiwazaki's gender as a major point of interest, and deemed the work "very feminine."13 Her 
memoir inspired gendered analyses in spite of her own protestations. As Kashiwazaki noted in 
the pages of her book, she reacted with hostility to a journalist who wanted to interview her "as a 
woman" in the movement. She noted, “Is it really so peculiar that a woman fights? In this 
struggle, I haven't been conscious of myself as a woman or as a wife at all."14 Although 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Yomiuri shinbun, 15 July 1969. 
13 “Tōdai gebaruto," Yomiuri shinbun, 11 July 1969. 




Kashiwazaki rejected a gendered reading of her participation, those writing book reviews and her 
ad copy sought out her words to gain insight into a specifically "female student" view on the 
movement. They did not share her assessment that, in the struggle, she does not act "as a 
woman." 
 At moments in her narrative, Kashiwazaki undermined her own willful rejection of a 
gendered subjectivity. In episodes that resonated with the experiences of many female student 
activists in the barricades, she described how young women cooked for the activists, making rice 
balls and boiled eggs to prepare for a battle against JCP-affiliated students, or preparing a New 
Year's feast in the barricades.15 While Kashiwazaki also occasionally cooked, she attempted to 
preempt gendered interpretations of that labor: “When I cook for my comrades in the barricades, 
it's because I really enjoy cooking and am concerned with everyone's health. It's absolutely not 
because I'm a woman."16 However, she also affirmed her own worth as an activist when she 
succeeded in completing what might be considered men's work. In building the Tokyo 
University barricades, she joined a men-only group, and noted with satisfaction that she held her 
own.17 Although Kashiwazaki declared that, for her, wielding a kitchen knife and brandishing a 
"Gewalt stick" were equally important, her own proclamations of overcoming her gender 
approached the individualist interpretations of extraordinary women from earlier generations, 
which Kanba Michiko identified as an impediment to collective women's action. Kashiwazaki, in 
rejecting completely the role of gendered labor in creating hierarchies of commitment in the 
movement also obscured the opinion, expressed by other usually younger female students, that 
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16 Ibid., 268–269. 
17 Ibid., 207–210. 
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Kashiwasaki was one of the few women to take up the Gewalt stick.18 Streetfighting remained 
the clearest rejection of the virtues of civil society, and participation in or abstention from 
violence became critical in student movement evaluations of activists' commitment. According 
to this system of appraisal, "wielding a knife" against a radish was considerably less 
revolutionary than thrashing a stick against the police or "enemy" students. 
 The only moment in Kashiwazaki's personal narrative in which she discussed the positive 
political implications of her female subjectivity was in describing her personal political 
awakening, which was linked to the 1960 death of Kanba Michiko. Raised in a Protestant, 
intellectual family (a “typical bourgeois home," as she put it), her three elder brothers had 
participated as university students in the 1960 anti-Anpo protest.19 She herself was a second-year 
high school student at the time, and recalled her deep shock at the 15 June 1960 death of Kanba 
Michiko. She shared the common view that Kanba's death marked the end of a democratic ideal, 
for with that tragedy “postwar democracy was completely finished."20 She located the depth of 
her early empathy with the dead female student as a sense of justice shared among women.21 As 
was the case for many observers at the time, as we have seen, Kanba Michiko the icon 
represented political purity and the potential of true postwar democracy for Kashiwazaki Chieko, 
even as Kashiwazaki so stridently rejected her feminine subjectivity in the late-1960s student 
movement. 
 Much like the mass media reaction to Kanba, although with a variation in the meanings 
created, the mass media of the late 1960s created popular images of Kashiwazaki the "Gewalt 
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19 Kashiwazaki, Taiyo to arashi to jiyu o, 80. 
20 Ibid., 70–72. 
21 Ibid., 64–68. 
	  
 185	  
Rosa" that had little in common with Kashiwazaki the real person. Although the tabloids also 
published speculative articles on prominent male student activists such as Tokyo University's 
Yamamoto Yoshitaka and Nihon University's Akita Akehiro, the figures of female student 
activists provoked more emotive responses. A female student activist like Kashiwazaki Chieko 
drew dramatically contradictory responses, from articles that accused her of promoting hysterical 
violence to those that rejected her significance among student activists. As demonstrated in a 
March 1969 article in the Yomiuri shinbun on "Gewalt Rosas," the very prominence of a female 
student activist within the movement suggested that the movement as a whole could be dismissed 
as irrational. The author used the presence of Kashiwazaki as evidence that the student 
movement "prioritizes women based on hysterical, infantile heroism."22 He also likened her 
relationship with student activists to that of "a mother to children studying for entrance exams," 
scolding and cheering them on.23 In this way, the author reduces Kashiwazaki's claims to 
leadership to the very feminine role of the mother, and the "education mama" in particular. In the 
postwar period, the term "education mama" took on negative valences in the media discourse. 
She represented a kind of perversion of the ideal "wise mother" responsible for guiding learning 
in the home. As a female corollary of the emasculated sarariiman, the wage slaves / soldiers of a 
rapidly growing national economy, the "education mama" was seen as domineering woman who 
invested all of her self into ensuring her children's success in the increasingly competitive 
meritocratic system of entrance examinations.24 Associating a female activist leader with the 
figure of the "education mama" assumed that a woman's role in the student movement would 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 “Yomiuri Sunpyō," Yomiuri Shinbun, March 23, 1969. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Marie Thorsten, “A Few Bad Women: Manufacturing 'Education Mamas' in Postwar Japan," 
International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 10, no. 1 (Fall 1996): 51–71. 
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replicate a feminine domestic role with potential for danger. In the case of the student movement, 
the presence of a female activist "education mama" would also intensify the violence, as 
Kashiwazaki's form of "education" included urging students into more and more dramatic 
confrontations. The presence of a goading feminine presence threatened to make the student 
movement more violent, but it also made the movement and its violence ridiculous. 
 The mass media treatment of Kashiwazaki Chieko demonstrated also that the mass 
media's strategy of seeking out insider sources often marginalized the very subjects represented 
in reportage. In the case of female activists, tabloid journalists often undermined young women 
through a variety of strategies, similar to those employed in the rash of "Coeds Ruin the Nation" 
articles from the early 1960s. Female students came across as both too earnest and too 
superficial. Sometimes even the same young woman received both treatments at once. A summer 
1969 article published in Shūkan yomiuri on Kashiwazaki Chieko after her release from prison 
employed quotes from male student activists to dismiss her political ideas completely. The 
opinions of male students—many of them from competing sects—are presented as insider 
information, and their comments damn her variously as too passionate ("I acknowledge that she 
is genuine and pure. But in the real struggle she just gets mad too abruptly.") or exceptionally 
trivial ("She had her hair cut at a salon especially for the meeting.").25 Within the article, a source 
also unfavorably compared Kashiwazaki to the silent Kikuyabashi 101. Whether one or the other 
was truly more revolutionary is less at stake than which one could more readily become a symbol 
for the movement. Kikuyabashi's silence was praised; her silence also meant that others could 
create meaning about her without the inconvenient intrusion of her own words. 
The Mass Media and the Creation of Gendered Political Meaning 
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 Although the mass media had long controlled the meaning of images of vulnerability and 
threat posed by student activists, tabloid articles from the mid-1960s responded to the increase in 
campus-based movements and in the participation of female students by relying on police as 
sources of insider knowledge. In contrast to photographs of police roughly handling young 
women, tabloids quoted police as expert witnesses of the dynamics of student protest. A police 
officer quoted in a June 1966 Shūkan shinchō article on female student activists declared that a 
key aspect of an increasingly aggressive student movement was the participation of young 
women not only dressed like men, but who also acted like the male students with whom they 
protested.26 Comments ranged from such declarations of potential threat to others in which police 
ridiculed the idea of female students as a political force. One police officer interviewed by 
Shūkan shinchō in May 1968 declared, "For me, the girls are not really an issue. In the end, what 
the girls do is just help the boys." 27 His opinion of the university student activist in general 
reflected a view of these elite youth as overprotected bourgeois youth, jumping into "revolution" 
after years at their mama's side. It is precisely this view of the coddled university student that 
drove the masculine logic of the student movement and the Tokyo University philosophical 
effort to negate the bourgeois self that was so dependent upon father and mother's resources and 
care. Reflecting also the tabloid's reliance upon the "expert" opinions of academics in 
interpreting the student movement, the article quotes Teruoka Yasutaka, the Waseda professor of 
the "Coeds Ruin the Nation Theory." For him, the young female activists were more dangerous 
than male student activists precisely because they were irrational, perhaps even insane. Although 
Teruoka felt he could talk sense to male student activists in one-on-one conversations, he reacted 
differently to female activists: “It's like they are crazed. And they have eyes like they've been 
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possessed by foxes."28 Much like tabloid interpretations of Kikuyabashi 101's long silence in jail, 
Teruoka read female student activism—in particular in its extreme variants—as something 
rooted in feminine characteristics impenetrable to logic. In many ways, the discourse in the mass 
media on female students active in the late 1960s New Left movement echoed themes articulated 
in the "Coeds Ruin the Nation" theory. The lack of intellectualism that supposedly made young 
women a poor fit for higher educations institutions also made them irrational and potentially 
dangerous activists. 
 Assuming also that the inclusion of female bodies introduced rampant sexuality, tabloids 
relied upon police conjectures as a main source of information for speculative articles on the 
kinds of sex that occurred as male and female students lived together in campus occupations. As 
student barricades became a key strategy of the campus-based student movements of the late 
1960s, the presence of female bodies led mass media sources to suggest that the "function" of 
young women participants must be sexual release for the young men.29 In publications such as 
Shūkan shinchō and Shūkan playboy, articles insinuated that coed campuses must be hotbeds of 
not only political but also sexual activity. Based on police gossip about literally hot beds—one 
officer reported feeling "the warmth of two bodies" on a futon in the barricades—the headlines 
of such articles included sensational terms like "free sex."30 However, in quotes from the 
students, which articles buried between hypotheses and rumors, students both male and female 
not only denied that such salacious behavior occurred, but also reflected a common view that 
sexual activity was consciously constrained. Students at several different schools reported that 
their movement codes of conduct were rather strict. A Nihon University student elaborated on 
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the custom in the campus barricades there, which was to assign a room to female students 
sleeping over, and to have them lock the door from the inside. Citing the fear of popular opinion 
as the basis for this policy, he noted, “Some have complained that it's an exaggerated gesture, or 
that it's bourgeois, but it's our first struggle, so we don't want some silly mistake to become a 
weapon for our enemies."31 A former activist at Hosei University repeated this fear on the part of 
the students that sexual activity could be used as a weapon against them, and noted that the Hosei 
University barricades also maintained a strict management of sexual activities.32 In spite of 
student activists' care to avoid mass media accusations of unbridled sexuality, tabloid journalism 
equated the inclusion of female bodies with the introduction of sexuality. Much like in the logic 
of the "Coeds Ruin the Nation Theory," in the tabloids, female students sharing space with male 
students sexualized those spaces. 
 Periodicals that targeted young women reflected a less dismissive view of female 
students in the New Left, although preoccupations with the potential for both titillating and 
terrifying encounters with activism also entered discussions of the student movement in women's 
magazines. The magazine Josei jishin included both celebratory and wary articles on female 
student activism.33 Particularly in early 1968, in the context of strong popular support of the 
student movement, articles on admirable and strong-willed female students introduced the 
periodical's readership to stories of fortitude, passion, and self-discovery through female student 
activism.34 Articles in Josei jishin rejected outright the idea that young men dragged young 
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riidaa," Gendai, January 1969. 
33 Although the magazine's name suggested female autonomy (meaning, roughly, "Woman herself"), the 
editorial staff also featured male leadership. 
34 “Sasebo e itta shachō reijō Shinoda Reiko-san no bâi," Josei jishin, 29 January 1968; “Furisode o 
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women into the movement, and included bold headlines like "Goodbye, Good Wife and Wise 
Mother!" In late 1968, however, addressing readers' potential concerns about how to navigate the 
changing political scene at campuses, which included women's colleges, the magazine featured 
an article framed around "women's colleges without disputes."35 Their analysis included not only 
what campuses were safe from unrest, but also what opportunities thirty schools offered students 
in terms of opportunities to meet young men, participate in clubs, and take particular courses. 
However, even while framing the article around schools without activism, the authors concluded 
by introducing their readers to key student movement terms, such as Gewalt and nonpoli. They 
also included anecdotes by female students at women's universities who described the 
excitement of their first awakening to student activism. In this way, even young women who 
were wary of campus disputes, and the negative impact participation might have on future 
marriage or employment, became familiar with the vocabulary of the student movement. 
 A serial comic in women's magazine Josei jishin demonstrated how the idea of the sexual 
availability of young female bodies in the student movement captured the popular imagination. 
Ostensibly based on a young woman's real-life account of losing her virginity, the illustrated 
story drew also on an "expert" on student issues for its claim to veracity.36 Over the course of 
four installations, a wealthy young female student became estranged from her father, found 
camaraderie and excitement when she fell in with two male student activists, and eventually, 
provoked "by a maternal instinct," undressed and offered her body to them both as an act of 
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selflessness and solidarity.37 The female protagonist's submission to the young men's sexual 
desire in this context suggested a feminine passivity. In this publication targeting young women, 
as in the tabloids that targeted a largely male readership, the idea of a politically awakened 
young woman often suggested an accompanying sexual awakening. 
Female Activist as Comedy: "College Sister" and "Campus Kyanko" 
 Although the campus-based student movement represented its ideal revolutionary 
subjectivity as a masculine, street-fighting one, mass media representations of the radical shifts 
in what constituted a young female activist attracted more attention. As an example of this, 
although the occasional cartoon would lampoon male student activists, two mainstream tabloid 
serial comics in the late 1960s featured a female student as the protagonist who exposed the 
twists and turns of the student movement. In some ways, the mass media's disproportionate 
fascination with the inclusion of female bodies in demonstrations and occupations continued 
social patterns set in the 1920s and 1930s, in which mass media political cartoons symbolized 
threats to political and social stability with female characters, whereas leftist and radical 
publications lacked representations of revolutionary female subjects.38 As noted earlier, student 
activists both male and female often ignored or actively sought to overcome feminine 
subjectivity in the student movement. The two comic strips, in contrast, demonstrated not only a 
view of the "new" young woman of the postwar baby boomer generation as overly sexual and 
greedy, but also illustrated her potential for a kind of revolutionary subjectivity. The earlier of 
the two was Sonoyama Shunji's "College Sister" (Kareji Neechan), which ran in Sunday mainichi 
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from September 1968 to July 1970, although the run of Sakurai Isamu's "Campus Kyanko" 
(Kyanpasu Kyanko), overlapped, running in Shūkan yomiuri from May 1969 through the end of 
1970.39 The fictional female protagonists of both series enjoyed vast appetites for food and men, 
expressing a corporeality marked by sensuality and sexual availability. Their creators often 
played their female title characters' brashness to comic effect, suggesting a kind of impossibility 
for integrating women into higher education; their bodies, drawn as busty and barelegged, 
always introduced sexuality. However, through including themes of radical activism, in which 
these female student characters participated, these two comic strips also highlighted female 
participation as a key characteristic of the late 1960s student movement and appealed to readers' 
attraction to and fear of the politicized subjectivity of the female student. 
 Although not all the weekly installments thrust these cartoon coeds into student activism, 
several episodes revealed the popular interest in such female student activists as Kashiwazaki 
Chieko and Kikuyabashi 101. At various points, both "College Sister" and "Campus Kyanko" 
wielded Gewalt sticks and wore helmets like Tokyo University's infamous "Gewalt Rosa"; both 
of them, like Kikuyabashi 101, claimed their right to remain silent when arrested.40 Of the two, 
Sonoyama's "College Sister" is more sympathetic to the student movement. In part, this reflects 
the shift in popular sympathies away from the student movement in 1969; by the time Sakurai's 
"Campus Kyanko" began to run in May 1969, the increasingly violent and confrontational 
student movement failed to elicit the strong public sympathy that it had enjoyed in 1968. 
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Nêchan, trans. Uematsu Tomii (Tokyo: Hyōronsha, 1971), 4. 
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 Although both College Sister and Campus Kyanko represented sexually frank "new" 
young women, Campus Kyanko embodied a more aggressive sexuality, and a correspondingly 
more radical politics. In an early Campus Kyanko strip, from July 1969, Kyanko, rather than 
being scared off by a warning that her date is only out "for her body," vigorously drains the 
young man of all his resources, out-drinking him, ordering large amounts of food, and, finally, 
creating a barricaded "liberation zone" when the young man cannot afford a hotel room for the 
two of them. By creating a barricade to facilitate a sexual encounter, Campus Kyanko's actions 
resonate with the speculations of tabloids that the campus barricades of a mixed-sex movement 
represented a "liberation zone" for sexuality, namely male sexuality and access to sex with 
female students. Kyanko, a sectarian radical as adept in mixing molotov cocktails as she is in 
seducing men, also wields her sexual power as a political weapon. She lures not only a young 
man whom she is supposed to tutor, but also the boy's father, to the Zenkyōtō cause (fig. 13). 
While confirming tabloid fears about the role of young women in the student movement and the 
potential of female student leaders to goad others into violence, the author also took the popular 
idea to a comical extreme. In Kyanko's case, she influenced not only an impressionable high 
school student, but also his conservative father. 
 
Figure 15. Father: "I'm also going to join the Zenkyōtō!" 




 Similar to many tabloid discussions of female student participation in radical politics, the 
ideological motivations of both the fictional coed protagonists "College Sister" and "Campus 
Kyanko" remained obscure. Their activism may have simply functioned as ways for the authors 
to comment on current events on campuses, and their politics were often undone by their desires. 
A running gag in both was their attraction to the manly riot police, for example. However, their 
creators also used the female students to foil the men—and male activists—around them, as the 
young women responded with earnestness to matters of political radicalism and affirmed their 
own sexual and political agency. Kyanko, as just demonstrated, attracted men of various 
generations to her politics through her sexual allure. But College Sister in particular 
demonstrated a just political subjectivity that exposed the hypocrisies of university authorities, 
police officers, and male students. For example, a fall 1969 installment contrasted the sincere 
commitment of "College Sister" with self-serving and careerist male students (fig. 14). In this 
strip, two male students discuss potential jobs at the Ministry of Finance and Bank of Japan and 
seek to ingratiate themselves with their professor to assure their future careers, while College 
Sister continues to go about collecting wood to erect campus barricades. To please the professor, 
the male students interrupt her, and restrain her with her materials. She cries out that she's been 
betrayed. This strip reflected a more general gendered divide perceived between young men who 
gave up student activism to take on careers and young women who found this to be a kind of 
betrayal; already by spring 1969 the Asahi Journal had begun to publish a series on male former 
student activists who had gone "from Gewalt stick to employment."41 In a roundtable discussion 
with young men who until their recent employment had been involved in campus-based activism, 
such topics as what could be brought from the leftist movement to the workplace revealed how 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 “Gebabō kara shūshoku e no dōtei," Asahi Journal, 6 April 1969. 
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both the mass media and also former student activists built a narrative in which an elite white-
collar career was not a break from radical activism. The term used for this shift from activist to 
sarariiman was "employment conversion" (shūshoku tenkō), which implied a kind of betrayal, 
but also alluded to a longer history of "ideological conversion" among leftists in modern Japan. 
Earlier, I discussed the implications of prewar and wartime leftists who abandoned their position 
of protest to embrace the nationalist project. In this late 1960s iteration, "ideological conversion" 
meant that leftist student activists turned from a position of opposition to the structures of 
Japanese capital and industry to a cooperative stance, in which they both built and benefitted 
from Japan's powerful national economy in the late 1960s. College Sister's "betrayal" by her 
male comrades as they prepared to join the white-collar workforce demonstrated the young 
woman's greater commitment to continued activism; the humor of the "betrayal" lies the 
knowledge, shared between the author and the reader, that College Sister should have known 




 Figure 16. "College Sister," Sunday mainichi, 5 October 1969. 
 
 As the campus-based student movement seemed to faded into irrelevance for the majority 
of people in 1970, Sonoyama's "College Sister" comic strip became an "Office Sister" series in 
summer 1970, while in fall 1970 Sakurai's "Campus Kyanko" dabbled in the women's liberation 
movement but ultimately became a shop girl. Tensions between men and women remained a key 
theme for the tabloids in which these comic strips ran. A new catch phrase from mid-1969 
characterized the moment as the "Era of Woman Superiority," echoing strains of anxiety about 
the proper place of women, but more often employed as a humorous slogan. Several sarariiman-
themed cartoons published in tabloids targeting a male readership used the idea of the "Era of 
Woman Superiority" to comic effect precisely because it seemed absurd that women would usurp 
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men's roles. Such cartoons represented the "Era of Women Superiority" as a complete swap in 
gender roles, in which men were demoted to "feminine" roles of serving women tea or of 
keeping house.42 These depictions allowed representations of women stepping into masculine 
social roles, but required that men take on feminine roles, thus preserving the significance of 
difference and differentiated labor between men and women.43 Humor contained the potential 
threat of women like College Sister entering the workplace as "office ladies." Campus Kyanko, 
when she marched in a November 1970 installment with women behind a banner asking "What 
is femininity?" drew the jeers of a male onlooker: "Women are superior! Embrace me! Hey, 
sister - are you braless?" This prompted Kyanko to end the demonstration and return to campus, 
where her male student comrades asked her to pour the tea. She refused, excused herself to use 
the toilet, and one young man suggestively insisted she enter the men's room with him, in the 
name of "equality." This comic strip in particular exposes the male framing of Campus Kyanko 
and her various affiliations, both political and sexual. Namely, the source of Kyanko's meaning is 
created in her relationships with the men around her, reflecting not only her male creator's view, 
but also the logic of most of the tabloids, which continually defined the role of the female student 
activist in terms of her relationship with men and male society. 
  Even when many young women formed a women-only movement to counter not only 
hegemonic structures of sexism in the workplace and the home, but also the sexism of the coed 
student movement in the late 1960s, tabloids attempted to define a narrative of "ideological 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Puro Santa and Satō Sanpei, “Warera sarariiman tō," Yūkan fuji, March 7, 1969; Ryōhei Yanagihara, 
“Sara-Yan," Shūkan Yomiuri, December 17, 1969. 
43 As E. Ann Kaplan noted in the case of cinema in the United States in the 1970s and early 1980s, "as a 
result of the recent women's movement, women have been permitted in representation to assume (step 
into) the position defined as masculine, as long as the man then steps into her position, so as to keep the 
whole structure intact." E. Ann Kaplan, “Is the Gaze Male?," in Powers of Desire: The Politics of 




conversion" for female student activists as well. The banner slogan questioning the meaning of 
"femininity" featured in "Campus Kyanko" referenced a group of two hundred helmeted women 
marching in an October 1970 peace demonstration who had marched behind those words, in an 
event that many determined the commencement of a distinct "feminist" movement. Those 
women unfurled another banner, too, directed at "Mama." It asked her, "Mother, is marriage 
really bliss?"44 Unconcerned with the debates circulating among a new generation of self-
proclaimed feminists, however, the mass media imagined how young women would transition 
from "Gewalt Rosas" to become wives and mothers. In some cases, this produced humorous 
situations. One cartoon featured a young couple out on a formal marriage interview (fig. 16). 
Although the young woman wears a kimono, her aggressive style, and impeccable aim, as she 
orders another juice by throwing a bottle at the waiter, betrays her activist background to her 
potential mate. The strip offered a humorous speculation on how this new breed of politically 
active young women would integrate into established rituals of courting and marriage. Although 
former female activists might prove a more aggressive breed of brides, it remained unthinkable 
that they would go so far as to resist marriage altogether. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Figure 17. Cartoon of a formal Marriage Interview. 
Young woman: "More juice!" 
Young man: "By her throw, I'll bet she's a Gewalt veteran." 
Suzuki Yoshiji, "Suzuki Yoshiji no kiza geba jihyō," Shūkan yomiuri, 5 December 1969, 87. 
 
 In a more earnest vein, although with similar effect, the 5 July 1971 issue of Young Lady 
placed female student radicals in the past in a feature on a young mother. The piece expressed 
admiration for the young woman's activism, introducing her story with the headline, "My Child, 
Remember. Mama Was Once a Fierce 'Gewalt Rosa'."45 However, much like coverage on how 
young men could apply the lessons of past activism to future career success, the article 
characterized the young woman's activism as part of her past; motherhood defined her future. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




 By the early 1970s, female students no longer represented political purity. They had 
proven themselves capable of participation in radical, and even violent, political action. 
Ideological attempts to associate women to the domestic sphere came to define young women's 
place in higher education, and the New Left's gendered hierarchy of labor and increasing focus 
on a masculine ethos of violence convinced a broad segment of leftist-leaning women that a 
women-only movement offered the only radical opportunity for female political activism. By the 
early 1970s, the women's liberation movement in Japan constituted an important inheritor of 
New Left strategies, even as it defined itself against the sexism of the 1960s student movement. 
As the New Left self-immolated in sectarian violence, women's lib also emphasized its 
difference from the "masculine" campus-based activism of the late 1960s. As we have seen, 
however, female participation formed the New Left in postwar Japan. Bringing women into the 
story of the student movement of the 1960s does not diminish the claims of postwar feminism in 
Japan, but illuminates further the patterns of media coverage, policy reactions, and activist 






If only I had had the independence to take on Kawashima's sexism in a structural way, our 
activism would have taken a different course. At the least, I think I might have avoided making 
such terrible mistakes as a leader.1 
 —Nagata Hiroko in 1983 
 
 
 Although, by the early 1970s, a proliferation of examples of sectarian violence 
represented the radicalization of the student movement to the Japanese public, no event 
symbolized the death of the New Left as dramatically and powerfully as the bloody internal 
purge waged by the United Red Army (URA) in their mountain retreat, revealed to the nation via 
the mass media in early 1972. Nagata Hiroko, the young woman who shared power with the 
male leader, Mori Tsuneo, quickly became emblematic of the perversity of female participation 
in radical activism. More so than Mori, Nagata came to be representative of the group's extremist 
violence in the mass media.2 As feminist contemporaries noted, male reporters gleefully seized 
upon Nagata's "extreme emotions" and "cruelty that even men feared." One male commentator, 
quoted in the mainstream Asahi shinbun even declared, "Women's participation in the movement 
is not only a problem for the URA, but a new problem today."3 This followed earlier patterns of 
portraying female student activists as agents of radicalization, as I have shown. With this violent 
incident, in which a young woman played a key role, both the New Left and the place of women 
in political movements came under crippling criticism. In a survey conducted twenty years later 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Nagata Hiroko, Hyōkai: Onna no jiritsu o motomete (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1983), 65. 
2 Patricia Steinhoff, "Three Women Who Loved the Left." 311. 
3 Shigematsu, Scream from the Shadows, 145. For more on the complicated reception of URA violence by 
women's lib activists, see in particular Chapter Five, "Ribu's Response to the United Red Army." 
	  
 202	  
of 563 former Zenkyōtō student activists, 16.9% cited the United Red Army incident as the 
reason they ended activism.4 
 As demonstrated in the opening retrospective quote, Nagata Hiroko herself, raped by her 
comrade and leader Kawashima Tsuyoshi in 1969, would conclude that her failure to attack the 
sexism of her male leaders and the leftist organization in general set the stage for her failure as a 
revolutionary leader. In this dissertation, I've shown how gender—and in particular the contested 
position of the female student activist—operated in the conception of the New Left in postwar 
Japan. The gendered circumstances of the New Left's dissolution underlines the importance of 
my history. The viciousness of the series of self-criticisms that took place during the United Red 
Army's training camp in the Japanese Alps in the winter of 1971 has undergone various 
interpretations, but there is no question that the issue of femininity had a great deal to do with it.5 
Indeed, the killing of twelve members in the space of two months, including a woman eight 
months pregnant, may be read in part as an effort to purge femininity from a revolutionary 
subjectivity.6 All accounts of the events that took place in the mountain retreat point to the 
"Toyama incident" as the spark for the violence that followed. In this "incident," Nagata Hiroko 
confronted Toyama Mieko about Toyama's maintenance of feminine rituals as she underwent 
guerrilla training: she kept her hair long, and wore a ring and make up. The confrontation 
between the two women marked two different positions contained within the United Red Army; 
the URA had formed in summer 1971 as a merger between a faction of the Japanese Red Army 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Zenkyōtō hakusho henshū iinkai, Zenkyōtō hakusho (Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 1994), 413. 
5 Steinhoff, “Death by Defeatism”; Wakamatsu Kōji and Kakegawa Masayuki, Jitsuroku rengō sekigun, 
2007. 
6 Ōtuska Eiji may overstate his case, based on linking Nagata Hiroko to the shōjo (young girl) culture of 
the 1970s and 1980s, that the key term around which the purges operated was kawaii (cute), but he does 
point out the sexism at work in the URA. Ōtsuka Eiji, “Kanojotachi" no rengō sekigun: sabu karuchâ to 
sengo minshushugi (Tokyo: Bungei shunjū, 1996). 
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(JRA), under the leadership of Mori Tsuneo, and the Revolutionary Left Faction (Kakusa), led 
by Nagata Hiroko. Both groups were far-left and operated underground by 1971. Members of the 
JRA had hijacked an airplane to North Korea in 1970, and other members had left Japan for 
Lebanon in 1971, where they linked up with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
(PFLP). JRA had money, also, from a series of bank and post office robberies. Kakusa had 
weapons obtained by robbing a gun shop in 1971. The URA formed out of a mutual desire to 
pool these resources and wage armed revolution in Japan, but significant differences marked the 
two sects: differences of class (the JRA boasted mostly middle-class youth, while Kakusa 
attracted the working-class students of technical colleges), ideology (the internationalism of JRA 
countered Kakusa's Maoism-inflected nationalism), and different activist cultures.7 Nagata based 
her criticism of Toyama on Kakusa's more explicit gender program, in which female members 
were to prioritize their identities as revolutionaries over their identities as women. In doing so, 
she touched on issues never discussed in the JRA. Toyama could not articulate a satisfactory 
response to Nagata, and Mori Tsuneo interpreted the incident as a call to ensure all members had 
overcome personal weaknesses and revolutionized from within.8 This eventually escalated into 
the torture and death of twelve of the young people—four of them female—at the hands of their 
friends and comrades. Patricia Steinhoff has described the stages by which what began as a 
consciousness-raising exercise became a deadly endeavor in her scholarly effort to understand 
URA members as humans, rather than the anomalous monsters the mass media made them out to 
be. In her account, Mori bears a great deal of responsibility for the intensification of efforts to 
"communalize" URA members. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Patricia Steinhoff, “Death by Defeatism and Other Fables: The Social Dynamics of the Rengō Sekigun 
Purge," in Japanese Social Organization, ed. Takie Sugiyama Lebra (University of Hawaii Press, 1992). 
8 Ibid., 199. 
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 In journalistic reports, however, no one came across as more monstrous than Nagata 
Hiroko, and the "Toyama incident" became in many cases a story of her female jealousy. Nagata, 
described by journalists as ugly, manly, and—they speculated—infertile attacked Toyama Mieko 
because Toyama represented a femininity unattainable to Nagata.9 A full accounting of the whole 
United Red Army incident, from the purge itself and the final confrontation between the police 
and five surviving male members on the run, to the media coverage that followed, goes beyond 
my current project. However, my research illuminates aspects of the misogyny that marked the 
URA. JRA leader Mori Tsuneo clearly feared the difference that marked women's bodies, at one 
point declaring his disgust for menstruation.10 The group assembled in the mountain lodge 
attempted to disrupt all kinship ties, and literally attacked the body of the soon-to-be mother 
among them, discussing how to separate the eight-month fetus from its "unrevolutionary" mother 
to raise it as a child of the revolution.11 When five male URA members armed with guns faced 
off against over fifteen hundred riot police in what became a massive media spectacle named for 
the mountain lodge, Asama Sansō, in which they holed up and took a housewife hostage, the 
police attempted to lure them out with the would-be revolutionaries' mothers. One young man 
shot at his mother.12 These events demonstrated also the power of the televised spectacle in 
Japan by 1972. If ever there was a single media event that unified the Japanese nation, this was 
it: "almost the entire nation" witnessed the final arrest of the radicals and rescue of the hostage 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Director Wakamatsu Kōji's 2007 film, United Red Army (Rengō sekigun), replicates this dynamic. 
Wakamatsu, famous for his leftist convictions and vast directorial experience in soft-core pornography, 
portrays Nagata Hiroko as a particularly brutal villainess fit for a horror film. 
10 Nagata Hiroko, Jūroku No Bokyō, vol. 2 (Tokyo: Sairyūsha, 1983), 128. 
11 Yoshikuni Igarashi, “Dead Bodies and Living Guns: The United Red Army and Its Deadly Pursuit of 
Revolution, 1971-1972," Japanese Studies 27, no. 2 (September 2007): 134. 
12 Ōizumi Yasuo, Asama Sansō jūgekisen no shinsō, vol. 2 (Tokyo: Kodansha, 2012), 100. 
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on television.13 This violent and masculine stand against state authority offered the extreme 
fringe of the New Left maximum public exposure, definitively associating leftist activism with 
violence. But it was the news of the internal purge, which emerged in March 1972, that truly 
marked the death of popular support for the New Left in general. The URA purge was not the 
only instance of sectarian violence, although most New Left infighting pitted rival sects against 
each other. Altogether, more students clashed with other students than they did with the police. 
Between 1968 and 1975, in the 1,776 internal factional disputes severe enough to merit police 
attention, 44 young people died and 4,848 more suffered injuries.14 The blood feud between the 
far-left sects Kakumaru and Chūkaku lasted for decades, but generally received less coverage 
than the actions of the URA. Part of this reflects the deep silence, sometimes forced upon former 
activists with threats of violence, surrounding issues of factional violence in the New Left after 
1972. One former activist told me about menacing calls he received on his home phone for many 
years after he left a far-left sect. He felt that they silenced not only his words, but prevented him 
from even being able to think about what had happened.15 However, the fact that the figure of 
Nagata Hiroko could so easily fit an emerging narrative about the dangers of women in positions 
of power certainly contributed to the infamy of her leadership and of the URA in general. 
 The violence conducted by the women of the URA under leadership shared by a woman 
threatened to smear all feminist activism in the 1970s. While Setsu Shigematsu's research 
explores efforts by radical women's lib activists, who attempted to use the occasion to understand 
the potential for female violence, many more feminists in the 1970s distanced themselves from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Shigematsu, Scream from the Shadows, 142. 
14 Patricia Steinhoff, “Student Conflict," in Conflict in Japan (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 
1984), 182. 
15 Kanō Akihiro, July 28, 2011. 
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New Left violence and the figure of Nagata Hiroko in particular. Ueno Chizuko, who later 
became a professor at Tokyo University and an prominent academic feminist, described her 
reaction as a young woman to the news of the URA purge: it convinced her that collective action 
was impossible.16 More conservative women intellectuals, dismissing the political gains of 
radical women's lib, continue to emphasize a completely non-confrontational history of female 
activism.17 Feminism never lost the taint of violence it gained in the early 1970s through 
associations both real and imaginary with groups like the URA. As Setsu Shigematsu points out, 
the mass media quickly exposed any ties between URA members and women's lib activists, 
suggesting that the feminist movement contained a deadly potential similar to that of the far-left 
sect.18 This conflation of feminist activism with far-left terrorism challenged the goals of radical 
women's liberation activists worldwide in the 1970s. As an example, a 9 January 1978 article in 
The New York Times paraphrased a female criminologist on the rise of women in far-left groups 
such as the Red Army Faction in West Germany, the Weather Underground in the United States, 
and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) to interpret "terrorist activity as [a] 
deviant expression of feminism."19 In the context in which feminists risked popular 
condemnation for radical activism, which by the 1970s was a global discourse, the choice on the 
part of many women's groups to insist upon an essentially "nurturing" feminine nature makes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Ueno Chizuko, “Hitori Ni Naru Koto," in Zenkyōtō Kara Ribu E, ed. Onnatachi No Ima O To Kai 
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sense. In contemporary Japan, popular stereotypes of women's lib continue to define feminism as 
"radical and harsh" or "radical and overpowering."20 
 However, the ideal of feminine nurturance can also become part of cultures of violence. 
The New York Times article on female terrorists included mention not of Nagata Hiroko, but of 
another Japanese woman involved in far-left extremism, Shigenobu Fusako, who in the late 
1970s headed the faction of Japan Red Army members that had hooked up with the PFLP in 
Lebanon. In May 1971, this faction of the JRA organized an attack on Lod Airport in Tel Aviv 
that launched the Japan Red Army and Shigenobu into the international arena of violent 
spectacle and terrorist fame. The JRA that relocated to the Middle East was careful to distinguish 
itself from the purge of the URA in 1972, and Shigenobu's public persona offered a dramatic 
contrast with Nagata's. Shigenobu was attractive and feminine; The Observer described her in 
1974 as "the lady terrorist with white gloves," less a "cold theoretician" than a "political tender 
heart."21 The "pre-battle ceremony" conducted by the JRA under Shigenobu's guidance in the 
1970s included a verbal oath delivered to a surrogate "mother and father" in a move that 
reformulated, rather than attempted to destroy, kinship ties.22 Shigenobu also portrayed herself as 
a manifestation of a self-consciously feminine revolutionary subjectivity. In her 1973 televised 
interview with Yamaguchi Yoshiko, Shigenobu spoke in unfailingly polite and feminine 
Japanese, brushing her long straight hair back from her modestly smiling face.23 A photograph of 
Shigenobu dressed in a cotton kimono and beaming at her cherubic baby girl, Mei, decorates her 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Laura Dales, Feminist Movements in Contemporary Japan (London: Routledge, 2009), 61. 
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22 Sam Jameson, “Woman Leader Tells Ritual," Los Angeles Times, August 9, 1975. 
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Kōran), and had performed in the United States as Shirley Yamaguchi, before she embarked on her career 
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slim memoir, written after her 2000 arrest.24 Nagata may have been terrifying for her 
"unfeminine" violent leadership, but Shigenobu terrifies as a femme fatale. If Nagata's mistake 
was attempting to outdo men's masculine poses of violence, Shigenobu represents the deadly 
combination of femininity and violence. 
 Indeed, the emergence of Shigenobu's brand of feminine global terrorism alongside 
women's liberation, both sprung from the ashes of the decimated New Left in Japan, undergird a 
powerful postwar narrative: that men, already the losers in the Fifteen-Year War, lost again in 
the wake of the defeat of radical activism. As the editor in chief of Japan's premier English-
language newspaper, The Japan Times, put it in a 1971 article on women's lib, "there is little 
from which women of Japan need to be liberated. This has been, in fact, an age of 'female 
supremacy' and if anyone needs liberation, it is the downtrodden, browbeaten men of Japan." In 
his view, Mishima Yukio's suicide affirmed a kind of postwar "men's liberation:" Mishima "died 
to restore masculinity for Japanese men."25 Statements like this affirm the postwar Japanese saw 
that, "After the War, only stockings and women got stronger." In some cases, the representative 
of the dissolved "great cause" of leftist activism in Japan becomes the young girl (shōjo). In a 
recent collection of the New Left journal Tōku made yukunda... (Going Far), the commentary 
concluding the volume of late-1960s essays is a contemporary meditation on, "What is the Party, 
Who is the Young Girl?" It traces a line between the dissolution of the unified left under the 
"Party" to the fragmented subcultures of contemporary Japan, as represented by the "young girl-
ization" of postwar (and "postmodern") Japan. This interpretation echoes the work of comic book 
editor and social critic Ōtsuka Eiji, who has written on the general "Young-Girl-ization" of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Fusako Shigenobu, Ringo ki no shita de anata o umō to kimeta (Tokyo: Gentōsha, 2001). 
25 Murata Kiyoaki, “Liberate Whom? Women's Lib Movement Unlikely to Take Roots in Japan," Japan 
Times, February 5, 1971. 
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various aspects of postwar Japanese culture, from the Emperor to the literary critic Etō Jun. 
Ōtsuka's interpretation of the URA purge, for example, centers around the radicals' attempts to 
eliminate any element of "cuteness."26 
 My project illustrates and analyzes how the postwar New Left in Japan, in practices and 
perceptions, perpetuated a gendered dichotomy that ultimately failed to question social class and 
its relation to politics. In examining how young women played various roles in the ostensibly 
"male" student movement, I show the interplay between ideas of femininity and masculinity and 
how they influenced perceptions and practices of the postwar student movement. However, I'd 
also like to underscore that the exceptionalizing of gender that took place within the New Left 
undermined left politics in Japan as well. The New Left's increasing insularity and stress on 
cultivating a street-combat subjectivity aligned with an emphasis on masculine homosociality.  
In light of recent street demonstrations in Tokyo to protest government handling of the ongoing 
nuclear crisis at Fukushima Daiichi and Prime Minister Abe Shinzō's administration's moves to 
flex the Japanese state's authority in military matters abroad, my story also offers a critical 
intervention. As the increasing numbers of memoirs documenting the "Zenkyōtō generation" line 
bookstore shelves in Japan, many of them express nostalgia for earlier struggles. I hope that my 
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